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ACCUMULATION MODEL PROCESSES OF  
HUMAN SUBORBITAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION  
INDUSTRY EMERGENCE 
Kenneth John Davidian 
ABSTRACT 
To respond to the research question, “by what processes do new industries emerge?”, the 
author identified different models of innovation development and industry emergence. 
Relevant streams of literature included economics, innovation, sociology, economic 
sociology, and institution theory. A functional goal innovation development theory, 
referred to as the accumulation model, states that many organizations, from both the 
public- and private-sectors, collect and accumulate resources in three major social 
functions. Previous research defined the model state-of-the-art at a high level of 
abstraction, identifying the three main components (industry infrastructure elements), 
depicted as separate boxes with arrows between them. This research uses grounded 
theory extension to identify microscopic processes, delving within and between the three 
macroscopic infrastructure elements. 
The industry context of this research was the emerging human suborbital space 
transportation (“space tourism”) industry. Data came from secondary sources, archival 
data, and primary sources. This research collected more than 8,400 pieces of secondary 
and archival data from news aggregator web sites, distilled them into approximately 600 
significant events, and categorized them within the accumulation model framework’s 
three main components: Institutional Arrangements, Resource Endowments, and 
Proprietary Functions. Industry structure and disruptive innovation studies provided 
additional analytical perspectives. Primary data, collected via 40 interviews of industry 
members, filled in and validated data gaps. The combined analyses resulted in a deeper 
understanding of the industry emergence process. Observations of the sequence of events, 
and of linkages between events and actors, allowed the author to propose a set of 
processes, describing how the accumulated industry resources resulted in industry 
emergence. Description of these processes required modifications to the original 
framework. Furthermore, this research analyzed a high-profile prize event that initiated 
the industry emergence, to propose a supplemental set of processes, describing how 
prizes influence industry emergence. 
The current research proposes that institutional activities contribute primarily to the 
accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy, and resource endowment activities contribute 
primarily to cognitive legitimacy. Both forms of legitimacy are a significant moderator of 
interactions between the three infrastructure elements. Furthermore, prizes positively 
contribute to sociopolitical legitimacy, positively moderate the creation of cognitive 
legitimacy, and positively moderate many steps in the business development cycle. The 
proposed processes identify the steps of legitimacy creation and industry emergence. This 
research provides new insights into the industry emergence and evolution processes, for 
entrepreneurs, managers, policy-makers, and for developing countries on the African 
continent. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For many years, some private citizens have dreamt of space tourism, the ability of 
buying a ride to space for personal reasons. Depictions of space tourism appeared in 
literature in the early twentieth century (Launius, 2016). In 2001 and 2002, these dreams 
became reality when an American and a South African (Dennis Tito and Mark 
Shuttleworth, respectively) each paid an estimated amount of 20 million the United States 
(U.S.) dollars (USD) to buy a round-trip ticket to and from the International Space 
Station (Rankin, 2003), despite objections on the part of the U.S. National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA). Tito’s experience proved that space tourism was 
possible, and Shuttleworth’s proved that demand for personal spaceflight was greater 
than just one person. These events impacted the legitimization effect on all types of space 
tourism, beyond the orbital space tourism market: 
“About the same time, tourism as a whole became validated in a different 
way by Dennis Tito plunking down money and being persistent enough to 
tough his way through NASA and get a ride to the space-station. The 
whole perception of tourism as a plausible market completely changed in 
2001 with those two events, and the previous conventional wisdom about 
what the market for new reusable spaceplanes was, had evaporated.” – 
Commercial Space Industry Executive 
To date, seven private individuals paid for eight personal trips to the International Space 
Station in low Earth orbit. For a ticket price that is 100 times less than what these orbital 
tourists paid, forecasts predict that thousands of individuals would buy a short flight 
aboard a suborbital vehicle, one that goes into space (greater than 100 kilometers high) 
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but doesn’t go into orbit (Futron Corporation, 2002; Tauri Group, 2012). The industrial 
capability to fly humans to orbit for governmental purposes has existed in the former 
Soviet Union since 1961, and in the U.S. since 1963. Vehicles capable of flying humans 
into space on a suborbital trajectory do not exist today, even for military or civilian 
governmental purposes. Consequently, there is significant activity in the private-sector to 
create a suborbital space tourism industry where one never existed before. In addition to 
suborbital tourism, scientists and their experiments can also benefit from these same 
vehicles. This research refers to the combination of both tourism and scientific market 
groups by a broader category name, the human suborbital space transportation industry 
(HSSTI). 
New industries don’t emerge frequently. Research shows, however, an increasing rate 
of new industry creation over time. This is welcome news to governments that pursue 
wealth and employment for their citizenry. New industries represent opportunity for 
growth and prosperity at the national, state, local, and individual levels. By understanding 
the processes by which new industries emerge, it may be possible for government and 
public leaders to concertedly and constructively accelerate one, some, or all of these 
processes, with the goal of creating a new industry. This research pursues an 
understanding of these industry emergence processes. 
1.1 PHENOMENON 
New industries come into being, seemingly out of nowhere (despite the fact that the 
underlying knowledge may have been in existence for many decades) before emergence. 
(Mensch, 1979). This research discusses the sources of industry emergence once it has 
begun by asking the fundamental question “how do new industries emerge?” Corollary 
1-Jun-18 4  
questions include “why do industries emerge so slowly?”, and “how can industry 
emergence be accelerated?”. 
1.2 THEORY 
The academic streams of literature relevant to this research include economics and 
innovation, innovation meta-theory, sociology and economic sociology, and institution 
theory. Each of these streams contributes in a distinct way to the research. Economic 
theorists originally formulated the concept of innovation as an engine of market 
dynamism (Schumpeter, 1939, 1947, 1983), and they later identified different types of 
innovation to explain observed changes in the economy, including growth, disruption, 
and the creation of new markets (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Christensen, 1997; 
Mensch, 1979; Utterback, 1994), also referred to as industry “emergence.” Sociology 
identifies the major functions of society (Parsons, 2005), and some models of innovation 
development use these functions as their structural foundation. Economic sociologists 
and evolutionary economists (Fligstein, 1996; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Parsons & 
Smelser, 1956) expand this framework, and emphasize the vital role of government in 
industry emergence (Capron, 1971). Finally, institutional theorists (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Tost, 2011) develop and expand important concepts that 
are vital to industry emergence, legitimation and legitimacy. 
There are many definitions of industry emergence. Gustafsson, et al. (2016) used the 
term to distinguish different industry emergence processes (including industry transitions, 
renewals, creation of niches, or actual emergence) and approaches (technologies, activity 
networks, markets, or industry identity). For the context of this research, the technology 
and identity of the new, unexploited industry were fairly well defined. Furthermore, some 
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of the actors already existed, but not with a focus on the new industry segment. A lack of 
incumbent firms already providing commercial services within the industry segment 
distinguishes the HSSTI as a new industry. This is consistent with the definition of a new 
industry used by this research. Another perspective on the definition of new markets is 
one which is not “inherently cannibalistic” (Christensen, 1997), meaning the growth of 
the new industry does not “eat” into the market share of any existing industry. Industries 
that experience “sustaining” or “low end” disruptive innovations (Christensen & Raynor, 
2003) by incumbents or new entrants are necessarily previously populated with 
incumbent firms that may or may not launch a competitive attack in response. The 
existence of incumbent firms prior to the disruption also infers the prior existence of the 
industry itself, and vice versa. Therefore, as stated above, it seems reasonable to define a 
new, or emerging, industry as one in which there are no incumbent firms. That is not to 
say that only de novo firms found new industries. It is possible that non-incumbent, de 
aleo firms diversify into the new industry, or are parents to the firm entering the new 
industry. Very generally speaking, however, all new industries are based on a special type 
or set of innovations. Innovations can be defined in many ways, including “the 
commercial or industrial application of something new – a new product, process, or 
method of production; new market or source of supply; a new form of commercial, 
business, or financial organization” (Schumpeter, 1983, loc. 230), or “an idea, practice, or 
object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers, 2003, 
loc. 667). Speaking more specifically, however, not all innovations result in industries. 
Mensch (1979) characterized new industries as being based on “basic innovations” which 
“open new realms of activity in the cultural sphere, [… and] create a new type of human 
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activity” (p. 36), and “establish new branches of industry and create new markets” (p. 
10). The characterization by Anderson and Tushman (1990) of an industry-creating 
innovation as “competence-destroying technological discontinuities” may or may not 
lead to an industry that meets the definition of “new” in this research, depending on 
whether incumbent firms adopt the innovation. Perhaps the best description of this 
special type of innovation is Christensen’s (1997) “new market disruptive innovation,” 
because the new entrants are pursuing an entirely novel performance metric. Given this 
definition of a new industry, a next logical question to answer might be “how often do 
new industries emerge?” 
When searching historical data for evidence of basic innovations, popular texts list 
many dozens of innovations throughout history (Johnson, 2010), and academic literature 
provide long lists of “basic” innovations (Mensch, 1979; National Science Foundation, 
1974). Not listed in these reports, however, are those basic innovations that did not lead 
to successful industry emergence (Milo, 2009). It may be that there are many more basic 
innovations if we included those industries that never successfully emerged. Therefore, 
empirical studies that count the number of basic innovations over time, may actually be 
basing the results only upon the number of successful new industries. Furthermore, the 
number of reported basic innovations includes both the emergence of new industries and 
the evolution of existing industries. Mensch (1979) presents the data for the number of 
basic innovations (which we infer to mean the number of successful industry emergences 
and evolutions) in Western economies between the years of 1740 and 1960, as shown in 
Figure 1 below. Anderson and Tushman (1990, p. 610) investigated four industries and 
tabulated nine “competence-destroying” innovations, emphasizing the point that not all 
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innovations lead to new industries. Therefore, historic data of successful industry 
emergence may suffer from left truncation bias, presenting us with the occurrence of 
successful basic innovations (those that resulted in successful new industries), and not the 
actual number of basic innovations. Also from 1740 to 1960, industry emergence is 
shown to be cyclic with approximately six basic innovations per decade, and with an 
increasing trend line over time (Mensch, 1979, p. 130). In other words, the rate of new 
industry creation or evolution was increasing over the period of study. A second study 
found the average number of basic innovations per decade, from 1953 to 1973, to be 3.5, 
approximately equal to the average number stated above (National Science Foundation, 
1974). Variation in the definition of basic innovations from one research organization to 
another may cause the estimated number of basic innovations of other studies to differ 
from these results. Therefore, the data shows that new industries emerge or evolve 
successfully on a fairly frequent basis, averaging one new industry every 18 months to 
three years.  
Figure 1. Frequency of basic innovations in Western economies, 1740 to 1960 
Source: (Mensch, 1979, p. 130) 
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 This research does not focus, however, on the reasons for, or frequency of, new 
industries emergence. This research focuses on the processes that enable successful 
industry emergence once the basic innovation development process has begun. 
Furthermore, this research is interested in exploring ways to encourage industry 
emergence processes. In practice, governments implement macroscopic- and 
microscopic-level policies to encourage new industry creation. Macroscopic policies are 
applicable to a broad range of industry segments, and include procurement, regulation, 
antitrust, patent and other policies affecting property rights on inventions, and general 
purpose instruments, including tax codes, monetary policy, price supports, and trade 
agreements (Nelson, 1982). Other macroscopic policies include encouraging increased 
participation by firms of different sizes, geographic regions, or economic sectors of 
society, and helping to change public perception, for example. Microscopic policies, 
targeting specific technologies or industry sectors, include research grants or contracts to 
specific organizations for significant and novel technology improvements, promoting the 
commercialization and diffusion of specific technologies and innovations, the creation of 
new businesses and technological communities, and prize competitions for specific 
accomplishments. 
Reflecting a technology-driven, Schumpeterian perspective (Krafft, Lechevalier, 
Quatraro, & Storz, 2014), and based on the definition that basic innovations are the 
foundation of industry emergence (Mensch, 1979), models of new industry development 
parallel models of innovation development. Innovation development is distinct from the 
innovation itself, and is defined as “the temporal sequence of events and activities that 
occur to create and transform basic scientific knowledge into commercially viable 
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products or services delivered to customers” (Van de Ven, 1993c, p. 214) . Innovation 
development meta-theory (theory about innovation development theories and models) 
was the focus of the Minnesota Innovation Research Program (MIRP), initiated in 1983, 
and was still on-going in 1990 (Poole & Van de Ven, 2000). Results of the MIRP 
identified three different models of innovation development that vary in their 
applicability based on the level of development of the institutional context, the degree of 
innovation novelty, the predetermination of the industry development path, and the 
“conceptions of control” (Fligstein, 1996) of an industry “end state.” The three classes of 
innovation meta-theory include theories of historical necessity, functional goal 
attainment, and emergent processes. For the problems that are the focus of this research, 
the industry environment contingencies of the evolving HSSTI favor the selection of a 
functional goal theory of innovation, incorporating Etzioni’s epigenesis model (1963). 
Functional goal theories are based on an industry’s levels of firm assertiveness, relative 
strengths of all actors, and the current set of circumstances. The HSSTI currently 
demonstrates characteristics of both dependent and accumulation roles within the 
industry, where a center of activity has not been well established, and the relative strength 
of industry firms in relation to external (typically government) actors is relatively weak. 
In light of the observation that the HSSTI internal actors have, for the most part, 
demonstrated responsible (rather than opportunistic) behavior with respect to the external 
actors, the dependence role is secondary to the resource accumulation role. 
One of the basic concepts upon which this research is based is that markets are not 
merely independent economic systems, but they are a part of larger social systems (Garud 
& Van de Ven, 1987; Parsons & Smelser, 1956). Literature reviews conducted by 
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Mowery (1985) and Thirtle and Ruttan (1987) demonstrate that, although a technological 
innovation focuses on the specific technical (scientific or engineering) details of a new, 
potential product at the microscopic level, innovations of “social, economic, and political 
infrastructure” (Garud & Van de Ven, 2000) are also required at the macroscopic level to 
ensure the product’s commercial success, and long-term viability of the new industry. 
The macroscopic foundation of the accumulation model is built upon the societal “system 
of action” (Parsons, 2005), and the four functional groupings, or “fundamental system 
problems under which a … social system operates,” including adaptation, goal-setting, 
integration, and latent pattern maintenance and tension management (Parsons & Smelser, 
1956, p. 18). These concepts are expanded in the field of economic sociology (Fligstein, 
1990; Parsons & Smelser, 1956; Swedberg, 2005). The accumulation model adopts three 
of these system functions, called industry infrastructure elements (IIEs), labelling them 
Institutional Arrangements, Resource Endowments, and Proprietary Functions (Van de 
Ven, 1993b), pertaining to the goal-setting, integration, and adaptation sub-functions, 
respectively. The accumulation model does not include the sub-function of latent pattern 
maintenance and tension management, corresponding to cultural sub-systems within 
society, because of its relatively immature state of theoretical modeling. Finally, 
institution theory literature also fed the development of the proposed process diagrams, 
adding phenomenological detail to the accumulation model. In these proposed processes, 
a dominant contributor that positively moderates the interactions between IIEs is the 
amount and type of legitimacy attributed to the new industry and its firms. Legitimacy 
research has strong roots in Weber (1978) and others, but multiple typologies were 
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created and expanded over the past 25 years (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 
2011). 
The accumulation model suggests that new industry emergence includes the 
performance of existing functions in new or (perhaps) more specific ways, and the 
creation of entirely new functions as well. The model attempts to answer questions 
regarding the order of new function creation, how they are created, and which actors are 
involved in their creation. The framework used in this study (Garud & Van de Ven, 2000) 
shows the required functions for industry development in a three-way process diagram 
(Figure 2).1  
Figure 2. Original accumulation model framework 
Source: (Van de Ven & Garud, 1993) 
Table 1 gives the complete taxonomy of this framework, listing all the first-, second-, and 
third-order elements. This is a listing of all the different resources and capabilities 
                                                 
1 The most recent literature (Van de Ven, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c) adopted the IIE label of 
“Proprietary Functions.” Early articles (Garud & Van de Ven, 1987, 2000; Van de Ven 
& Garud, 1989) referred to this function as “Instrumental,” and in later writings (Van de 
Ven & Garud, 1993), as “Technical Economic Activities.” 
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required for successful industry emergence according to the accumulation model. This 
research assesses the status of HSSTI industry emergence by accounting for each of these 
elements and components. 
Table 1. Original accumulation model taxonomy 
First-Order IIEs Second-Order Elements Third-Order Elements 
Institutional  
Arrangements  






Governance  Norms and Rules  Regulations 
 Laws 
Technology Standards  Government Regulatory Mandates 
 Cooperative/Voluntary Ind. Standards 






Financing and Insurance 
Arrangements 







 Recruitment and 
Training 










Innovation Network and 
Resource Channel 
Activities 





Market Creation and 
Consumer Demand 
 Marketing 
 Cultural Norms 
 Consumer Demand 
Source: (Van de Ven & Garud, 1989) 
The IIE framework was initially demonstrated using an historic event analysis (HEA; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994) of the cochlear implant industry (Garud & Rappa, 1994; 
Garud & Van de Ven, 2000; Van de Ven & Garud, 1993), and has been applied to 
contemporary industry contexts seven times since then, prior to this research. Analyses 
include market studies of over the counter financial derivatives, financial derivative 
standards, medical test equipment, medical supply storage, floor covering, business 
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school curricula, and nanotechnology. In the nanotechnology industry study, Woolley 
(2011b) used the model to extend the firm-level “liabilities of newness” concept 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) to the (macroscopic) community-level, proposing a “trifecta of 
burdens” faced by firms trying to build a new industry (Figure 3).  
1.3 PROBLEM 
New industries emerge and become viable by accumulating resources within all three 
IIEs. The individual and collective actions of actors from both the public- and private-
sectors contribute to resources accumulation. Interactions between IIEs affect the process 
of resource accumulation to overcome technology uncertainties, industry legitimacy, and 
the liability of newness (the “trifecta of burdens”). Understanding the processes that 
constructively mediate or moderate the accumulation of resources within the IIEs, and the 
Figure 3. Accumulation model macroscopic extension 
 
Source: (Woolley, 2013, p. 19) 
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interactions between IIEs, can help promote, assist with, and accelerate, new industry 
emergence. The current accumulation model requires more detail about the components 
and processes within and between each IIEs. To date, no prior research of the 
accumulation model has proposed a better phenomenological understanding of industry 
emergence processes at the microscopic level. 
This research extends our understanding of new industry emergence within the 
context of the HSSTI by asking the following questions: what are the processes within 
each IIE based on the emerging HSSTI case?, and what are the implications of common 
policy options to stimulate and accelerate the emerging HSSTI? This research attempts to 
answer these questions by proposing microscopic-level process flow diagrams that 
capture the effects of the accumulation model. By elaborating on the internal workings of 
the three IIEs, this research enables the understanding of how certain events, whether 
initiated by industry, government, or natural causes, may affect industry emergence. 
1.4 SETTING 
The HSSTI, an emerging space industry segment that intends to provide ordinary 
people with a commercially-available experience of space travel, is the context for this 
research. The U.S. government conducted supporting research for the HSSTI in the 1950s 
through the 1970s. More recently, the stimulus for the emergence of this industry was the 
Ansari X PRIZE competition. 
1.4.1 Industry Context 
When the X PRIZE Foundation announced the X PRIZE in 1996, many companies 
around the world signaled their intention to develop commercially-viable vehicles to 
safely fly ordinary humans to the edge of space and back. New HSSTI firms have 
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proposed many vehicle designs to date. Some designs look like traditional rockets (with 
capsules placed atop long cylinders, like the Saturn V or Soyuz launch vehicles) and 
others look like winged vehicles (similar to airplanes, or the Space Shuttle). Unlike the 
Saturn V, Soyuz, or Space Shuttle, however, these new vehicles are suborbital. The word 
“suborbital” describes the vehicle’s path, meaning it does not go fast enough to enter 
orbit around the Earth. Typically, a suborbital vehicle climbs into the sky under rocket 
power until the rocket shuts off. The vehicle coasts upward until it slows to a stop 
(primarily due to gravity), at which time it returns to Earth. This research focuses on 
vehicles intended to carry ordinary people to a minimum altitude of 100 kilometers (an 
approximate delineation between “air” and “space”).2 These vehicles must return to the 
surface of the Earth safely, under a parachute (for the capsules), or by flying or gliding 
back to a runway (for the winged vehicles). From the time the rocket fires until the safe 
return to Earth, the entire flight typically lasts between 15 and 30 minutes. 
Suborbital flights carrying people in rocket-powered vehicles in the U.S. began with 
the X-2 in 1956 and continued through the mid-1970s with the end of the X-24B 
                                                 
2 100 kilometers (km) altitude is the current definition of space from the Fédération 
Aéronautique Internationale (Sanz Fernández de Córdoba, 2016). During the X-15 
program, the U.S. Air Force used 80 km (or 50 miles) as the delimiting altitude. There 
is no universally accepted demarcation between air and space. 
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program.3 Two decades later, in 1996, the idea for a non-governmental industry of 
human, rocket-powered, suborbital flights was promoted with the announcement of the X 
PRIZE competition (Uhlenbrock, 1996). The goal of the competition was essentially to 
develop a prototype HSSTI vehicle that could be commercially viable. The vehicle had to 
be of sufficient size to carry three people, complete two successful flights within a two 
week period, and fly to an altitude of at least 100 km (Schwartz, 2004). The ten million 
USD prize purse was ultimately won by SpaceShipOne and the Scaled Composites team 
(led by famed experimental aircraft designer, Burt Rutan) in October, 2004 (Schwartz, 
2004). As a testament to the magnitude of this accomplishment, the spacecraft was never 
flown again, and is on display at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in 
Washington, DC (Hales, 2005). SpaceShipOne is currently hanging in the “Milestones of 
Flight” gallery, next to another prize-winning vehicle, Charles Lindbergh’s “Spirit of St. 
Louis.” 
As of December 2017, five suborbital vehicles have reached or surpassed the 
milestone of initial fabrication. Figure 4 shows photographs of four suborbital vehicles, 
including (clockwise starting from the upper left-hand corner) SpaceShipOne, 
SpaceShipTwo, New Shepard, and the Lynx Mark I (under assembly). Scaled 
Composites, Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin, and XCOR Aerospace designed and/or owned 
                                                 
3 Between the X-2 and the X-24B programs were flights of the X-15, HL-10, X-24A, 
M2-F3, and Project Mercury. NASA conducted Project Mercury, the only civilian 
program, and the U.S. Air Force conducted the rest. 
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these vehicles, respectively. 4 This analysis does not include firms who have designed and 
operated suborbital vehicles (including sounding rockets) to transport scientific payloads 
(both inert and animal), but not humans. These firms, including Armadillo Aerospace 
(which ceased operation in 2013), Masten Space Systems, Garvey Spacecraft, UP 
Aerospace, and others, may eventually enter the HSSTI, but have not done so to date. 
One firm that has built initial hardware but is not included in this study, Copenhagen 
Suborbitals, has been operating since 2008 with the goal of designing a vehicle to fly a 
single human on a suborbital trajectory in a rocket-powered vehicle. The reason for not 
including them in this analysis is because the company’s long-term public plans do not 
include commercial operation. Finally, even Elon Musk has included human suborbital 
flight as one of the possible business operations from his successful orbital space launch 
business, Space Exploration Technologies, more commonly known as SpaceX (Musk, 
2018). The first announcement of initial fabrication of his Big Falcon Rocket, however, 
only became public in late 2017, too late for inclusion in this study. Of the HSSTI 
operators included in this study, none has yet begun revenue-generating flights. There is, 
therefore, currently no direct evidence of HSSTI demand.  
                                                 
4 Although XCOR did not design it to fly to 100 km, this study includes the Lynx Mark I 
because of the important role XCOR played in HSSTI development, and because of its 
direct connection to the subsequent vehicle designed to achieve that altitude, the Lynx 
Mark II. Despite its inclusion here, however, XCOR suspended construction of the 
Lynx Mark I in May 2016 (Foust, 2016). The fifth HSSTI vehicle is the Rocketplane 
XP, not shown. 
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Figure 4. HSSTI vehicles as of December 2017 
1.4.2 Industry Analogs 
A brief discussion of possible analog industries to the HSSTI may demonstrate 
common or note-worthy characteristics of industry emergence. Transportation or high-
tech industries have been studied in the past to find “lessons learned” that may be 
applicable to different commercial space sectors (Hanson & Rosston, 2017; Launius, 
2014). This section is not an in-depth comparison with every possible industry, but is a 
cursory look, based on a limited number of sources for the selected industries. 
Comparisons are made below with the industry emergence of steamboats (Geels, 2002), 
railroads (Launius, 2014), automobiles (Rao, 1994), aviation (Capron, 1971; Launius, 
2014; Maryniak, 2001; Phillips, 1971; Stekler, 1967), and computers (Hanson & Rosston, 
2017). As a baseline, the HSSTI is a set of privately funded firms, engaged in a 
prolonged pre-production period of operations and testing, with limited support from the 
government. Substantial government-funded research, performed 40 to 50 years ago, 
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preceded the most recent activity. Even before it has begun commercial operation, the 
public perceives the HSSTI as being potentially unsafe, and only affordable for joy-
seeking rich people. There are no dominant HSSTI trade organizations or professional 
societies. In the U.S., the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Office of Commercial 
Space Transportation (AST) regulates the HSSTI. The regulatory framework for the 
HSSTI is well established, and the government policy is generally favorable and 
supportive of the industry. 
The steamboat industry emergence began in approximately 1780 with private 
construction of the first steamboats (Geels, 2002). Early steamboats were so inefficient 
regarding fuel (coal) consumption, they had little room for cargo. The result was that they 
could only survive commercially in areas with heavy traffic of passengers or mail, and by 
carrying high-value payload. Very early in the emergence process, the government 
assisted the industry by building canals and deepening rivers to allow for steamboat 
passage and operation. Military use of steamboats began in the 1820s, approximately four 
decades after the first experimental vehicles. Industry groups measured better 
performance as increases in “distance margin” (the distance below which steamships 
could compete with sailing ships), boiler pressure, and fuel (coal) consumption 
efficiency. Major improvements in propulsion systems (compound steam engines and 
screw propulsion) and iron construction occurred in the mid-1800s. Although countries 
had their own “Navigation Acts” that ensured country-run monopolies could not use 
privately-owned vessels, the sailing ship industry had previously established private 
ownership as a norm. This norm carried into the steamboat era, resulting in an industry 
that was privately funded, although government assisted, from the outset. 
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In 1829, the South Carolina Canal and Rail Road Company was the first operational 
railroad in the U.S. (Launius, 2014). The company received local and state government 
support, improving overland postal connections in the 1830s and 1840s. A philosophy of 
“build it and they will come” was prevalent within the new industry, as exemplified by 
the willingness of state governments to invest substantial amounts of money. For 
example, the state of New York invested $1.2 million USD (equivalent to approximately 
$5 billion 2010 USD) between 1837-1860. The federal government passed the Land 
Grant Act in 1850, transferring 21 million acres of land to the railroads in the Mississippi 
River valley by 1857. Railroad companies then raised capital to expand the new 
transportation system by selling these lands at a profit to willing buyers. 
Emergence of the automobile industry (Rao, 1994) occurred between 1879 and 1912. 
Construction of the first factory to build automobiles began in 1895, more than 15 years 
after the first hand-built cars appeared. The industry was entirely privately funded, and 
government support didn’t begin until 1908-09, with interest from the War Department, 
Post Office, and municipal governments. High purchase prices and frequent mechanical 
failures resulted in a public perception that these early vehicles were unsafe and merely 
playthings for the rich. The dominant design of a four-cylinder, gas-powered vehicle 
appeared by 1912. Weak trade associations, governmental organizations, and professional 
societies characterized the early automotive industry. 
Prior to the first flight of the Wright brothers’ Flyer in 1903, the U.S. government had 
invested approximately 100 thousand USD to the Smithsonian’s Samuel Pierpont 
Langley to develop similar technology, which ultimately ended in failure (Launius, 
2014). Subsequently, major development of the required technologies, and valuable 
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operational experience, was accumulated through approximately four dozen aviation 
contests conducted around the world prior to the First World War (Maryniak, 2017). In 
the U.S., the Army made their first purchase of a Wright Flyer in 1908, and ended up 
being a major customer, ordering 21,000 planes per annum by 1918 (Mowery & 
Rosenberg, 1982). In 1919, the government Army Air Service built 69 air fields for 
aviation operations, effectively establishing minimal initial infrastructure. The 
government was practically the entire demand market, however, as evidenced by a 
reduction of aircraft production in 1922 by over 98%, when the government stopped 
ordering planes after the war (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1982). Government-funded 
research, conducted under the auspices of the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics, had no private-sector influence from the time of its founding in 1915 until 
the late 1930s (Phillips, 1971). The government was the sole funder of engine 
development work conducted by private companies between 1919 and 1926. Passage of 
the Kelly Air Mail Act of 1925 created a government market for mail carried by air. 
Ultimately, an event that marks major acceptance of aviation as a mode of transport was 
the successful flight in 1927 by Charles Lindbergh to win the 25 thousand USD Orteig 
Prize with a non-stop crossing of the Atlantic, between New York and Paris:  
“Lindbergh’s flight and widely covered air tours made Americans air 
minded, setting off a vast aviation boom. Air mail surged, new air routes 
proliferated, aircraft manufacture increased, and passengers flocked to 
the airports. Overnight college students turned to careers in aeronautics. 
Investors, ever alert to the fresh new thing, poured millions of dollars into 
aviation research, development, and production. And in a very brief span 
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of time large new aviation companies formed colossal cartels that 
catapulted America’s air industry to world leadership.” (Kessner, 2010, p. 
xvii) 
Despite this heightened level of public acceptance, that could have led to a emergence of 
a commercial market, the government (military) controlled the aircraft industry after the 
Second World War, again comprising the vast majority (90%) of the market share, 
stimulating most of the technical advances within the industry (Capron, 1971), and 
possessing many of the manufacturing facilities until 1951 (Stekler, 1967). 
Finally, the computer industry (Hanson & Rosston, 2017) is presented as an industry 
analog although it is not associated with transportation. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, 
the U.S. government funded 100% of the research to build the computer industry in 
support of military applications (nuclear weapon development, radar systems, and the 
integration of sensor data for early warning systems). In the 1950s, the government still 
paid for a majority (60%) of the overall computer research funding. During this same 
time, however, the government funded 100% of transistor research. International 
Business Machines (IBM) was a major contractor to the government during these early 
decades, and was able to benefit by the public investment to accumulate private 
equipment, intellectual property, and valuable technical expertise. Although there was 
interest in computing by the private-sector as early as the 1940s (especially by the 
insurance industry), IBM didn’t introduce the first commercial (non-governmental) 
computer system until the 1960s. The IBM System/360 featured software compatibility 
(FORTRAN, matured by 1957). IBM introduced the System/370 in 1970. The first 
personal computers arrived on the market in 1975 (the Altair 880 and the Apple I), 
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followed by the Apple II, and the TRS-80, in 1977 and 1978, respectively. Apple had its 
initial public offering in 1980. 
This cursory discussion provides a basis of comparison of emergence characteristics 
between these five analog industries and the HSSTI. The HSSTI is emerging on the basis 
of private funding, like all the other analog transportation industries. Only the computer 
emerged primarily based on government funding. It is interesting to note that none of the 
analog industries were based on prior government research until the aviation industry 
emerged in the early 1900s. This coincides with the emergence of research “labs” for the 
purpose of systematizing the production of technological innovations: 
“the impact of these and other educational institutions on actual practices 
of research and the shape of American science was slim to negligible prior 
to the 1890s” (Mirowski, 2011, loc. 1340).  
Since the end of the 19th century, all the industries included here have benefited from 
prior government research, but that may be a result of the industries chosen in our analog 
study: 
“most of the successful [business-government] cooperative ventures in the 
past have been either for the government’s military or space exploration 
needs” (Chakravarthy, 1985, p. 259)  
Here, this cursory study notes that emerging industrialists used prior government research 
when it existed. All of the analog transportation industries were able to benefit from the 
private market of passenger carriage, and most had access to government contracts to 
carry mail. Only the automobile and aviation industries did not immediately receive mail 
contracts. The immediate demand of private markets in the 1960s facilitated the 
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emergence of the computer industry, in addition to the captive government customer. On 
the one hand, one can only speculate at this early stage of HSSTI emergence that it will 
have access to the private market, carrying private individuals on flights similar to the 
early aviation “barnstorming” activities. On the other hand, there does not appear to be 
any immediate military or civil government demand for the HSSTI. Finally, the repeated 
use of contests and prizes is shared by the early days of the automobile (Rao, 1994) and 
aviation industries (Maryniak, 2001).  
Table 2 gives a summary table of this discussion. At first glance, the HSSTI is clearly 
similar to the emergence of the aviation industry. Future comparative studies could better 
identify and clarify the emerging industry characteristics, and add more detail for each 
industry investigated. Also, this section only includes examples of successful industry 
emergence for this discussion. Future comparative studies could include other 
transportation innovations that have not yet achieved, or never will achieve, a broad level 
of adoption, including dirigibles and airships, submarine tourism, flying cars, moving 
sidewalks, hovercraft, and supersonic passenger aircraft (Milo, 2009). 























Steamboats 1780s Yes No Yes Yes No 
Railroad 1829 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Automobile 1875 Yes No No Yes Yes 
Aviation 1904 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Computer 1940 No Yes Yes Yes No 
HSSTI 2004 Yes Yes ? Yes Yes 
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1.5 THESIS ROAD MAP 
The rest of this thesis provides detail and description of the research introduced in this 
Introduction. Chapter 2 covers the literature review, providing more detail about the 
contributions of the different literature streams, introduced earlier in section 1.2. Chapter 
3 describes the research methodology and data collected in support of this research, 
justifies the methods employed, and addresses data transformations, robustness, and 
limitations. Chapter 4 presents research results, providing a comprehensive accounting 
for results in all three IIEs, including their second- and third-order elements. A discussion 
of the results is the topic of Chapter 5, divided into two parts. The first four subsections 
cover the results of the three IIEs and the linkages between them. The fifth subsection of 
Chapter 5 discusses the processes proposed in this research. The first six propositions 
pertain to processes within and between the three IIEs. The next four proposed processes 
are related to the effect of prizes on the initial set of industry emergence processes. The 
last section of Chapter 5 discusses the generalizability of these results to other industries. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the research conclusions, limitations and ideas for future 
research. A final section on general conclusions compares the results of this research with 
the basic tenets of the original accumulation model, provides responses to the “corollary” 
research questions asked here, and gives an explanation of practical implications of this 
research for new industry entrepreneurs, managers, policy-makers, and, finally, the 
African continent. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter introduces the main streams of academic literature that apply to this 
research, each contributing in a distinct way, as described below. An explanation of how 
this research fits into the integrated context of those themes follows. Finally, this research 
identifies and discusses eight past studies that relate to this research.  
2.1 MAIN ACADEMIC THEMES 
The main academic themes upon which this research draws include economics and 
innovation, innovation development meta-theory, sociology, economic sociology, and 
institution/neo-institution theory. The economic perspective provides the foundation for 
industry creation and renewal cycles, based on different types of innovations. The link 
between innovation and industry development provides the setting for the theoretical 
investigation of different types of innovation development, and how industry 
development models derive from them. The applicability of the functional goal category 
of innovation models to the chosen industry context leads us to the accumulation model 
of industry emergence and evolution, built upon the system of major social functions 
developed by Parsons (2005) and the epigenesis model of development (Etzioni, 1963). 
The result is an expanded notion of markets beyond purely economic systems, a 
perspective developed in the fields of evolutionary economics and economic sociology 
(Fligstein, 1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Parsons & Smelser, 1956). Finally, the 
discussion concludes with the field of neo-institution theory (with its roots traced back, 
again, to sociology), emphasizing legitimacy and its role in market emergence. 
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2.1.1 Economics and Innovation 
The word “innovation” is used both as a noun and a verb. As a noun, innovation 
pertains to items of novelty. There are different types of innovation, and special types of 
innovations can become the foundation upon which new industries are based. As a verb, 
the innovation process describes the path, or technological trajectory, by which the 
innovation evolves and the new industry emerges. This research focuses on the 
innovation process, rather than the specific innovation, but it is worthwhile to understand 
the types of innovations that may facilitate new industry emergence. 
Early definitions of innovation as a noun include “new products, processes, markets, 
resource sources or forms of organization” (Schumpeter, 1939, as cited in Wollin, 1996). 
Other definitions highlight the broad nature of innovation, including “an idea, practice, or 
object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers, 2003), 
or: 
“[a]nything that creates new resources, processes, or values or improves 
a company’s existing resources, processes, or values. Obvious innovations 
include new or improved products, processes, and services. New delivery 
mechanisms, customer service strategies, and business models are all 
other forms of innovation” (Christensen, Anthony, Roth, & Kaufman, 
2004, loc. 3672). 
Not all innovations, however, are capable of, or responsible for, the creation of new 
industries. Recognizing that such a broad spectrum of innovations do not all result in new 
industries, Mensch differentiated between “basic” innovations (those technological or 
non-technological activities “which establish new branches of industry” [Mensch, 1979, 
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p. 3]), and other types (radical improvement and pseudo-innovations). Disruption 
innovation theory (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor, 2003) includes an entire 
category of “new market disruptive innovations” to precisely define those innovations 
which may result in new markets. 
The innovation development process is defined as “the temporal sequence of events 
and activities that occur to create and transform basic scientific knowledge into 
commercially viable products or services delivered to customers” (Van de Ven, 1993a, p. 
26). Schumpeter (1947) introduced the concept of “creative destruction” to describe the 
cyclic nature of new opportunities and more efficient operations overcoming established 
means of production. From an innovation management perspective: 
“The process of innovation consists of motivating and coordinating people 
to develop and implement new ideas by engaging in transactions (or 
relationships) with others and making the adaptations needed to achieve 
desired outcomes within changing institutional and organizational 
contexts.” (Van de Ven, 1992, p. 223).  
At the industry level, this process is manifest by the replacement of established industries 
with emerging and evolving industries. Economic theorists originally formulated the 
concept of the innovation process as an exogenous engine of market dynamism 
(Schumpeter, 1939, 1947, 1983), defining it as: 
“the whole range of activities that are needed to translate a new idea into 
commercial practice for the first time. The innovation stage also includes 
identifying the market for a new product, investing in the capital goods 
needed for production and distribution, and raising the funds for that 
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investment” (Schumpeter, 1947, as cited in George, Joll, & Lynk, 2005, p. 
231).  
This definition was later extended through the identification of different types of 
innovations (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Christensen, 1997; Mensch, 1979; Tushman 
& Romanelli, 1985; Utterback, 1994). These models explain observed changes in the 
economy, including the creation, growth, renewal, and disruption of markets. 
Changes in technologies translate into changes in industries. Industry emergence is, 
therefore, a reflection of the innovation development process, since innovation is one of 
the bases for the creation and development of new industries. Utterback (1994) 
emphasized the connection between the development of innovation and industry:  
“Innovation is at once the creator and destroyer of industries and 
corporations. Over the years, new technologies have made industrial 
giants out of many upstart firms, invigorated older ones that were 
receptive to change, and swept away those that were not. Today, when 
competitiveness hinges on the ability to develop or adapt new technologies 
in products, services, and processes, understanding the dynamics of 
industrial innovation and change is essential for survival and success” (p. 
xiv).  
The connection, however, may not be well-understood or obvious, because Utterback 
(1994) starts the entire discussion by stating “the importance of technological innovation 
[to industry] has not been adequately addressed” (p. xiv). Finally, it’s important to realize 
that as an industry emerges and evolves, a progression of different types of innovations 
will develop. In support of the innovation process, technological innovations are the 
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foundations of new technological paths, or “trajectories” (Nelson & Winter, 1982). A 
new technological trajectory  
“diverges from and is often rejected by an existing industry because of its 
discontinuous rupturing effects on the established technological paradigm. 
Thus, to explain how this new technological trajectory develops, one has 
to start almost from the beginning to explain how a new industry is born” 
(Van de Ven & Garud, 1989, p. 202).  
Opportunities for national economic growth accompany technological change, including 
the growth of existing industries, or the creation of new industries (Adner & Levinthal, 
2002). The opportunities for increased economic growth and, therefore, an understanding 
of the overall industry emergence process, are of great interest to entrepreneurs, 
managers, and policy-makers. 
Based on this chain of logic, the emergence, evolution, and development of new 
industries, therefore, mirrors the emergence, evolution, and development of the 
innovation. Innovation development is a foundation of understanding industry 
development, so understanding different types of innovation is important as well. 
Although this study of industry emergence only focuses on the earliest stages of 
innovation development, understanding the development of multiple types of industry 
and innovation requires the development of theory about different innovation theories, 
referred to as innovation development meta-theory. 
2.1.2 Innovation Development Meta-Theory 
Innovation development meta-theory identifies three major categories of innovation 
development models, one of which (the functional goal category) includes the epigenesis 
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model (Etzioni, 1963). When applied at the industry or community levels for the industry 
context of this research, the epigenesis model is adapted to become the model of resource 
accumulation, as researched and described in the MIRP in 1989 (Poole & Van de Ven, 
2000). This model was initially demonstrated for industry emergence using an HEA of 
the cochlear implant industry (Garud & Rappa, 1994; Garud & Van de Ven, 2000; Van 
de Ven & Garud, 1993). Since that time, various researchers have used the accumulation 
model to contemporary industry contexts seven more times, as detailed below. 
Individual theories of innovation development as it impacts industry development, 
social change, or technological developments are plentiful and varied, including 
typologies of entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; Baumol & Strom, 2010; Spencer, 2004), 
the impact of technology consortia (Baumol, 2002), disruption innovation theory 
(Christensen, 1997; Christensen et al., 2004; Christensen & Raynor, 2003), the stimulus 
of innovation by economic recession (Mensch, 1979), the description of business cycles 
of different time scales (Schumpeter, 1939), the “creative destruction” phenomenon 
(Schumpeter, 1947), “punctuated equilibrium” (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985), the cyclic 
and sequential innovation of product and process (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
Utterback, 1994), and the “democratization” of innovation by end users (von Hippel, 
2006). Innovation processes that have been the subject of study have led researchers to 
conclude that no one theory can capture the high degree of “complexity and diversity” 
observed (Poole & Van de Ven, 2000, p. 660). Types of technological and innovation 
development are encompassed by Poole and Van de Ven (2000) within three “motors:” 
historic event, functional goal attainment, and emergent processes. Research that 
concentrates on industry development has a perspective that is quite broad and a long 
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time-frame. The level of analysis is global, with a focus on the larger “economic trends, 
social needs, the legal system, cultural norms, and long-term institutional arrangements,” 
and not on “micro ideas, decisions, actions, or events of particular developmental 
episodes” (Poole & Van de Ven, 2000, p. 643). The following paragraphs give a brief 
discussion of these three motors. 
Natural sciences of the nineteenth-century influenced social development theory, and 
developmentalism was the basis for the historical motor logic of innovation development 
(Nisbet, 1970, as cited in Poole & Van de Ven, 2000). Developmentalism proposed that 
the evolution of a social system must pass through a certain set of stages that are 
irreversibly time sequenced. As applied to social systems, creation from a defined starting 
point leads to a known set of phases, stepping through time, until achieving a 
predetermined end state. Although it may not be applicable in all industry development 
contexts, historical models of industry development are applicable in well-defined or 
highly-prescriptive (regulatory) environments. Furthermore, these types of models are 
best applied to industries experiencing incremental, or pseudo (Mensch, 1979) 
innovations. Research of the historic motor of innovation development, however, has 
shown little consistency of development phase sequence for most industries. 
Furthermore, boundaries between development phases are indistinct and do not follow 
regular sequences, resulting in the possibility of phases occurring multiple times (Poole 
& Van de Ven, 2000). 
In stark contrast to historical motor logic, emergent process models are highly 
relativistic, specifying neither development path nor desired end state. These models 
characterize innovations of extreme creativity or departure from industry norms, and 
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typically in undeveloped, or underdeveloped, institutional environments. The emergent 
process model can manifest itself in different ways, including the Marxian dialectic, 
Darwinian evolution, self-reinforcing cycles, and garbage can models (Poole & Van de 
Ven, 2000). The dialectic mode characterizes the creation of an innovation (a stabilized 
synthesis) as resulting from the interaction between an antithetical position that arises in 
response to the originally stable thesis (status quo). The evolutionary mechanism of 
variation-selection-retention (Aldrich & Ruef, 2002; Campbell, 1965, as cited in Greve, 
2005) is another emergent process mode of innovation creation. Self-reinforcing cycle 
modes are “interlocking action loops among interdependent people and organizational 
units” (Masuch, 1985, as cited in Poole & Van de Ven, 2000). Finally, the garbage can 
mode (M. D. Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) consists of serendipitous encounters to 
achieve innovative solutions to complex and dynamic problems, similar to what is 
described as an “adhocracy” (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2005). 
The intermediate category of innovation development meta-theory, the functional 
motor models, typically encompasses innovations of moderate degree, and although it 
does not make an assumption of historical necessity (as do the historical models), it does 
assume equifinality. Therefore, a specific development path of the industry is not given, 
but a desired end state of industry development is presumed (Poole & Van de Ven, 2000). 
A functional logic drives the innovation toward a stable end state through the 
accumulation of new resources and power over time, as in the epigenesis model of 
development (Etzioni, 1963). In an attempt to establish a unique identity, organizations 
within the innovating industry (i.e., internal organizations) must create and manage 
relationships with the organizations in the external environment. These functional goal 
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relationships depend on contingencies of innovation activity centrality, power balance 
(between the internal and external organizations), and degree of proactivity (or reactivity) 
on the part of internal organizations. The remainder of this section provides more detail 
in support of the accumulation model applied to this research regarding the contingencies 
mentioned above. The possible types of the functional motor model relationships will be 
described below, and include fortification, problem-solving, peer, accumulation, and 
dependence (Poole & Van de Ven, 2000), in the order of greatest to least level of 
dominance of the organizations within the industry with respect to the external 
organizations. 
When the internal organizations (typically the industry firms) are in a dominant 
position over the external organizations (typically the government organizations), the 
type of interaction characterizes the specific type of relationship. If the internal 
organizations are sufficiently independent so they can ignore the external organizations, 
functional motor theory refers to this relationship as the “fortification model.” If, 
however, internal organizations react to actions of the external organizations while still 
maintaining their independence and superior position of power, functional motor theory 
refers to this relationship as the “problem-solving model.” If the internal and external 
organizations possess similar levels of power, and the two groups treat each other as 
equals, then a “peer model” relationship develops, making decisions jointly in a collegial 
atmosphere, without a loss of independence for either group. In cases where the external 
organizations have decidedly more power in their relationship with the industry 
organizations, the internal organizations can choose one of two paths. Either the internal 
organizations may cede all power to the external organizations, demonstrating “reactive” 
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or “opportunistic” behavior, in what the functional motor theory refers to as a 
“dependence model” relationship. They may, however, demonstrate “responsible” or 
“productive” behavior, accepting their dependencies as a temporary condition, and 
striving to build the necessary relationships and capabilities, over time and sometimes in 
cooperation with other organizations within and outside the industry. The functional 
motor theory refers to this as an “accumulation model” relationship. The goal of 
accumulating these different resources is to increase the power of the internal 
organizations relative to the external organizations, striving for independence from the 
external organizations, toward the other relationships described above (Poole & Van de 
Ven, 2000). 
The industry context of this research is the U.S. HSSTI. Of the three broad sets of 
innovation theories, the functional motor category provides the most compelling lens 
through which to explore the development of the HSSTI, given the industry’s level of 
institutional support, the establishment of a desired industry end state, and the 
intermediate level of innovation. Furthermore, the accumulation model relationship best 
describes the collective actions and demonstrable level of positional power of the internal 
industry actors relative to the external environment of the HSSTI. Within the U.S., the 
legal structures that define the operation and interactions of HSSTI firms are well defined 
and mature. Although the norms and accepted practices for space activities were 
developed by an international treaty (US Department of State, 1967), specific regulatory 
regimes were left to each country. In many space-faring countries where space activities 
are only conducted by state owned enterprises, or hybrid firms (i.e., firms with partial 
state ownership) (Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, & Xu, 2015), the governmental 
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“authorization and continuing supervision” as required by treaty is conducted implicitly, 
through direct control and oversight of the firm’s activities (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & 
Wright, 2012). In the U.S., it is permissible for privately-owned firms (i.e., firms with no 
state ownership) to conduct specific space activities, including the launch and re-entry of 
space vehicles. In order to satisfy international obligations in response to the new private 
space activity that began in the early 1980s, the U.S. Congress created a regulatory office 
and framework (Commercial Space Launch Act, 1984) that has been periodically updated 
and modified (Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act, 2004; Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act, 2016). Although the HSSTI is still in a pre-production 
stage, having only taken “preorders” for future flights, and not yet having flown (and 
safely returned) a single customer, the existence of a regulatory framework also helps 
clarify the desired “end state” of a HSSTI that ensures the safety of the uninvolved public 
and property, and thereby maximizes the probability of safe flights for the paying 
customers (referred to in the regulations as human spaceflight participants, [HSPs]).5 The 
level of innovation of the HSSTI is “intermediate” because it is neither new nor high 
performing. U.S. military and civil (government) research organizations were flying a 
“suborbital trajectory” in a “suborbital vehicle” since the 1950s, as per definitions written 
                                                 
5 In the HSSTI, the FAA refers to people who pay to ride in the vehicle as HSPs, not as 
“passengers.” The latter term implies the guarantee of safe passage. Currently, all 
“reasonable” people assume that suborbital space flight is a risky endeavor, and none 
assume the guarantee of safe passage for HSPs. 
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into U.S. statute (Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act, 2004).6 For these reasons, 
the HSSTI is well-suited to be modeled by a functional goal motor of innovation 
development. Because they have not yet begun revenue-generating operations, the 
collective level of power of the HSSTI firms is lower than that of organizations in the 
external environment (i.e., regulatory agencies, military and civilian space organizations, 
etc.), despite having substantial financial resources. The HSSTI internal organizations are 
quite determined, however, to develop into an industry that can operate independently of 
the government (although servicing government customers is part of every HSSTI firm’s 
market strategy). This posture of the internal organizations clearly defines the internal-
external relationship as “accumulation,” and not “dependent.” 
The accumulation model is based on a theory developed to describe the emergence of 
supra-national organizations. The theory originated from two mutually exclusive 
perspectives applied to the development of social groupings (including elites, families, 
and underdeveloped countries), the socialization process, and industrialization (Etzioni, 
1963). The first model, preformism (or differentiation), contends that an embryonic form 
of the group or process of interest possesses primitive versions of all the capabilities, 
                                                 
6 Quoting directly from the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act (2004): 
“‘suborbital rocket’ means a vehicle, rocket-propelled in whole or in part, intended for 
flight on a suborbital trajectory, and the thrust of which is greater than its lift for the 
majority of the rocket-powered portion of its ascent,” and “‘suborbital trajectory’ means 
the intentional flight path of a launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, or any portion thereof, 
whose vacuum instantaneous impact point does not leave the surface of the Earth.” 
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resources, and processes it will ultimately require in its fully mature form. The 
development of these capabilities and resources grow and mature as does the social 
grouping or process. The second model, accumulation (or epigenesis), rejects the 
assumption of preformism, and assumes the lack of critical capabilities and resources in 
the embryonic form of social groups. These capabilities and resources, however, 
accumulate over time, in various ways, as the social grouping grows and matures. 
Furthermore, an emerging industry, the social system of interest to this research, does not 
exist as an independent entity, but is hierarchically embedded within larger social 
systems (Granovetter, 1985). Within the emerging industry, a structure of subordinate 
subsystems will emerge which possess capabilities to perform functions required as the 
industry matures. The early work in economic sociology by Parsons and Smelser (1956) 
identify a model that includes “latent pattern-maintenance and tension-management, 
goal-attainment, adaptation, and integration” as the four general categories of required 
functions of a social system. Ruttan and Hayami (1984), adopted this general model, and 
relabeled the four categories as cultural endowments, institutions, technology, and 
research endowments (respectively) to describe institutional innovation. Figure 5 shows 
the two models side by side. Omission of the first function category listed above, latent 
pattern-maintenance and tension-management, is a recognized limitation of the 
accumulation model, as noted by Ruttan and Hayami: 
“We also insist on the potential significance of cultural endowments, 
including the factors that economists typically conceal under the rubric of 
tastes and that political scientists include under ideology. … Until our 
colleagues in the other social sciences provide us with more helpful 
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analytical tools, we are forced to adhere to a strategy that focuses 
primarily on the interactions between resource endowments, technical 
change, and institutional change” (1984, p. 218). 
The latter three of these functions were characterized by subsequent researchers as 
proprietary functions, allocation of resources, and institutional arrangements, respectively 
(Van de Ven, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c; Van de Ven & Garud, 1989). This trio of subsystems, 
“has been a common theme underlying structural descriptions of complex organizations 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967), corporations (Porter, 1985), and 
interorganizational networks (Van de Ven, Emmett and Koenig, 1974; Aldrich & 
Whetten, 1981)” (Van de Ven & Garud, 1989, p. 222). Figure 2 on page 11 shows the 
resulting model used in this research. 
Figure 5. Two social system functional models 
Source: (Parsons & Smelser, 1956, p. 68) 
 
Source: (Ruttan & Hayami, 1984, p. 216) 
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These three functional categories are also referred to as IIEs (Garud & Van de Ven, 
2000; Van de Ven, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 2005, Van de Ven & Garud, 1989, 1993). The 
first IIE, Institutional Arrangements, includes second-order elements of Legitimation, 
Governance, and Technology Standards (Van de Ven, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). The second 
IIE, Resource Endowments, includes second-order elements of Scientific and 
Technological Research, Financing and Insurance Arrangements, and the Human 
Competence Pool. The third IIE, Proprietary Functions, includes second-order elements 
of Technological Development Functions, Innovation Network and Resource Channel 
Activities, and Market Creation and Consumer Demand. Each of these nine IIE second-
order elements has its own set of third-order elements, as shown in Table 1 on page 12. 
For long-term industry viability, these first-, second-, and third-order elements all need to 
develop through the cooperative or unilateral contributions by the internal and external 
organizations of the emerging industry. This is a basic description of the innovation 
development functional model’s accumulation relationship.  
Each IIE is built by the firms within the industry acting as innovation units, and by 
other industry actors that are commonly perceived as being outside the industry (Van de 
Ven & Garud, 1989). In extreme cases of relatively large financial endowments upon 
entry, individual firms may be able to build some components of the Proprietary 
Functions IIE by themselves, but in many cases, an industry collective will encourage 
cooperative efforts between multiple firms to help construct other parts of the Resource 
Endowments and Institutional Arrangements IIEs. Similarly, external actors may execute 
unilateral actions that affect the industry (e.g., government mandated standards). In other 
cases, however, these same external actors will cooperate with the industry firms or 
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industry groups, as in the case of regulation development that requires some period of 
time to encourage feedback from industry members on the economic impact and 
operational constraints the proposed regulations may cause and incur. The process is 
referred to as “boundary obfuscation,” or blurring of the boundaries (Woolley, 2013), 
whereby one actor helps build many elements of the industry infrastructure, or where 
many actors help build a single element.  
Within the structure of these IIEs, there are many linkages between all the industry’s 
elements and firms. First, between the first-order elements of Resource Endowments and 
Proprietary Functions, there is a linkage that drives the development of new technology 
(“technology push”). This process of adapting research to create a product is described as 
“a long, complex, and uncertain journey that amounts to being an interactive search 
process involving large amounts of ‘backing and forthing’ between technology and 
market conditions in efforts to reduce uncertainty” (Stobaugh, 1985, as cited in Garud & 
Van de Ven, 2000, p. 494). Although research commonly precedes most of the IIE 
subsystems, the commercial application of research is not a well understood 
phenomenon, setting the stage for the second linkage. Between the Institutional 
Arrangements and Proprietary Functions IIEs, the linkage drives certain technological 
developments (“technology pull”). Industry standards force firms to decide whether to 
cooperate or compete in what is commonly an exercise charged with political tension. 
Government regulations and/or industry trade groups can mandate standards if industry 
consensus is not possible. Industry consensus requires collaborative efforts between new 
entrant firms, and these “exploratory” alliances (Rice & Galvin, 2006) typically occur 
during the early stages of industry emergence. Between firms, a large number of market 
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and relational ties are formed, including “exchanging multiple resources, communicating 
with other firm representatives on industry and trade committees, sharing common pools 
of knowledge, acquiring personnel trained and socialized in a common pool of 
competence, friendship and kinship ties, and overlapping board memberships” (Van de 
Ven, 1993b, p. 224). 
2.1.3 Economic Sociology 
In this thesis, the role of economic sociology, and its foundational science, sociology, 
permits the treatment of emerging industries within a wholistic environment of economy, 
society, and polity (Parsons & Smelser, 1956). There are many differences between 
economic sociology and “pure” economics, but many of these trends are changing in both 
fields. Even within the confines of economic theory, attempts by theorists to describe 
dynamic phenomenon (including business cycles and new firm creation) has forced the 
reconsideration of many simplifying assumptions. Economic sociology also appreciates 
the role of government to provide an environment of stability and resource munificence, 
despite strict interpretations of classical and neo-classical economics. However, through 
the lens of economic sociology (instead of economics alone), the contextual description 
of industry emergence is vastly more complex. The economic sociology perspective can 
better reflect the realities of industry emergence, because of its broader scope of 
influencing factors, and the greater variation of possible actors’ reactions and behaviors. 
There are many important differences between economics and economic sociology. 
The concept of the economic actor in economics is a disconnected individual. The 
individual focus, originating in early utilitarianism and political economy, was later 
referred to as “methodological individualism” (Smelser & Swedberg, 2005a). Economists 
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assume rational action, defined as the efficient use of scarce resources, based on an 
actor’s stable preferences and the maximization of utility. To economists, economic 
choices are determined by utility and price, made during an interaction between equals. 
Market power to economists is vital in the study of imperfect markets, labor economics, 
and industrial economics. Economists do not consider the influence of social groups or 
institutional actors on the individual actor’s decisions, and focus primarily on markets. 
Society is a peripheral region to this central focus, assumed to be stable and, therefore, 
neglected. Economists assume norms and institutions do not exist. Economists emphasize 
predictive capabilities, and, therefore, the creation of formal, abstract, analytical models. 
Economists perceive descriptive analysis as being too atheoretical, and ignoring real data. 
The data upon which the economists rely, however, is created by and for themselves to a 
large degree. 
The analytical starting point for economic sociology, on the other hand, is with 
groups, institutions, and society. Sociologists (such as Weber) describe many types of 
actions, such as rational, traditional, or affectual. Rationality to sociologists is a variable. 
To sociologists, objects have historically developed meaning. Hence, economic decision-
making cannot be made without empirical investigation. The economic concept of power 
in sociology is very broad, and the power relationship between trading parties is also a 
variable to consider. Social groups and institutional actors, the position of an individual 
in society, and cultural meanings, all influence the individual actor’s decisions. 
Sociologists embrace description as interesting and essential in theory building, and they 
tend to state facts and events after they have happened. Sociologists also tend to embrace 
many types of experimental methods and data. 
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As early as the first half of the twentieth century, it was recognized that economics 
was thought to be “a science sufficient unto itself,” but at the same time, “economics 
must lean on the other social sciences, both on the theoretical and empirical levels, as 
they also must lean on it” (Parsons & Smelser, 1956, p. 1). There are important reasons 
why the study of markets should be seen as more than uniquely economic systems. When 
investigating a phenomenon that is dynamic in nature, the need to examine alternative 
influencing factors from non-economic sectors of society is particularly vital, due to the 
assumptions of equilibrium made in the classical and neo-classical formulation of 
economics.  
In the case of emerging industries, economic sociology asserts that there is an 
important role for government to play. “The protection of infant industries - one of the 
few effective arguments against the classical case for free trade - involves a similar input 
of encouragement balanced by an output of productivity” (Parsons & Smelser, 1956, p. 
93). Governments provide the necessary environments for markets to exist (Fligstein, 
2001). “Stable markets are like sand castles” (Fligstein, 2001, p. 90), and to think that 
markets could thrive and endure without governmental involvement, “is simply wrong” 
(Fligstein, 2001, p. 6). Intuitively, building a sand castle through public-private-sector 
cooperation must be more efficient and take less time than if either did it alone, or worse 
yet, in conflict between the two. 
The government is not the only non-economic actor in the construction of a new 
industry. The accumulation model used in this research builds upon a foundation of the 
societal “system of action” (Parsons, 2005), and the four “fundamental system problems 
under which a … social system operates,” adaptation, goal-setting, integration, and latent 
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pattern maintenance (Parsons & Smelser, 1956, p. 18). Goal-setting is the function of 
“polity” (performed by a group of actors not limited only to government), adaptation is 
the role of the “economy” (performed by a group not limited solely to private-sector 
actors), and integration is a function of matching resources to the economy to achieve 
goals set by the polity. The accumulation model adopts these three system functions, 
labelling them Institutional Arrangements, Proprietary Functions, and Resource 
Endowments, respectively. The fourth social function, latency (pattern maintenance and 
tension management), corresponds to cultural sub-systems within society. The 
accumulation model does not include the latency function, because of the latter’s 
immature state of theoretical understanding. 
2.1.4 Institution Theory - Legitimacy 
All these literature streams fed into this research project in the development of 
proposed processes that add microscopic-level phenomenological detail to the 
accumulation model. In these processes, a dominant contributor that positively moderates 
the IIE interactions is the amount and type of legitimacy attributed to the new industry 
and its firms. Legitimacy research has strong roots in Weber (1978) and others, but 
multiple typologies were created and expanded over the past 25 years (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). 
Building on Weber’s (1946) initial discussion of authority (rational, traditional, and 
charismatic) and legitimacy based on conformity with norms and laws, and subsequent 
discussion in 1956 by Parsons (2005) based on alignment with values, norms, and social 
laws, the new institutional theory of the late 1970s initiated a resurgence of theoretical 
investigations, beginning to differentiating different types of legitimacy (Meyer & 
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Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977). By the mid-1990s, scholars discussed descriptive types of 
legitimacy in different ways. One typology proposed by Aldrich and Fiol (1994) 
differentiates between cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy 
refers to society’s subconscious acceptance of an activity or its “taken-for-grantedness” 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Sociopolitical legitimacy refers to 
“the extent to which a new form conforms to recognized principles or accepted rules and 
standards” (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994, p. 646), or a “formal legal standing, as coded in laws, 
charters, regulations, and so forth” (Ranger-Moore, Banaszak-Holl, & Hannan, 1991, p. 
37). Scott’s categories included normative, cognitive, and normative legitimacy.7 A fine-
grained categorization scheme exists, such as Suchman’s 12-part typology of legitimacy 
(1995), including three types (pragmatic, cognitive, and moral), two time-frame elements 
(episodic and continual) and two focus areas (organizational actions and organizational 
essences). A later study by Tost (2011) combined institutional and social psychology 
theory to identify four non-exclusive dimensions of legitimacy: instrumental (“rooted in 
the self-interest calculations of individuals or groups”), cognitive (“taken-for-
                                                 
7 Scott (1995) defines normative legitimacy as “grounded in a social context and to be 
oriented by a moral dimension” (p. 51), cognitive legitimacy is define as “widely held 
beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions that provide a framework for everyday 
routines, as well as the more specialized, explicit and codified knowledge and belief 
systems promulgated by various professional and scientific bodies” (p. 53), and 
regulatory legitimacy is defined as complying with the governance systems’ “codes, 
norms, and rules” (p. 54). 
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grantedness”), regulative (“the validity of an entity”), and moral (“the extent to which the 
entity conforms to moral values and ethical principles”) (p. 692). Although no one 
typology is necessarily superior to any of the others, researchers need to make a selection 
for the purposes of their study. A translation table (see Appendix A on page 220) between 
the different typologies of legitimacy, based on similarities and parallels between them, 
allows researchers to convert from their selected typology to any of the others. This study 
utilizes the two-part typology by Aldrich and Fiol (1994), distinguishing cognitive from 
sociopolitical legitimacy. 
2.2 RESEARCH FIT WITHIN THE LITERATURE 
The research performed in this thesis identified the contributions by actors in the 
HSSTI to each of the IIEs discussed above. Specific events, defined as “an incident when 
change occurred” in each of the IIEs (Van de Ven & Garud, 1993), were tabulated and 
chronologically sequenced to construct an industry emergence chart for the HSSTI to 
date. The expanded IIE framework, shown in Table 1 on page 12, proved to be robust and 
comprehensive, requiring only minor modification to include the identified HSSTI 
events. This research made changes to the framework only when needed, primarily at the 
second- and third-orders of the outline structure. The most substantial modification made 
was at and beneath the original second-order element of Financial and Insurance 
Arrangements, in the Resource Endowments IIE. This research found the original 
second-order emphasis on insurance arrangements overly specialized to the industry 
context that supported its creation (i.e., the cochlear implant industry), thereby limiting 
the generalizability of the framework. At the third-order level, this research modified the 
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original framework elements of public- and private-sector investments to allow for 
nuanced differences of investment types observed in this study.  
In summary, the relevant literatures that contribute to this study include economics 
with an emphasis on the innovation process (Christensen, 1997; Christensen et al., 2004; 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Mensch, 1979; Schumpeter, 1939, 1947, 1983), the 
literature stream that became the accumulation model of innovation development (e.g., 
Etzioni, 1963; Poole & Van de Ven, 2000; Van de Ven & Garud, 1989; Woolley, 2013), 
sociology, and particularly the theory of action systems (Parsons, 2005), the subsequent 
outgrowth to economic sociology and evolutionary economics (Fligstein, 2005; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Parsons & Smelser, 1956; Smelser & Swedberg, 2005b), and another 
subsequent domain of legitimation theory (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Parsons, 1963; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011; Weber, 1946; Zucker, 1977), 
based on institution and neo-institution theory. Figure 6 shows the confluence of these 
literature streams. In brief, the economic and innovation literature identifies the “creative 
destruction” process, whereby new industries are created through the process of 
innovation (Schumpeter, 1947), although only a certain type of innovation results in 
industry emergence (Christensen, 1997; Mensch, 1979). Mensch (1979) also describes an 
observed lag in time between an industry’s first scientific inventions and its first 
commercial implementation, the “seniority principle,” that can last as long as 100 years. 
The length of time required for an industry to emerge is a function of its development 
path, which is dependent upon many factors. There are three main types of 
innovation/industry development models (Poole & Van de Ven, 2000), and the one that 
best fits the industry context of this research, within the functional goal model category, 
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is called the accumulation model (Garud & Van de Ven, 2000), based on the epigenesis 
model proposed by Etzioni (1963). A basic tenet of economic sociology, and the 
accumulation model, is that the market is not a purely economic system, but an integrated 
social system (Fligstein, 2005; Parsons & Smelser, 1956). All industry actors (public- and 
private-sector) helped construct all three IIEs of the integrated social system. The 
construction and establishment of legitimacy ultimately facilitates the interactions 
between the three IIEs, and this helps accelerate industry emergence. 
Figure 6. Relevant literature streams 
2.3 CONTEXT OF OTHER STUDIES 
This research study portrays the emerging market as a social system, using the 
functional goal motor and accumulation model to characterize the predominant industry 
(and innovation) development. To find other studies that employed this same model, a 
search was conducted within publications and articles that cite the originating and related 
works of the innovation meta-theory (Van de Ven, Angle, & Poole, 2000) and the 
accumulation model framework as applied to the cochlear implant industry (Garud & 
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Van de Ven, 2000). Based on literature searches using multiple keywords,8 eight 
additional research studies employed this framework. Listed chronologically as they 
appeared in print, these analyses include case studies of financial derivatives (Rusinko & 
Matthews, 1997), the American film industry (Mezias & Kuperman, 2001), umbilical 
cord blood banking (Rusinko & Sesok-Pizzini, 2003), standard setting for over the 
counter derivatives (Matthews & Rusinko, 2005), nanotechnology (Woolley, 2007, 
2011b; Woolley & Rottner, 2008), the incorporation of environmental practices in the 
U.S. carpet industry (Rusinko, 2010), the introduction of sustainability into Australian 
business schools (Benn & Rusinko, 2011), and human papilloma virus (HPV) molecular 
diagnostic tests (Rotolo, Hopkins, & Rafols, 2012). The remainder of this section briefly 
describes the original study that defined the accumulation model framework, and the 
additional studies that employed it. As a side note, different authors refer to the 
framework of three IIEs by different names. Rusinko and her collaborators (2005; 
Rusinko, 2010; 1997; 2003) call it the “technological community framework,” Woolley 
(2007, 2011b) called it a “framework for industry emergence,” and both Mezias and 
Kuperman (2001) and Rotolo, Hopkins, and Rafols (2012) refer to it as the “social system 
framework.” This research refers to this framework as the “accumulation model.” 
The original accumulation model study was conducted as part of the MIRP (Van de 
Ven & Poole, 2000), for which, researchers performed longitudinal case studies of 
                                                 
8 The keywords used were the names of the three IIEs that are key to the framework, 
“institutional arrangement” AND “resource endowment” AND “proprietary function.” 
Any study employing this framework would include all three of these terms. 
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multiple industries, at multiple levels of analysis, each undergoing different stages and 
kinds of innovation. These studies were based on a common framework that allowed 
cross-case comparisons with the goal of developing innovation meta-theory. Research of 
the cochlear implant industry emergence (Garud & Van de Ven, 1987, 2000; Van de Ven 
& Garud, 1993) was the case that most closely resembled this research’s focus, the 
HSSTI emergence. The cochlear implant study included an HEA (as was performed in 
this research), developed the original accumulation model framework (presented in Table 
1 on page 12), and described three phenomena observed between IIEs. 
Ten years before the Great Recession, Rusinko and Matthews (1997) employed the 
accumulation model framework to characterize the evolution of the financial derivatives 
market. The financial derivative community consists of the product providers (financial 
institutions), consumers (corporate and individual investors), trade organizations, and 
regulators. This study traces the evolution of derivative markets from its theoretical 
beginnings at universities, through its operationalization by the efforts of highly educated 
“financial engineers.” Insufficiently educated and informed managers oversaw the sale of 
products by their employees. Some (but not all) of the derivatives benefitted from 
regulatory oversight and standardization through the efforts of industry groups. The 
consumers who bought these products had a wide range of investing experience and 
savvy. “Breakdowns” of the industry (as indicated by losses to consumers of financial 
derivatives in the 1991-1995 timeframe) were due to gaps or significantly different levels 
of IIE development across the community of actors. Such gaps include large securities 
and commodities firms that traded customized, over the counter derivatives, unregistered 
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with the appropriate regulatory agencies.9 Other gaps included the lack of appropriate 
education for managers and insufficient management controls, reducing their ability to 
properly understand the levels of risk represented by the products their sales force was 
selling. The design of incentive structures for sales people at the financial product 
companies encouraged increased levels of risk taking. In each identified case of 
institutional, resource, or proprietary gaps, the authors described the impact upon the rest 
of the framework system. These gaps were faults in the community-level performance 
that accumulated and combined until industry performance failed (as measured in losses 
to consumers). In essence, this study highlights the opposite of resource accumulation 
being a central element in successful industry performance, in the sense that “gap 
accumulation” can result in industry performance failures. Although this study focuses on 
framework gaps of an established industry, and not on industry emergence during the 
predominant phase, the observation of similar IIE resource development levels is 
pertinent to the present study. 
Mezias and Kuperman (2001) employed one of the IIEs of the accumulation model 
framework (Proprietary Functions) to develop a community dynamics model of 
development, expanding the definition of entrepreneurship, and exploring the collective 
nature of industry emergence, at the industry population and community levels. 
Furthermore, the authors identified an expanded scope of constructive organizational 
behaviors that benefit the innovation (and industry emergence) processes, including the 
                                                 
9 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Commodities Future 
Trading Commission. 
 53 1-Jun-18 
creation of innovating firms, the creation of imitating firms, firms that innovate 
internally, and firms that imitate successful behaviors through internal change. The 
authors also noted that innovations at the community or population levels could affect 
other members of related communities or populations. This expands the opportunities for 
industry emergence for the firm, because they may be able to focus their efforts outside 
the population or community to which they belong. 
In the next study, the accumulation model framework was used to analyze the 
emergence of a market for umbilical cord blood banking (Rusinko & Sesok-Pizzini, 
2003). As with the previous case, this study did not extend the accumulation model, and 
findings included confirmation that gaps, or underdeveloped portions of the framework, 
could cause undesirable conditions for industry emergence. Identified issues included 
“product quality problems, product failure, loss of funding, negative press, litigation, 
financial losses, and ultimately, failure of the innovation or new technology” (Rusinko & 
Sesok-Pizzini, 2003, p. 417). Additionally, gaps in one IIE could create additional 
challenges and problems in the others via the IIE interactions. 
A second study of financial derivatives was undertaken by Matthews and Rusinko 
(2005). In 2004, the demand for over the counter financial derivatives was strong, but the 
regulatory constraints were not. Again presaging the Great Recession, the authors used 
the accumulation model framework to analyze this new market. Their conclusions 
described the need for industry members (risk managers, specifically) to become active in 
the community of traders to ensure the use of the best technologies in support of, and to 
set risk standards on these financial instruments. As with the other publications by 
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Rusinko, this study employed the accumulation model framework as an analytical tool, 
and the objective of the work did not include a theoretical extension of the model. 
Of all the studies that incorporated the accumulation model framework, the most 
comprehensive and thoroughly presented among them was conducted by Woolley in her 
analysis of the nanotechnology industry (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2013, 
2014; Woolley & Rottner, 2008). Through the analyses of the nanotechnology industry 
emergence, accumulation of the IIE resources was shown to be accomplished through the 
activities of individual actors who contributed to multiple elements of the framework, and 
by the coordinated efforts of multiple actors to individual framework elements, a 
phenomenon Woolley calls “blurring of the boundaries” (Woolley, 2013). Furthermore, 
as shown in Figure 3 on page 13, the “liability of newness” faced by individual firms is 
only one of a “trifecta of burdens” facing the industry or population (Woolley, 2011b). In 
contrast to the microscopic perspective taken by the present research, Woolley’s studies 
focus on the influence of the macroscopic entrepreneurial environment on high-
technology industry emergence. 
Next, Rusinko (2010) examined the adoption of environmentally sustainable practices 
in the U.S. carpet industry, and used the accumulation model framework to assess 
possible methods for increasing the adoption and dissemination of those innovative 
practices. Rusinko assessed the level of development of the three IIEs and their second-
order elements, identifying strengths and weaknesses within the industry context. She 
found gaps in certain parts of the framework, including in the research and development 
(R&D) functions, education, and training. She also identified those gaps as potential 
barriers to wide-spread adoption of the environmentally sustainable practices. She also 
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noted that the gaps “coproduce” each other, with negative reinforcement being an 
undesirable effect of the linkages between IIEs.  
In a study by Benn and Rusinko (2011), an analysis was performed on the 
introduction of an environmental sustainability curriculum to seven Australian business 
schools and their industry partners. Barriers to successful implementation, and 
identification of potential roles for the various actors, were the primary results of the 
study. As with the other publications authored or co-authored by Rusinko, this study 
employed the accumulation model framework as an analytical tool, and the objective of 
the work did not include a theoretical model extension. 
Finally, Rotolo, Hopkins, and Rafols (2012) used the same accumulation model 
framework to analyze the evolution of the HPV molecular diagnostic test industry over 
the course of two decades, starting in the mid-1980s. Full industry evolution was 
documented through four stages of a technology “career” (Blume, 1992), starting with 
exploration, and continuing through the phases of development, adoption, and ending in 
growth. A new entrant came to disrupt and dominate the new industry, but instead of 
causing the exit of incumbent firms in the established industry, the authors found that the 
new technology was able to peacefully co-exist with the old, primarily through its ability 
to innovate, and the centrality of its position within the broader domain of the 
communities and field encompassing HPV and medical diagnostic testing. Resource 
partitioning and mutual forbearance theory (Markman & Waldron, 2014) may well 
describe the phenomena of coexistence observed in this study. The authors hint at 
possible policy options to encourage collaboration in research and product development 
among market actors. Similar to the financial derivatives study, this analysis pays no 
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special attention to the early emergence phase of industry development. These studies 
are, however, good examples of how the accumulation model is well-suited for study of 
the evolution of existing industries. 
These eight studies used the resource accumulation framework developed under the 
MIRP (Van de Ven et al., 2000; Van de Ven & Poole, 1990), with the original study of 
the cochlear implant industry. The settings for five of the eight studies were previously 
established industries, with very mature institutional structures and actors, and a well-
defined base of existing customers. Although this diminishes the resemblance between 
those studies and the current research (with a focus on emerging industries), it also 
emphasizes the applicability of this model to the study of industry evolution. The 
resemblance of the American film industry study to this research is diminished because 
the former only focuses on one of the three accumulation model IIEs. The similarity of 
the nanotechnology and UCB studies to this research is much greater, with its focus on 
the industry as it emerged from conceptual beginnings. Differences in levels of 
government involvement between the HSSTI and the nanotechnology study (for 
example), however, are substantially different. In the space industry, government has 
participated heavily since the end of the Second World War, and the beginning of the 
Cold War. This involvement included setting the vehicle performance and design 
requirements, fulfilled with hardware constructed by the private-sector under contracts 
funded by the government. In the nanotechnology industry, the private-sector led the way 
with foundational inventions, such as the scanning tunneling microscope and the atomic 
force microscope (Woolley, 2010). Similar to the space industry, incumbent 
nanotechnology firms were not the primary actors in creating consumer markets for the 
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products they had developed (Woolley, 2013). Suborbital space transportation companies 
have yet to deliver their service for paying customers, and the U.S. government is 
continuing to be involved through multiple agencies, programs, and procurement 
activities. In this way, because of differing kinds of government involvement, evolution 
of the space industry is different from that of nanotechnology.  
Studies are rare that investigate the emergence of a high-technology industry, 
combining the functional goal of accumulating necessary capabilities, resources, and 
power, and enacted by industry actors interconnected as a social system. This may be 
because the innovation development meta-theory, and the resource accumulation 
framework used in this study, are relatively new (originally published in the late 1980s). 
Also, this type of industry analysis requires in-depth and detailed understanding of the 
industry, using data collected from multiple sources and in multiple ways, to ensure high 
levels of reliability and validity. The task of data collection may be less difficult for 
industries that have experienced emergence and evolution since the internet became 
popularized in the late part of the twentieth century, because web logs (also known as 
“blogs”), focusing on that industry specific sector, may now exist. These blogs, often 
staffed by enthusiasts, amateurs, or professionals, aggregate many types, and large 
quantities, of secondary data sources about the subject industry. Aggregated 
documentation of emerging industries by enthusiastic bloggers may permit an increased 
number of studies of this type in the future. The analysis methodology and data collected 
for the current research are the topics of the next chapter. 
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3. METHODOLOGY & DATA 
This chapter is comprised of two major sections, first describing the methodology 
used to answer the research question, and then providing a detailed justification for the 
methods selected. This research executed an HEA and created an industry emergence 
chart through data collection from multiple secondary sources, and augmented with the 
results of different industry analyses and primary data collection. The resulting chart of 
HSSTI emergence permitted the induction of the proposed processes within each first-
order IIE, thereby extending the current accumulation model.  
3.1 METHODOLOGY DESCRIPTION 
The paradigm of this research is scientific realism (Azevedo, 2005; Baum & Rowley, 
2005; Suppe, 1989), embracing the strength of applying multiple models and frameworks 
to a problem. This research employed qualitative methods to conduct an HEA, where the 
unit of analysis was the “event,” and the level of analysis was the “industry” (or 
population). The researcher collected secondary and archival data to identify significant 
industry incidents. Analysis perspectives of industry-level structure (Porter, 1980) and 
evolution (Christensen, 1997) were also incorporated. Aggregating these inputs helped 
identify significant events that defined the industry’s path of emergence (Van de Ven & 
Garud, 1989). Primary data, collected via personal interviews, validated and answered 
questions raised in the secondary data, as well as provided additional insights into the 
HSSTI emergence. These inputs permitted a longitudinal case study of inductive 
reasoning (Eisenhardt, 1989) for the purposes of understanding HSSTI emergence, and 
extending the existing theory. The proposed industry-level processes of industry 
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emergence resulting from this study are new and testable. This section provides more 
details of the research methodology.  
Grounded theory is defined as “the discovery of theory from data” (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967, p. 1). Perceptions of industry study deficiencies are partly because 
“much normative literature on organizing for environmental analysis is 
not based on a grounded theory of organizations; thus, many of the 
prescriptions applied by corporations are overly rational. Basic 
phenomena such as intra-organizational power relationships, the inherent 
structure of decision processes, and effects of environmental contingencies 
on business- and corporate-level administrative structures and decision 
processes are often ignored” (Lenz & Engledow, 1986, p. 342).  
This study uses grounded theory building to extend an existing theory that describes a 
specific type of industry emergence. This research extends the accumulation model 
within the functional goal category of innovation development theories, describing the 
relationship between internal (typically referenced as “industry”) and external (typically 
referenced as “governmental”) actors. The current accumulation model (Garud & Van de 
Ven, 2000) is strong in structure, but lacking in process detail. The grounded theory 
model extension methodology is well suited to the proposition of industry-level 
processes, because “grounded theories themselves have meaning only if they can be 
related to what we already know (existing ideas or theories)” (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 
2012, p. 24), and “grounded theory research presumes a level of semi-ignorance or some 
suspension of belief in the received wisdom of prior work” (Gioia et al., 2012, p. 23). The 
data collected may not fully support the proposed processes developed in this research, 
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but this is not unusual. As Gioia, et al. (2012) explain, sometimes “the data structure does 
not account very well for chains of events and interactions among concepts. That 
accounting, however, is the purpose of the subsequent grounded theory development, for 
which the data structure serves as a content substrate for the coming process model” (p. 
28). Furthermore, Poole and Van de Ven (2000) assert that “any grounded theory that 
emerges out of the foregoing interaction between field observations of innovations and 
theories of development requires testing to evaluate its validity” (p. 659). This approach 
is ultimately productive, because “inductive theory development efforts grounded in 
concrete and rich field observations are more likely to lead to significant new insights 
than deductive armchair theorizing approaches” (Van de Ven, 1992, p. 220). 
To conduct the HEA, this research identified individual firm-level incidents (the units 
of analysis), and combined them, sometimes many of them, into relevant HSSTI-level 
events. For example, the announcement of an upcoming flight test may occur many 
weeks or days before the flight, followed by another announcement in the days prior. 
Those, along with the different accounts of the flight test, and even reports that might 
occur days or weeks afterwards, are all individual incidents that combine into a single 
event: the flight test. Multiple events typically followed predictable sequences, describing 
the evolution of firms, certain legislative or regulatory actions, or industry-wide events 
(e.g., conferences). For example, firm creation might follow a funding investment event, 
and precede a sequence of manufacture and assembly events of its flight vehicle. Another 
example could be the passage of a law, followed by the funding of a firm via a tax credit, 
that leads to subsequent private investment, etc. Successful completion of this analysis 
resulted in an industry emergence chart, and provided a visual depiction of the 
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longitudinal evolution of HSSTI firm life-cycle events (e.g., foundings, exits), a deep 
industry context, basic metrics of industry emergence (e.g., number of conference and 
journal articles about the industry, etc.), and details of many types of funding. 
Identifying important contributing events of the HSSTI required data collection and 
analysis of individual incidents. The fundamental datum of these analyses is the 
individual event, defined as “an incident when change occurred” (Van de Ven, 1993a, p. 
33) in each of the accumulation model framework elements. This research initially 
collected data from industry blogs, primarily including NewSpaceWatch (spanning the 
time period of August 2012 through today). NewSpaceWatch was the most recent 
incarnation of a series of blogs, curated by the same individual, including RLV Transport 
News and HobbySpace, spanning the time period between April 1999 and July 2012 
(NewSpaceGlobal, 2015). Of the approximately 28,000 entries available in the website 
archives, over 8,400 records of incident data were relevant to the HSSTI for the blog 
coverage dates of 26 April 1999 and 31 December 2016. Individual records relevant to 
the industry (i.e., HSSTI incidents) were identified by searching the records for text 
strings that were general descriptors of the industry (e.g., “suborbital,” “spaceport,” 
“spaceship,” or “prize”), roots of the HSSTI firm names (e.g., “XCOR,” “Virgin,” or 
“Blue”), and roots of the spaceport names or acronyms (“Mojave,” “OSIDA,” or 
“NMSA”).10 Additionally, other valuable sources of information included company web 
                                                 
10 The complete list of search terms related to spaceports alone includes: “spaceport,” 
“brownsville,” “oklahoma spaceport,” “osida,” “texas spaceport,” “mojave,” “nm 
spaceport,” “nmsa,” “wallops,” “spaceport america,” “california spaceport,” “cape 
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page archives, other web logs, and the traditional media research databases (LexisNexis 
was employed particularly for incidents and events prior to April 1999 and after 
December 2016). These sites provided data from various types of secondary archive 
documents, including press releases, publicly available government documents, 
conference presentations, news media reports, editorials and commentaries, etc. 
Secondary data collected after December 2016 did not originate from NewSpaceWatch. 
Each incident record underwent a two-stage process of categorization and association 
of events to framework elements. The event categories and their definitions included: (a) 
meetings, expositions, and conferences (announcements, milestones, conclusion, and 
retrospectives of ~); (b) launches (announcements of, milestones for, and 
results/conclusions of ~); (c) hardware testing (announcements, milestones, and 
results/conclusions of ~), (d) raffles, or other types of games of skill or chance (the 
announcements, milestones, or conclusions of ~); (e) individual speaking engagements or 
interviews (the announcement, profile of, plans for, milestones, or conclusion of ~); (f) 
organizations or government agencies (the creation/entry, profiles, plans, activities, 
partnerships, milestones, marketing announcement, milestone forecasts, conclusion, 
retrospective, or exit of ~); (g) government programs (the announcement of, reactions to, 
milestones of, conclusion of, or retrospective of ~); and (h) bills, legislation, or laws (the 
introduction, passage, signature, enactment, or enforcement of ~). The HEA categorized 
                                                 
canaveral spaceport,” “cecil field,” “colorado spaceport,” “florida spaceport,” “front 
range,” “kodiak,” “mid-atlantic regional spaceport,” “poker flat,” “sheboygan 
spaceport,” “spaceport florida,” and “west texas spaceport.” 
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each record by the type of event (or sub-event) and its life-cycle stage. Event life-cycle 
stages included: (a) start, entry, or introduction, (b) a retrospective, profiles, plans, 
information, activities, partnerships, reactions, or forecasts; (c) milestones; (d) 
conclusion, exit, or passage; and (e) retrospective, or future plans. Finally, not every 
combination of event category and stage was an actual event. From the 8,400 HSSTI 
incidents, the categorization process identified approximately 600 events.  
Analyzing the data involved chronologically ordering each event within the 
framework elements, and identifying temporal interdependencies between them (Van de 
Ven, 1993a). The resulting industry emergence chart (Garud & Van de Ven, 2000) was a 
complex web of lines and arrows that easily overwhelms most casual observers, but 
which provided ample opportunity for in-depth description and analysis (Appendix B on 
page 222). The vast majority of historic events easily fit into the accumulation model 
framework. The industry emergence chart traced a storyline that describes how individual 
firms entered the industry, sought and acquired financing, interacted with regulatory 
agencies, conducted vehicle design, assembly, testing, and operations, and, in some cases, 
exited the industry. The chart also showed relationships between supporting facilities 
(such as spaceports) and firm activities, and activities that support the creation of 
knowledge and market resources.  
In addition to the secondary data and archival data used, this research also collected 
primary data through 40 semi-structured personal interviews with members of the HSSTI. 
Interviewees represented HSSTI private firms, trade organization, the regulator (FAA 
AST), government executive branch agencies (including NASA, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy), the U.S. 
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legislative branch, industry consultants, conference organizers, and supply chain 
members. The University of Cape Town (South Africa) conducted and granted the initial 
ethics review for this research. Research ethics required additional reviews and written 
concurrence by each interviewee’s current employing organization in the U.S., due to 
differences between South African and U.S. policies on research involving humans. Each 
interview was approximately one hour in duration (for a total of approximately 40 hours 
of interviews). The researcher digitally recorded, and employed a commercial service to 
transcribe, each interview. The researcher also coded each transcript using the contextual 
analysis software, NVivo. The collected primary data validated and supported both the 
identified HEA events and the proposed accumulation model processes. 
In addition to the collection, categorization, and analysis of secondary incident data, 
the researcher conducted an industry structural analysis (ISA) to provide the industrial 
organization economic perspective to this study. The ISA is based on industrial 
organization economics, and the Bain-Mason paradigm of “structure-conduct-
performance” (Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939; Porter, 1980). Results of the ISA were based on 
responses to a list of questions (provided in Appendix C on page 223) derived from 
Porter (1980, pp. 3–29). These questions cover details for the five forces: the threat of 
entry by potential entrants, the intensity of rivalry among existing competitors, pressure 
from substitute products, the bargaining power of buyers, and the bargaining power of 
suppliers. The data collected for the ISA came primarily from secondary sources and 
previous studies (Davidian & Conrad, 2012). The researcher also identified the 
interaction effects between the seven entry barriers, using a method similar to the way 
mutual goal achievability is assessed in the “classic approach” to strategy formulation 
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(Andrews, 1980; Porter, 1980, pp. xvi–xx). Successful execution of the ISA provided the 
HEA with insights into the manufacturing and testing activities of the industry members, 
the industry vendor-supplier-distributor channels, and the industry consumer demand and 
firm competition. 
Finally, the researcher conducted a disruptive innovation analysis (DIA) to provide an 
industry evolutionary perspective (Christensen, 1997, 2006; Christensen et al., 2004; 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003). As with the ISA, the DIA utilized secondary and archival 
data in response to a list of questions (given in Appendix D on page 234) derived from 
the disruption innovation citations listed. These responses provide details of the industry 
context, a definition of the analyzed innovations, and the target industry offerings. The 
DIA highlighted details of the history of the HSSTI precursor industry, sounding rockets, 
which, in turn, originated in, and evolved from, the military missile industry. The 
scientific community uses sounding rockets primarily for lofting experiments to high 
altitudes on suborbital trajectories. The DIA generated insights into the identities of 
potential and near-substitute markets. Finally, the DIA collected and used detailed 
descriptions of HSSTI product attributes. All of these results supported a deep industry 
understanding of the HSSTI, its “close ancestor” industry, and a possible glimpse into 
what its products’ characteristics might be, assuming the HSSTI ever evolves past the 
stage of pre-production operation. Although much of the ISA and DIA results were not 
suitable for inclusion in the HSSTI emergence chart, the exercise of these analyses 
increased the understanding of the subject industry, providing depth of insight that 
complements the grounded theory extension methodology. 
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After completion of the HEA, ISA, DIA, and the industry emergence chart, the 
researcher analyzed interactions between events (depicted in the chart by arrows) for 
patterns or repeating sequences, and recognized the process of general business 
development and evolution in the Proprietary Functions IIE. Analysis of the interactions 
between the IIEs provided indications of the content of the IIE linkages. The researcher 
then introduced elements of legitimacy to both the Institutional Arrangements and 
Resource Endowments IIEs, and proposed processes to link IIE second-order elements to 
their respective components of legitimacy. Identification of these processes make this 
research accessible to others by making the phenomena of industry emergence more 
explicit. These processes can also provide ideas for different metrics and indices for 
future testing. By combining the results of secondary data, the archival documents, the 
personal interviews, and the two independent analyses of the same industry, this research 
created a rich description of the history that was subsequently diagramed, fitting within a 
slightly modified version of the accumulation model framework (described in the 
Discussion chapter). This deepened understanding led to, and supported, the proposition 
of legitimacy creation processes. 
3.2 METHODOLOGY JUSTIFICATION 
This section provides a justification of the selected methodology for the theoretical 
contribution made by this research, describes the underlying philosophy of the research 
paradigm, and how the selected method is consistent with the literature. The discussion 
also describes how the researcher ensured accuracy and validity of the research findings, 
and avoided and controlled errors (to the greatest extent possible). 
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The scientific realism research paradigm, emphasizing that “multiple perspectives and 
research methods are essential” (Baum & Rowley, 2005, loc. 751), downplays the 
positivist philosophy, and recognizes that the perception of any industry context can be 
different, based on the observational “lens.” Each perspective is analogous to one of 
many blind men surrounding an elephant (Mintzberg et al., 2005). The philosophy of this 
research, therefore, also rejects a purely relativistic philosophy with the assertion that 
there are a finite number of relevant perspectives. The realist philosophy realizes the need 
for a select few perspectives, relevant to the particular stage of industry emergence and 
evolution being studied, and based on situational contingencies. This phenomenological 
case study of single-industry emergence uses qualitative methods and applies inductive 
reasoning for the purpose of grounded theory extension. The result is an HEA, where the 
unit of analysis is the “event” and the level of analysis is the population (industry). The 
researcher chose the method of merging the results of different data sources and analyses 
over other possible methods, or any individual method. This resulted in a rich and 
detailed history of the industry emergence, and it allowed for the incorporation of data 
from multiple organization theory perspectives. Also, the accumulation model provides a 
comprehensive perspective of the emerging market as a social system, beyond an isolated 
economic system, where efficiency, personal interest, and financial rationality are the 
underlying assumptions (Fligstein, 2001; Parsons & Smelser, 1956; Poole & Van de Ven, 
2000).  
This method is consistent with the literature because each component analysis (i.e., 
HEA, ISA, DIA) is methodologically consistent with the literature. These analyses also 
meet the criteria for data results that are logical, generalizable, dependable, and 
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confirmable. The data is logical because it has been validated through triangulation (Jick, 
1979) of secondary and primary sources, thereby ensuring internal validity to the 
maximum possible degree. A common question about this study’s data generalizability is 
based on the observation that the number of firms included in the HSSTI is so small 
(there is a total of five firms altogether, but only two are active as of the time of this 
writing). In fact, because this is a process study and not a variance study, the relevant 
metric is not the number of firms under investigation, but the number of events used to 
describe the phenomenon under investigation. The generalizability of the results may be 
relatively high, therefore, because of the large number of incidents and events used to 
describe the HSSTI emergence. Section 5.6, later in this thesis, discusses of the 
generalizability of these research results to other industries. The data is dependable 
because of triangulation (with both secondary and primary sources), and there is a well-
documented audit trail by which the researcher can identify, examine, and correct any 
data discrepancies (if need be). The data is confirmable because it is based on public 
events covered in the popular and trade presses, and validated by eye witnesses or 
individuals who personally contributed to individual incidents. 
Although the purpose of this research is to identify and illuminate accurate 
representations of reality, it is possible that the findings do not accomplish that goal, in 
whole or in part. To minimize these types of errors, the researcher made a continuous 
effort to avoid known and knowable traps and biases, both of data and reasoning. Much 
of the datum, used to describe individual incidents, include information that has very high 
accuracy and precision simply due to the nature of the information. The precision of dates 
was to the level of the day, and the precision of locations was to the level of the city. 
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Incident and event descriptions were qualitative (narrative) in nature, and the level of 
detail provided in archived data and personal accounts were reasonably, and sufficiently, 
accurate and precise. For all these reasons, there is no reason to believe that the data 
contains levels of error that would alter the results in a significant way. 
This research benefited from active and continuous practice of validation of data 
integrity and logical reasoning. Where possible, the researcher addressed internal validity 
(an indication of logical reasoning, consideration of alternative concepts, and overall 
credibility) through triangulation of individual HSSTI incidents events using multiple 
secondary sources of data. Additionally, personal interviews (as described above) 
provided validation of specific events. The interviews conducted for this research were 
effective data member checks of data validity. Time sampling of data was not applicable 
in this research project. Multiple analyses (i.e., the HEA, ISA, and DIA) used to analyze 
the emergence of the single industry enhanced the external validity (related to 
transferability or generalizability of the results). Triangulation (as mentioned previously) 
enhanced the objectivity (confirmability) of the data and results, as did the notation of all 
major decisions, processes, and routines. This allowed for consistent application, repeated 
scrutiny, and error detection/correction (if any), during the entire research activity. The 
thorough note-taking also created an audit trail of the research methods employed, 
allowing for a strategy of examining (and adjusting or correcting, if necessary) the data 
and processes on multiple occasions. In combination with the “code-recode” capability 
and data triangulation, the existence of this type of “audit trail” helped ensure data 
reliability (dependability). 
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The researcher took many precautions not to introduce or create errors within the 
project. Careful and continual evaluation of the data ensured its accuracy and validity. 
The researcher repeatedly questioned, evaluated, and tested the logic and reasoning 
through interactions with experienced primary data sources. Data collection from trusted 
and established sources helped minimize errors, and avoided relatively new, dubious, or 
unverifiable sources of information. 
Errors of historic incidents and events may occur due to sloppiness of reading, 
transcription, or other human perception error. Triangulation validation, and the use of 
other primary and secondary sources of data, helped minimize these types of errors. The 
researcher made every reasonable effort to ensure validation through triangulation. For 
concepts more complex than simple incidents and events (such as identification of 
institutional and cultural norms), errors of interpretation are also possible. Methods 
employed to minimize interpretation errors included validation through direct questioning 
of multiple primary data sources. Often, interviewees expressed multiple interpretations 
of a seemingly obvious concept, and the researcher incorporated these alternative ideas 
into the findings of this study. 
3.3 DATA 
Extension of the accumulation model framework required an understanding and 
depiction of the HSSTI emergence to a sufficient level of detail, richness, and nuance. 
The researcher accomplished the collection of required data through the execution of 
three analyses: the HEA, ISA, and DIA. These analyses required many different primary 
and secondary data types to collect sufficient amounts and quality of information. The 
fundamental data requirements include many incidents, events, and metrics, gathered 
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from secondary sources, but validated and supplemented by primary data collection. The 
three analyses also required supporting data to create a comprehensive story of industry 
emergence. The following sections provide details of these contributing data components. 
Identifying important contributing events of the HSSTI for the HEA, ISA, and DIA 
required data collection and analysis of individual incidents. The fundamental datum of 
these analyses is the individual event in each of the accumulation model framework 
elements. The researcher primarily collected data from a comprehensive news aggregator 
site, collecting many different types of data sources. The researcher also consulted a 
secondary aggregator site that commonly identified the same industry incidents, and 
provided links to the same sources as the principle site. The benefit gained from the 
secondary site was marginal at best (i.e., very little new information was found). The 
researcher also queried other valuable sources of information, including company web 
page archives, other web logs, and the traditional media publishing sources and databases 
(especially for incidents and events prior to April 1999 and after December 2016). 
 The ISA and DIA utilized the same set of information sources as those listed for the 
HEA. The DIA, however, also relied upon on-line databases of rocket flights 
(planet4589.org and space.skyrocket.de), an astronautical encyclopedia 
(astronautix.com), and the user guide documents provided by the two major vehicle 
operators to collect additional data. Both the ISA and DIA relied, to a certain extent, upon 
subjective assessments by the researcher. For example, the ISA required estimates of the 
strength of the five forces due to the lack of available quantitative measures. Earlier 
sections of this thesis described the sources of all the data employed. 
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The compilation of information about individual incidents into the distinction of 
events “when change occurred” was the goal of the data collection work. Events were the 
primary units included in the HSSTI emergence chart. The chart spans seven decades, 
starting with the earliest events (dating back to the early 1950s) until the present day. 
The researcher filtered the required data for the HEA to extract the information from 
multiple incidents that comprised an individual event. For example, a vehicle flight test 
event could appear as many public relations press release incidents prior to, during, and 
after the event. Articles in periodicals included individual incidents that appeared both 
before and after the single event. Biographical information about the vehicle pilots would 
appear as an announcement before an upcoming appearance event, and newspaper 
accounts described the event afterwards. This filtering process reduced the 8,400 
incidents down to approximately 600 events. 
The identification and use of multiple data sources maximized HEA data robustness. 
Data triangulation, maintaining records that permit a coherent audit trail, and a thorough 
description of industry emergence incidents and events maximized the reliability and 
validity of the data. The use of primary source interviews to validate or correct industry 
emergence incidents and events further enhanced data reliability and internal validity. 
The use of multiple sources for individual events (triangulation), and the conduct of 
interviews with individuals employed by the HSSTI firms enhanced external data 
validity. 
A recognized limitation of the data collection and transformation process for the 
HSSTI HEA was the heavy reliance upon secondary data, diminishing the data 
confirmability (objectivity) and credibility (internal validity). Data triangulation and the 
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use of multiple sources were attempts to counter these limitations. Multiple secondary 
data sources in conjunction with triangulation addressed possible limitations of data 
reliability and dependability. The thorough documentation of the research design, 
detailed data reports, and description of the methodology used, and a cursory study of 
historical industry emergence analogs addressed limitations of generalizability from this 
study to other emerging industries. 
Given the strengths and limitations of the research methodology described here, the 
data results are presented next, providing a detailed description of HSSTI emergence 
dating back to the 1950s, but more recently due to the initiating “shock” (Schroeder, Van 
de Ven, Scudder, & Polley, 2000) of the 1996 X PRIZE announcement. 
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4. RESULTS 
The first part of this chapter describes the results of the three analyses conducted to 
understand the development of the emerging HSSTI through the lens of the accumulation 
model framework. The HEA identified specific HSSTI events for the three IIEs of 
Institutional Arrangements, Resource Endowments, and Proprietary Functions. The ISA 
and DIA further enhanced the evidence, and extent, of IIE construction. The results 
describe and discuss the interactions between the three IIEs. The HEA provided the 
foundation for the industry emergence chart, depicting the interrelationships of individual 
firms, their market activities, sources of required resources (e.g., knowledge, personnel, 
and funding), and their various encounters with institutional entities. The HSSTI 
emergence chart clearly shows industry as an interrelated social system (instead of an 
isolated economic system) as defined by the accumulation model. The industry 
emergence chart identifies and maps specific events into each of the accumulation 
model’s first-, second-, and third-order elements (listed in Table 1 on page 12). 
4.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The Institutional Arrangements IIE is the initial first-order element described below. 
The original framework consists of three second-order elements: Legitimation, 
Governance, and Technology Standards. This section details the HSSTI events for each 
of these second- and third-order elements.  
4.1.1 Legitimation 
The initial second-order element of the Institutional Arrangements IIE is 
Legitimation. Van de Ven and Garud define “legitimation” as “the creation of trust” (Van 
de Ven, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c), but, according to other definitions, legitimation also 
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results in reputation (Rao, 1994), “market category’s meaning, the formation of 
categorical and organizational identities, and perceptions about the viability of the 
business model” (Navis & Glynn, 2010, p. 439), for example. Legitimation of a new 
venture or industry involves an “approving social consensus” (Blau, 1964), “acceptance 
by key stakeholders, the public, key opinion leaders, and government officials of a new 
venture as appropriate and right” (Aldrich, 2005), and the acceptance by new firms and 
industries that “certain practices or forms are appropriate” (Palmer & Biggart, 2005), 
with the intention of increasing their chances of survival. To encompass the many 
definitions of the word, this research defines “legitimation” as “processes that create 
legitimacy.” Legitimacy leads to trust from society by demonstrating that the “actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Within the 
accumulation framework, the original second-order element Legitimacy includes third-
order elements of Guarantees, Licensing Practices, Industry Regulations, and 
Endorsements. This research sought and found evidence of these elements within the 
HSSTI, as described below. 
Of course, there is no such thing as a “100% guarantee” in practice, but the closest 
comparable thing in the aviation community, included in the third-order element of 
Guarantees, is the certification of a vehicle type or design. Certification “guarantees” the 
safe carriage of passengers that board the aircraft. An equivalent guarantee for HSSTI 
vehicles does not yet exist. Currently, FAA AST can issue safety approvals, which affirm 
that a given product (good or service) offered by a firm performs as advertised against 
some set of criteria, as determined by the firm itself. The company makes the criteria 
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public so that others could replicate that level of performance (if they so desire), and to 
encourage the adoption of voluntary consensus standards within the industry. The 
intention of the safety approval is to allow the company to obtain a “pre-approval” of 
their product in order to streamline the launch licensing process. It can also be beneficial 
to the company in its business development efforts, offered as evidence that the product 
meets its advertised capabilities (hence, the moniker of “guarantee”).  
“The company has an opportunity to have a government entity take a look 
at what they’re doing, and basically give what I sometimes refer to as a 
“Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval” if you will, that the government 
has looked at this process, and has agreed that is does what the company 
says it does, which they could find very helpful in their future business 
development and engagement with the rest of the industry. They can sell 
their wares, basically, with this review having being completed by the 
government already.” – HSSTI Regulator 
The FAA AST issues safety approvals for a period of 5 years, and renewals result in a 
revision to the existing safety approval (not the issuance of a new safety approval). 
Specific to the HSSTI, AST issued safety approvals to companies and organizations for a 
suborbital human spaceflight and microgravity environment simulators, an altitude 
chamber training facility, and a variety of crew and spaceflight participant training 
programs (including scenario altitude training, crew and spaceflight participant training, 
and a certified aerospace technician credentialing program). Appendix E lists all FAA 
AST safety approvals issued in support of the HSSTI as of the time of this writing. 
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The third-order element of Licensing Practices for the HSSTI include the issuance, 
renewal, suspension, or revocation of licenses, experimental permits, waivers, or any 
other regulatory instrument. The types of HSSTI licenses issued (and renewed) by the 
FAA include experimental permits, launch operator’s licenses, and launch site (i.e., 
spaceport) operator’s licenses. The process of obtaining a launch license starts with a pre-
application consultation. After submitted and deemed to be “complete enough,” then 
AST conducts a policy review, a safety review, a payload review, a financial 
responsibility determination, and an environmental review. After issuance of the license, 
AST conducts compliance monitoring. By law, the FAA cannot take more than 180 days 
to make a license determination decision. Operation of HSSTI vehicles require licenses 
when the operator wishes to receive compensation for hire (i.e., getting paid for providing 
suborbital flights). The experimental permit, available for HSSTI vehicles since 2004 
(Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act, 2004), is an abbreviated version of the 
launch license permit, limiting the time of determination to 120 days. Between September 
2006 and February 2016, AST issued ten experimental permits, split between two HSSTI 
firms (listed in Appendix F). During approximately the same time period (April 2004 to 
July 2016), AST issued eight launch licenses to four HSSTI firms, including one to a 
vehicle that only existed “on paper” (listed in Appendix G). From June 2004 to June 
2015, FAA AST issued or renewed operator’s licenses for six separate HSSTI spaceports 
(listed in Appendix H). Of the six HSSTI launch site operator’s licenses issued, two 
spaceports are currently active, or under contract to be active in the future, both to the 
same HSSTI firm. The other active HSSTI firm flies from its own launch site that does 
not require a license to operate, because it is a “private use spaceport.” The small number 
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of issued launch and spaceport licenses is an indication of the HSSTI pre-production 
status. 
The third-order element of Industry Regulations includes certifications or industry 
licenses for manufacturing, design, engineering, etc., guidelines (whether adopted or not), 
proposed by industry or government entities. Examples include guideline documents 
issued from the safety organizations (IAASS, 2013) and the FAA AST (2017b). At the 
current phase of HSSTI emergence, there are no industry regulations adopted by all the 
HSSTI firms. FAA AST (2014) released a document of recommended practices with the 
hopes that the content would be a good starting point for the development of industry-
developed regulations, but that has not yet happened. 
Both public- and private-sector actors contribute to the third-order Endorsements 
element of the emerging industry. When initiated by the HSSTI public-sector, these 
activities include public acknowledgement of HSSTI milestones (Hales, 2005) and the 
establishment of public-private partnership agreements (“NASA Space Act Agreements,” 
2017). The simple association of the HSSTI firm with a well-established federal agency 
provides high levels of legitimacy, whether through a funded relationship (as with a 
reimbursable or funded agreement) or an unfunded relationship (referred to as a “non-
reimbursable” agreement). Between NASA and HSSTI firms, there were a total of 14 
agreements and amendments between 2012 and 2015 (see Appendix I). Self-
endorsements by the private-sector include many forms of corporate political activity, 
including interactions with the general public, their constituency (fellow industry 
members), policy-makers (primarily in the legislative and executive branches of 
government), and other forms of action (both internal and external to the firm). Although 
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corporate political action is commonly performed discretely, some data is available in the 
U.S. due to the passage and amendment of the Lobbying Disclosure Act in 1995 (2007). 
The expenses of HSSTI firms for activities of lobbying and campaign contributions 
(through political action committees), are indicators of the HSSTI private-sector actors 
endorsing their programs, capabilities, and perspectives to public-sector actors in the 
legislative branch of government. Private-sector endorsement activities to public-sector 
actors in multiple executive branch agencies also took place, although there is no 
quantitative data available. The following quotes from actors in both sectors emphasize 
common themes repeated by multiple executive branch individuals (including from the 
Office of Management and Budget, NASA, and the FAA AST), and participants from the 
HSSTI firms: 
“you’re going to folks in the White House and other places, and every four 
years sometimes there’s turnover, so it’s an educational process there.” – 
HSSTI Firm Employee 
“At [the Office of Management and Budget] we had numerous people 
come in for visits to share their ideas for things they wanted to do, through 
informational and capabilities briefings. Same thing at NASA... a lot of 
people coming in and sharing ideas and capabilities.” – Government 
Executive 
“…we would be the friendly front door, so to speak, where people who 
were working the programs would want to keep us informed. We wanted 
to be up to date on who had what money, who had been raising, who was 
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trying to raise, and also the issues that people would have, challenges 
they’ve had with the program.” – Government Economist 
“This has been [a] pretty cordial interaction with them and of course, they 
always tell us what their interest is, and then we tell them what we can do 
legally and within the scope of our program. I know that sometimes they 
may ask us more than what we could do, and we say, “Hey, this is the 
limits we have.” – Government Executive 
4.1.2 Governance 
Governance is broadly defined as “the general rules in a society that define relations 
of competition and cooperation and define how firms should be organized” (Fligstein, 
2001, p. 34). Following Legitimation, Governance is the next second-order element of the 
Institutional Arrangements IIE. Discussed below are the third-order elements of Norms 
and Rules, Regulations, and Laws (Van de Ven, 1993b) within the Governance 
framework element.  
From a governmental perspective, norms include non-binding resolutions, but from a 
broader sociological perspective, norms can be defined as “informal rules that facilitate, 
motivate, and govern joint action of members of close-knit groups” (Nee, 2005, loc. 
2432), “commonly or widely shared sets of behavioral expectations” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978, p. 147), or “how things should be done; they define legitimate means to pursue 
valued ends” (Scott, 1995, p. 37). Within the Norms third-order element, this research 
recognized accepted American business practices, cultural worldviews, and assumptions 
as influencing interactions of the HSSTI (because of the U.S. provenance of the active 
firms), but norms which were more specific to the space industry in general were also of 
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primary interest. During the interviewing process of different individuals from the public- 
and private-sector HSSTI organizations, a number of space industry norms emerged. The 
space industry norms were not necessarily particular to HSSTI actors, but deeply 
engrained within the group. Norms identified and discussed with interviewees include the 
following: (1) government is the only “reasonable-risk” customer for human spaceflight, 
(2) safety (in human spaceflight) is the most important consideration in trade-off 
decision-making (especially involving cost considerations), (3) space industry individuals 
are highly enthusiastic about space, (4) commercial success in human spaceflight 
ventures requires large amounts of capital, (5) international cooperation is important, and 
(6) government has an important role in the commercial space industry.  
In addition to norms, this research also identified rules of the HSSTI for inclusion of 
the third-order element of Norms and Rules. Rules include “contract law; billing 
practices; banking and credit rules; insurance, health, and safety standards” (Fligstein & 
Sweet, 2002, p. 1207). They establish “weights, common standards, shipping, billing, 
insurance, the exchange of money (i.e., banks), and the enforcement of contracts” 
(Fligstein, 2005, loc. 7753), and they “define who can transact with whom and the 
conditions under which transactions are carried out” (Fligstein, 1996, p. 658). All these 
forms of rules are generally well-established and enforced in the U.S., but rules also 
include treaties. The international treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space (US 
Department of State, 1967), provides the legal basis for the regulatory framework 
adopted in the U.S. and executed by FAA AST. In a similar vein, a set of recommended 
practices for HSPs, and a guidance document for informing HSPs of risk, were released 
by FAA AST (2014, 2017a). 
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Regarding the third-order element of Regulations, different countries perceive HSSTI 
activity differently, and therefore want to regulate it differently. The European approach 
is to regulate HSSTI vehicles as airplanes that go to space, since the outer space treaty 
does not consider suborbital vehicles as “space objects.” However, the U.S. is regulating 
these vehicles as spacecraft that spend a fraction of their flight time in the national air 
space. In 2006, the FAA AST issued a final rule for crew and HSP requirements (2006) 
“to protect the safety of the uninvolved public. They also call for measures that enable 
passengers … to make informed decisions about their personal safety” (David, 2006). 
Currently, FAA AST regulates to ensure the safe operation of the vehicle, and the extent 
to which the crew is involved with operational safety, the regulations apply to them as 
well. By law, however, the FAA AST does not currently regulate the safety of HSPs. 
This is because HSSTI members have expressed the desire to minimize regulations, by 
having a temporary period of time, referred to as the “learning period,” during which the 
FAA withholds this category of regulations, while the industry matures.  
Other forms of regulation exist that either support or supplement the licensing and 
permitting activities mentioned above. The supporting regulation activities include 
evaluations of safety, expected casualties, and possible financial liabilities of a launch or 
reentry operation, the environmental assessments, and the evaluation of policy 
conformity across the different agencies of the U.S. government. A prominent additional 
regulation is the International Trade in Arms Regulation (ITAR). The barrier of entry 
represented by ITAR is estimated by private-sector entities as being very high because it 
restricts many aspects of doing business in the HSSTI, including employment (firms 
cannot hire non-U.S. citizens), companies with whom you can partner and do business 
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(limited to U.S. companies almost exclusively), companies with whom you can share 
information (again, U.S. companies only, with some exceptions), whether you can export 
your product, and who your customers can be or what they are allowed to see (C. Nelson, 
Bolton, & Maynard, 2014). ITAR has a real impact on HSSTI firms, highlighting the 
difference between governmental (national) and commercial activities, and driving some 
details of their business plans: 
“from a human training and safety perspective, we use a device that is on 
the [U.S. Munitions List] and ITAR controlled, so we did submit a 
commodity jurisdiction request which was successful so that we could 
train participants for space. Typically, for our military clients, we get 
issued a ITAR license for that country, but in commercial space we train 
individual participants from a lot of different countries...and this process 
just doesn’t make sense.” – HSSTI Firm Employee 
“I developed a wet lease model, which kept all of the control and 
ownership of the vehicle within [our firm], or [we] designated city areas 
or entities underneath the control of a U.S. entity. And, of course, [we] put 
a U.S. person in those positions overseas and worked pretty extensively 
with State Department on that.” – Former HSSTI Executive 
The environmental regulation barrier is restrictive because it requires a lengthy period of 
time and large amount of money to ensure compliance, typically performed by a third-
party, costing hundreds of thousands of USD, and requiring 12-24 months’ time. Less 
burdensome are the safety, expected casualty, policy, and financial responsibility 
evaluations. Overall, the regulatory burden on HSSTI actors favors larger firms with 
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surplus resources (e.g., time, money, personnel, and information) to accommodate the 
regulatory requirements. In response, firms may hire personnel, or consultants with 
relevant experience, to provide the necessary information, or may take advantage of 
parent company experience in another industry for application to the HSSTI context. 
The U.S. Congress passed three laws to establish the regulations discussed above. 
The Commercial Space Launch Act (1984) established the commercial space sector 
within the U.S., identified the Department of Transportation as the regulatory authority, 
established the “learning period” during which regulations on HSPs were not permitted, 
and also became the enabling statute for the licensing of launch, reentry, and launch and 
reentry site operations.11 Later, the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act (2004) 
established experimental permits relevant to the HSSTI, and extended the end date for the 
“learning period.”12 Next, passage of the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 
(2016) again extended the end date for the “learning period.” On the state level, the 
legislatures of California, Florida, Georgia, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas passed 
many laws related to the HSSTI. In general, these laws pertained to topics of limited 
liability, informed consent for HSPs of known spaceflight risks, tax exemptions for 
HSSTI firms, and the establishment and funding of spaceports. 
                                                 
11 An executive order transferred this authority to the FAA in 1995. 
12 These were the provisions relevant to the HSSTI. Other provisions in this bill, not 
listed here, are not relevant to the HSSTI. 
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4.1.3 Technology Standards 
The final second-order element of the Institutional Arrangements IIE is Technology 
Standards. This section discusses the three categories of technical standards as related to 
the HSSTI, including Government Regulatory Mandates, Cooperative/Voluntary Industry 
Standards, and Market-Driven/de facto Standards. 
Government Regulatory Mandates include standards mandated by government 
regulatory agencies. To date, the FAA AST has been hesitant to impose standards on the 
emerging HSSTI. Cooperative/Voluntary Industry Standards include collaborative 
initiatives on the part of government and industry participants. HSSTI industry 
participants include federal advisory groups (e.g., the Commercial Space Transportation 
Advisory Committee - Standards Working Group), national and international 
organizations (such as the Commercial Spaceflight Federation [CSF], and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization), and standards-setting organizations (such as 
the American Society for Testing and Materials [ASTM] International). Most of these 
groups recognize the need for industry standards, and some have actively attempted to 
generate standards through cooperative action, with limited success, and despite the 
inherent difficulties the process entails. 
“Developing standards is an activity that takes time. Startups, especially 
the small companies, don’t have the time to participate. They’re fighting 
for survival. It’s difficult to get people to support a time-consuming effort 
with no immediate financial return. It’s becoming easier, though, in the 
current investment environment. Today, the space investment climate is 
comparable to “dot com” investment climate of the 1990s. Startups are 
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well-capitalized and can afford to put in the effort today to save a lot of 
regulatory grief in the future. I think one of the reasons that the consensus 
standards didn’t arrive earlier is that none of the small guys could 
participate, and they were afraid that the big guys, who had the 
wherewithal, would write the standards and use them as a weapon. After 
having dealt with AST for an interminable length of time, space companies 
large and small are discovering they’d rather have standards, and that it’s 
worth the investment.” - Former HSSTI Entrepreneur 
Market-driven/de facto standards are those “imposed by a dominant producer” (Van de 
Ven, 1993b, p. 217), which does not yet exist in the HSSTI. Because there are no HSSTI 
firms delivering a service for compensation or hire, there are no de facto standards, 
created or adopted. Standards that have carried over from the space industry at large do 
exist, however. For example, standards accepted by the HSSTI include the handling of 
liquid propellants (such as oxygen and hydrogen), and the siting of propellant tanks. To 
avoid imposing standards upon the HSSTI firms, FAA AST released more than two 
dozen non-binding documents, including advisory circulars, guidelines, and other 
guidance documents, as foundations upon which industry standards could be based. 
4.2 RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS 
The second first-order element of the accumulation model framework is Resource 
Endowments, consisting of three original second-order elements: Scientific and 
Technological Research, Financing and Insurance Arrangements, and the Human 
Competence Pool. This section describes the construction of each, by public- and private-
sector HSSTI actors, down to the third-order elements. 
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4.2.1 Scientific and Technological Research 
The Scientific and Technological Research second-order element includes knowledge 
and technical inventions primarily from government sources external to the firm, 
typically in the form of government contracts, research grants, or a category of 
acquisition instrument referred to as “other transaction authority.” Recipients are 
typically private-sector firms, non-profit research organizations, or universities. 
The first series of government contracts for technologies and vehicle research directly 
related to the HSSTI dates back to the mid-1950s, and finished in the early 1970s. The 
U.S. military conducted seven major experimental (abbreviated as “X”) vehicle programs 
during that time, the most famous of which was the X-15. Large generalist aerospace 
firms were the recipients of those contracts, and the capabilities gained during these 
programs contributed to the U.S. space program. In more recent activity that started in the 
1990s, the government researched more HSSTI component technologies with the “Delta 
Clipper” (also known as the “DC-X”) program under government contract (begun by the 
Strategic Defense Initiative Office, then passed to the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, DARPA, and finally handed-off to NASA). Although ultimately 
cancelled in 1996, the DC-X was the initial foray into reusable, vertical take-off and 
vertical landing, launch vehicles. DARPA’s “Responsive Access, Small Cargo, 
Affordable Launch” program next identified three technologies that would be essential to 
the success of the HSSTI. Although it only lasted four years before cancellation, 
preliminary design studies of airplane-like operations and flight profiles were studied, 
and became the basis for some HSSTI entrants. From 2008 until the present, other 
government contracts were competed and funded, both large and small in award amount. 
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Some of these contracts benefited firms that assisted in the HSSTI emergence. For HSSTI 
firms, there were a number of small business innovative research (SBIR) grants awarded 
by NASA and two U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) units (DARPA and the Air Force), 
ranging from just under one hundred thousand USD to one million USD (for a total of 
almost two million USD). All these grants went to only one of the five HSSTI firms 
operating between the years of 2003 and 2011. The larger contract awards, competed and 
awarded to HSSTI firms, were for capabilities or technologies that did not help the 
HSSTI emerge. For example, one of the HSSTI firms received a major NASA award for 
orbital launch technology and vehicle development. Similarly, DARPA initiated the XS-1 
program in 2012 that was partially related to the HSSTI, and made multiple, small awards 
to teams that included, but were not led by, the HSSTI firms. Finally, the government 
awards scientific and technological research grants to principal investigators at 
universities. For many years, NASA and the DoD awarded many grants for the 
development of technologies that are, or could be, related to the HSSTI. The FAA AST 
funded research grants specifically for non-governmental space activities (which can be 
very different from research on governmental space activities) through a consortium of 
universities, known as the Center of Excellence for Commercial Space Transportation 
(COE CST). Between 2010 to 2016 inclusive, AST funded the COE CST with 
approximately 6.3 million USD in non-proprietary research, some of which is partially 
related to HSSTI technologies, and some of which is directly related.13 
                                                 
13 In the interest of full disclosure, the author of this research thesis has been the program 
manager of the FAA COE CST since its inception in 2010. 
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Space Act Agreements (SAAs), mentioned in a prior paragraph on Endorsements, and 
the Flight Opportunities Program (FOP), mentioned later in the discussion of the Market 
Creation and Consumer Demand second-order element, both had an alternative benefit to 
the industry by providing a mechanism for the transfer of technical expertise and know-
how, from NASA to the HSSTI firm. The SAAs provided a way for HSSTI firms to 
access NASA engineers and their technical expertise directly: 
“those broader Space Act Agreement activities are useful from a 
technology exchange basis. … we have technology interchange meetings 
with NASA on a variety of topics. They are able to use that mechanism to 
say, okay, you don’t have to pay us for five people to sit on the phone for 
an hour. We’ve got an agreement, they have resources, they have a charge 
code they can charge. … they’ve got great expertise and you can say, hey 
we’re running into this issue, how did you do it? If you want to talk about 
radiation hardening or whatever it is, seats or windows or however all 
those things are done. So we’ve had lots of [technology interchange 
meetings], and those are very useful.” – HSSTI Firm Executive 
The FOP contract mechanism allowed a channel of communication between the 
experienced government agency and the inexperienced private firms. At first the small 
companies didn’t feel they had anything to learn from the government: 
“initially they said, ‘Give us the money and go away,’ ‘We don’t need any 
government help,’ and ‘Well, we don’t really need your help other than 
maybe if you create a market for us, that’ll be great.’ That’s how they 
were standoffish.” – Government Executive 
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The initial rejection of help from the government had the potential, however, of being 
very dangerous: 
“Out in Mojave … they are trying to push the envelope and trying to 
really get beyond just being dependent on government. They rejected the 
government way of doing things on safety, on how to do all this stuff. And 
I think it’s led to some tragedies, frankly.” – Industry Analyst 
Ultimately, however, the relationship between the HSSTI firms and NASA normalized, 
and the companies began benefitting from NASA’s experience and willingness to help: 
“I think then their approach to NASA and approach to the program, they 
changed from that perspective, because then they say, ‘Hey, maybe we can 
get some help from government.’” – Government Executive 
A potentially negative aspect of the government financing actions is that they provide 
an immediate opportunity for revenue generation (previously referred to as “opportunistic 
behavior”). This immediate opportunity had the potential to divert the firm’s activities 
from directly pursuing their concept of commercial demand (i.e., previously called 
“responsible behavior”). Driven by mere survival, firms felt the necessity to pursue 
immediate contracting opportunities that could result in revenue, but which could divert 
them, to some extent, from their market goals:  
“We were actually opposed to government programs to develop new 
launch vehicles. But the prospect of the government putting investment 
into a competitor meant that we had to at least try to get that contract. 
Otherwise, investors would look at us and our competition and say ‘Well, 
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NASA is financing them. We can’t compete with that.’” - Former HSSTI 
Entrepreneur 
The effects, however, were potentially catastrophic: 
“We were moving along, we would have been in flight test and probably in 
operation by 2008 or 2009 if it hadn't been for [a different government 
program], and we hadn't been distracted and ultimately bled out.” – 
HSSTI Executive 
By pursuing alternative, revenue-generating goals, in lieu of the company’s initial 
(primary) market goals, this introduced new risks for the company, as was the case when 
a vehicle developer began selling tickets: 
“I never wanted to be in the consumer sales business, and ultimately, 
getting in the consumer sales business probably is what ultimately killed 
the company. I didn’t want to get into that business because I thought, 
‘That’s an incredibly different business.’” - Former HSSTI Executive 
4.2.2 Financing and Insurance Arrangements 
As described by Van de Ven (1993a, 1993b, 1993c) and his colleagues (Van de Ven 
& Garud, 1989), the Financing and Insurance Arrangements second-order element 
includes multiple third-order elements, such as Private Organizations (Venture Capital 
within a corporation or in the market), or Public Institutions (unique industry-wide 
financing arrangements). In the HSSTI case, this is a fairly coarse delineation of the types 
of financial (not simply insurance-related) arrangements available during the time of 
industry emergence. As one of the theoretical contributions, and to better describe the 
diversity of investment arrangements that can influence the participation of actors (both 
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public- and private-sector) involved with industry construction, this research proposes 
alternative third-order elements within, and a slight renaming of, this second-order 
element. This research proposes to rename this entire portion of the framework from 
“Financial and Insurance Arrangements” to “Financial Arrangements,” to remove the 
emphasis on insurance arrangements that are not uniquely generalizable to other 
industries.14 These new third-order elements include SBIR Funding, Government 
Contract Funding, Government Grant Funding, Non-Equity Investments, Equity 
Investments, and Industry-Wide Stimuli. The government grants and contracts provided 
funding for research activities described in the previous section on scientific and 
technological research. The paragraph below picks up the discussion with non-equity 
investment, equity investment, and industry wide financial stimuli. The paragraphs below 
discuss each of these new third-order elements. 
Included in the Non-Equity Investments third-order element are grants or loans that 
achieve economic development goals (Pages, Freedman, & Von Bargen, 2003). Although 
it is not possible to list all possible reasons for non-equity investments, they may include 
the appropriation of naming rights of programs or vehicles, for example. State and local 
governments provided investments in this category. One example was for 15 million 
USD in the form of transferrable tax credits to Rocketplane. Banks purchased these 
                                                 
14 The original research, conducted within the cochlear implant industry emergence, 
emphasized industry-wide insurance arrangements of the health care system. Retaining 
that emphasis in this research would seemingly limit the generalizability of the 
framework. 
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credits from the company at a discounted rate for 12 million USD. XCOR was another 
HSSTI firm to receive non-equity investment, including a three million USD loan from a 
state-level government organization, Space Florida, and ten million USD from a 
municipal-level government organization, the Midland Development Corporation 
(Copelin, 2013, 2014). The latter financial arrangement was a loan that would not have to 
be repaid, dependent upon the accomplishment of certain milestones. A non-equity 
investment, totaling 500 thousand USD by FAA AST, was made in 2010 to multiple 
spaceports that support HSSTI firms (Messier, 2011).  
Van de Ven (1989) originally labelled equity investment in a single firm by private 
organizations as Venture Capital, but for this research has been renamed Equity 
Investment for two reasons: (1) to draw a consistent but clear distinction between 
investment for equity and non-equity purposes, and (2) to also include other types of 
investing organizations and individuals, not just venture capitalists. For example, some 
fraction of equity investment in the HSSTI has been on the part of individuals and small 
groups (e.g., angel investors). As one example of individual HSSTI investing, founders of 
Rocketplane put ten million USD of their own funds to help convince the Oklahoma state 
legislature to pass the creation of transferrable tax credits for that company: 
“…our CEO and biggest investor ended up putting 10 million of cash into 
the Oklahoma company in order to meet the capital requirements, and that 
was enough to satisfy the tax commission. We got the certificate signed 
literally at 4:55pm local time on December 31st, just as they were closing 
the office when the bill was going to sunset.” – HSSTI Executive 
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Another individual investor, Paul Allen, invested a reported 30 million USD in the 
creation of Mojave Aerospace Ventures, a partnership with Burt Rutan (of Scaled 
Composites) in which Mr. Allen was majority owner. At the high end of individual 
investing, Jeff Bezos invested 500 million USD in Blue Origin in the year 2000, and 
another 200 million USD in 2015. In terms of equity investments by organizations in 
HSSTI firms, a collection of angel investors combined for approximately 25 million USD 
investment in XCOR in a deal that took multiple years to close, from 2012 to 2015. 
Additionally, the Virgin Group started Virgin Galactic with 100 million USD in 2004. 
This was followed in 2009, by a 380 million USD investment from Sheikh Mansour bin 
Zayed al-Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates, through aabar Investments PJS (280 
million USD for the suborbital venture and 100 million USD for a future orbital launcher) 
in exchange for 31.8% equity share (de Selding, 2012; Ruddick, 2009). The parent 
company of aabar Investments is the International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC; 
Cornwell, 2014), wholly owned by the government of Abu Dhabi (IPIC, 2017). aabar 
supplemented their initial investment with 110 million USD in 2011, raising their equity 
share to 37.8% (Tauri Group, 2016). 
Regarding the Industry-Wide Stimuli third-order element, the intention of certain 
HSSTI emergence events was to support not just one firm, but to stimulate investment of 
many firms simultaneously. In most cases, the events did not target a specific set of 
existing firms, but desired to provide the catalyst for technological innovation and 
increases in performance. For the HSSTI, the most influential of these types of events 
was the X PRIZE, later renamed the Ansari X PRIZE. This competition was announced 
in 1996 (Uhlenbrock, 1996) and attracted the participation of almost two dozen teams. 
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The most prominent team among the roster was Scaled Composites, led by Burt Rutan. 
His vehicle design, SpaceShipOne, ultimately won the competition in October 2004 
(Doughton, 2004), claiming the ten million USD purse. A government program that 
subsequently stimulated activity on reusable rocket and “airplane-like operation” 
technologies, both important to the HSSTI, was the Lunar Lander Challenge. The NASA 
Centennial Challenges program15 funded the two million USD purse, and the X PRIZE 
Foundation administered the competition. Northrop Grumman (the company that made 
the Lunar Excursion Module for NASA during the Apollo program) provided funding to 
cover operating costs in exchange for title sponsorship recognition. Although no HSSTI 
firms participated in the competition, participating companies expressed future ambitions 
of flying humans to space. Finally, formation of the private Rocket Racing League in 
2005, intended to stimulate the development of the same technologies as the Lunar 
Lander Challenge, and also attempted to increase public engagement through the 
excitement of head-to-head, rocket-powered racing. XCOR was the only HSSTI firm to 
actively engage in the Rocket Racing League by integrating their liquid rocket engines 
into the air frames of experimental vehicles, resulting in the creation of the X-Racer Mark 
I. XCOR’s involvement ended, however, when the Rocket Racing League chose another 
company (Armadillo Aerospace) to continue engine development instead of XCOR. 
                                                 
15 In the interest of full disclosure, the author of this research was a program manager of 
the NASA Centennial Challenges program from 2004-2009. 
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4.2.3 Human Competence Pool (Training and Accreditation)  
The Human Competence Pool second-order element of the Resource Endowments IIE 
includes third-order elements of Educational Training Programs, Recruitment and 
Training, and Sharing of Knowledge. The category of Educational Training Programs, as 
originally identified by Van de Ven (Van de Ven, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c), seems to co-
mingle education and training, but for the sake of clarity in this study, training programs 
that are relevant to HSSTI activities are included in the subsequent Recruitment and 
Training element. To keep the two types of knowledge separate, this research shall use 
the separate labels of Educational Programs, and Recruitment and Training. The 
Educational Programs resources identified below are generally relevant to the HSSTI, 
focusing on more than just the scientific, engineering, or operations aspects of the space 
industry. The HEA includes programs that are multidisciplinary in nature, because any 
industry segment is comprised of a broader community beyond its technical boundaries. 
Industry actors founded Recruitment and Training activities to support the HSSTI. 
Finally, within the third-order element of Sharing of Knowledge (or Knowledge Sharing), 
there have been a wide variety of conferences and a growing number of papers discussing 
the evolving HSSTI. 
To differentiate Educational Programs from the subsequent Recruitment and Training 
Programs, this third-order element includes university programs that relate to the HSSTI. 
Starting in the late 1980s, the International Space University and the University of North 
Dakota both started multi-disciplinary space studies programs. Started in 1987, the 
International Space University program initially consisted of a ten-week summer program 
that eventually spun-off a year-long Master’s level program in 1995, and a five-week 
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program for southern hemisphere participants in 2011. The University of North Dakota 
program also began in 1987 and was part of their College of Aerospace Sciences. Each of 
these programs included lectures and studies in the technical and non-technical aspects of 
space, including science, engineering, policy, history, law, remote sensing, medicine, and 
others. HSSTI firms all have employed graduates from these programs. In 2013, the 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University began a program in Commercial Space 
Operations/Space Flight Operations to address the educational needs of emerging and 
evolving space industry segments, such as the HSSTI. 
The Recruitment and Training third-order element of the Resource Endowments IIE 
includes the movement of employees between companies, and companies that possess 
training equipment and/or provide operational training that is relevant to the HSSTI. For 
the HSSTI firms, finding employees with the right skill mix was important, but not 
always easy. Specialization of skills, and a high degree of tacit knowledge, existed in the 
established space industry. There was a mismatch between this type of employee, and the 
HSSTI need for highly skilled, but broadly trained, engineers. 
“I needed somebody who could design and build a rocket engine, and I 
was getting people who could design or build, but not both, extremely 
small parts of the system, and nobody who saw the whole thing soup to 
nuts.” - Former HSSTI Executive 
Despite these issues, finding employees to work in remote areas, such as Mojave, was not 
a problem.  
“The number of people that were willing to take a two-thirds cut in pay to 
go work in Mojave to go work on this kind of stuff, they’d leave their job 
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making $200,000, to go make $70,000 working in Mojave. There was a 
stack of resumes always ... I used to always sit there and think, you know, 
for every one of me, there’s 50 people that are working in IT or some 
other business that would quit their job tomorrow to do what I’m doing.” 
– Former HSSTI Employee 
New or diversifying firms began providing preliminary and preparatory training for 
future suborbital astronauts. Example training firms include NASTAR (Werner, 2011), 
Astronauts4Hire (Messier, 2010), and Black Sky. To facilitate awareness of this 
emerging training industry segment, that could support the also-emerging HSSTI, a 
survey of existing training organizations was funded by FAA AST (Futron Corporation, 
2008), including organizations that provide physiological training. Many of the identified 
organizations are government agencies (e.g., the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute), 
hospitals (e.g., the Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas), or universities (including Arizona 
State University, University of North Dakota, and Oklahoma State University). The only 
for-profit organization among them, NASTAR, has conducted the suborbital spaceflight 
training for the initial set of Virgin Galactic ticket holders (Futron Corporation, 2008). 
Some of the educational organizations saw the need for training and began programs, 
such as the ERAU “Polar Suborbital Science in the Upper Mesosphere” training program 
(Jarmusz, 2016) that started in 2016 (Roddey, 2016). This category also includes 
Astronauts4Hire, who train their employees to conduct experiments in weightless 
conditions for compensation. Another aspect of this category includes personnel activity 
among HSSTI firms. An important component of development of the human competence 
required for an industry to emerge comes from the past experiences of firms in related 
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industry segments, or from those in direct competition. Both of the predominant HSSTI 
firms have been very selective in their hiring, and have taken advantage of the lessons 
learned from incumbent firms that comprise other segments of the space industry. As 
much as the new entrant firms want to develop their own corporate culture, and tap into 
the enthusiasm and fresh training of younger employees, both HSSTI firms hire many 
industry veterans, from the public-sector (including NASA, branches of the DoD, and 
policy offices of both the executive and legislative branches), and the private-sector 
(including the large space industry generalist firms, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and 
Lockheed-Martin). Interestingly, both HSSTI companies have also hired former 
employees of the other HSSTI firm, but only to a very limited extent. 
The Knowledge Sharing third-order element includes widespread attendance at 
conferences and meetings, the presentation of papers, and the conduct of promotional 
activities. The number of annual conferences and semi-regular and episodic meetings that 
are directly related to the HSSTI is very small. Since the early 1980s, there have been 
many annual conferences and episodic meetings that pertain to “commercial space,” and 
are therefore related to the HSSTI to some degree. The number fluctuates from year to 
year. Conferences for space enthusiasts, such as the National Space Society’s 
International Space Development Conference (ISDC), and for students of the sciences 
related to space (the SpaceVision Conference by the Students for the Exploration and 
Development of Space) both began in 1982. The precursors to a conference that had 
commercial space as a primary focus began in 1991 (the Space Frontier Foundation’s 
NewSpace Conference). A group that grew out of the amateur rocketry community 
started the Space Access Society (SAS) meetings in 1993. They met annually in Phoenix 
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until its last event, held in 2016. The FAA AST began holding an annual conference on 
commercial space starting in 1998. A “C Suite” conference, initially focused entirely on 
commercial spaceflight, became the more general “International Symposium on Personal 
and Commercial Spaceflight,” started in 2005 in Las Cruces, NM. There were many other 
episodic and non-annual meetings and events held throughout the years, some hosted by 
the same groups, and others held by newly interested organizations. Figure 7 shows the 
number of HSSTI events each year, starting in 1993. Appendix J provides the data for 
this figure. The occurrence of annual conferences and episodic meetings specifically 
organized on suborbital human spaceflight (including human-tended science) is fairly 
small.  
The aforementioned SAS meetings, that began in 1993, were the meeting place of many 
of the suborbital vehicle pioneers prior to the announcement of the X PRIZE. The 
Figure 7. Knowledge sharing: HSSTI conferences and meetings 
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number of special (one-off, or episodic) events increased in the 2008-2009 period at the 
same time the Lunar Lander Challenge prize purses were won, and the HSSTI 
community was forming around the industry trade organization’s Suborbital Applications 
Research Group. There was a decline in HSSTI events in 2014, the same year as, but 
likely not related to, the SpaceShipTwo accident that occurred on 31 October. This 
accounting does not include firm-specific gatherings of potential customers, although 
those could be serving a double purpose of knowledge sharing and marketing/customer 
development. 
Another way to demonstrate the increase in Knowledge Sharing resources in the 
HSSTI is through a basic bibliometric analysis of technical papers submitted and 
accepted at the major space industry conferences. These conferences include the 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) “Space,” and the 
International Astronautical Federation’s “International Astronautical Congress” (IAC). 
The researcher queried the content of papers (including titles, abstracts, and all text) 
using the composite “suborbital AND tourism” search term. Despite the very low paper 
counts at both the IAC and AIAA conferences, the total number of both conferences 
increases after the winning of the X PRIZE in 2004. The number of AIAA papers shows 
a decrease afterwards, however, and the number of IAC papers stays approximately 
constant. The total number of google scholar citations (that presumably includes all the 
papers presented at both these conferences in addition to others) showed a fairly 
consistent increase in the number of HSSTI papers, with only a recent two-year 
downward trend. Figure 8 shows these trends. 
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Figure 8. Knowledge sharing: HSSTI bibliometric analysis 
4.3 PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS 
The last first-order element of the accumulation model framework is Proprietary 
Functions, consisting of three second-order elements, Technological Development 
Functions, Innovation Network and Resource Channels, and Market Creation and 
Consumer Demand. This section provides descriptions of how each of these second-order 
elements have developed for the HSSTI.  
4.3.1 Technological Development Functions 
The Technological Development Functions second-order element includes third-order 
elements of Applied (i.e., proprietary) R&D, Manufacturing, and Testing, conducted by 
HSSTI firms. 
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Proprietary research results within the third-order element of Applied R&D, 
conducted by firms for their own purposes, is different from the publicly-available R&D 
conducted in the Resource Endowments element. The in-house R&D activities of each 
firm contribute to their intellectual property, protected through the patenting process, or 
by the keeping of trade secrets. These protections are necessary to ensure that the firm 
benefits from their research, and “free riders” do not. Patent data exists for HSSTI firms, 
but the numbers of patents for some firms are small or zero, and the quality and 
applicability to the suborbital tourism industry of the patents that have been granted are 
open to question. For these reasons, patent data is not included in this analysis. Primarily 
for these reasons, firms are reluctant to discuss the specifics of their internal research 
activities, although an observer can deduce general areas of research by monitoring press 
releases and media coverage of each firm.16 For example, Virgin Galactic has conducted 
research in solid rocket motor and liquid rocket engine development. Blue Origin has also 
been working on liquid rocket engine technology, as well as the capability to conduct 
vertical landings of their propulsion module. Without a doubt, both these companies have 
more extensive in-house R&D programs underway with the goal of bringing their 
vehicles and services to market, but the details are not available to the general public. A 
principal goal of proprietary R&D is to create technologies that provide a means of 
product differentiation between competing firms (Comanor, 1967). Some of the more 
                                                 
16 For these same reasons, firms normally prefer to conduct their pre-production 
operations out of the public view. Later sections of this thesis discuss how prizes 
encourage firms to contradict this tendency. 
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prominent proprietary technologies belonging to HSSTI firms include the wing 
“feathering” mechanism and operation (for Virgin Galactic) and the ability to perform a 
vertical soft landing of the propulsion module (for Blue Origin). Many of the dimensions 
of product differentiation for the HSSTI, such as customer conveniences, or lower cost, 
are not necessarily life threatening or mission critical. The functionality differentiator of 
experiencing a condition of microgravity for more or less time, with bigger or smaller 
windows to look through, may be an important differentiator for some segment of 
customers. Vehicle safety and reliability, however, will be the ultimate differentiator for 
all HSSTI operators, especially once they start carrying paying customers. Attaining the 
goal of safe and reliable vehicle operation, especially at the earliest stages of production 
operation, will be a very high barrier to entry of the HSSTI. Overcoming this barrier will 
favor new entrant firms that have a greater amount of slack resources, because it will 
allow operators to take necessary precautions, and conduct a reasonable amount of 
quality assurance and testing activities to ensure adequate safety and reliability. 
The Manufacturing third-order element of the Technological Development Functions 
includes design and assembly functions of HSSTI vehicles. As a condition of inclusion in 
this research, all five HSSTI firms conducted these activities to some extent, although 
only three successfully completed and flew their vehicles. Rocketplane was in the initial 
phase of the manufacturing process with their XP vehicle when major redesign 
considerations and a strained financial situation forced their permanent cessation. XCOR 
had completed the Lynx Mark I design, and had begun assembly of the vehicle, but the 
firm’s financial situation ultimately resulted in the project’s indefinite cancellation 
(Foust, 2016), 14 months before the firm finally ceased all operation (Messier, 2017). 
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Scaled Composites was the first HSSTI firm to successfully complete the design and 
assembly of the suborbital transportation system, including the WhiteKnightOne carrier 
aircraft, and the SpaceShipOne vehicle. Virgin Galactic, through the creation of a joint 
venture with Scale Composites, called The SpaceShip Company, also successfully 
completed the design and assembly of the follow-on system, consisting of 
WhiteKnightTwo, and SpaceShipTwo. Finally, Blue Origin also completed the design 
and assembly of the New Shepard vehicle, comprised of the propulsion module and the 
crew capsule.  
The Testing element resources, accumulated by or for HSSTI firms, includes 
component, subsystem, and system tests conducted on their vehicles. It also includes 
operational testing, such as vehicle ground tests, captive carry tests, unpowered flight 
tests, and powered flight tests. Prior to the Lynx vehicle, XCOR conducted several flight 
tests of their EZ-Rocket vehicle (an experimental aircraft air frame fitted with an XCOR 
rocket engine) and the X-Racer Mark I vehicles. XCOR also conducted a number of tests 
once assembly of the Lynx Mark I vehicle began: 
“We did pressure tests on the cockpit after it was integrated into the 
fuselage and tank assembly. The [liquid oxygen] tank took up most of the 
fuselage on the Lynx, so it was quite a large structural element. Then we 
did bending tests on them, both with and without internal pressure on the 
fuselage, [liquid oxygen] tank, cockpit assembly. Most of the complexity 
was in all the subsystems: the various kinds of engines. Valves, actuators 
and whatnot, and those were all tested at the component level. We had the 
avionics suite running on a bench with the sensors driving the displays. 
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We had the reaction control system running with all of its valves, and we 
had the propulsion systems still under development.” – Former HSSTI 
Executive 
Scaled Composite’s HSSTI vehicle, SpaceShipOne, underwent a complete suite of flight 
testing along with its carrier aircraft, WhiteKnightOne. The WhiteKnightOne conducted a 
total of 45 flight tests over a period of three years and SpaceShipOne experienced three 
captive-carry tests, eight glide flight tests, and ultimately had six powered flights. The 
last two powered flight tests won the X PRIZE competition. Virgin Galactic is 
conducting a similar set of flight tests with SpaceShipTwo. WhiteKnightTwo conducted 
100 test flights between 2011 and 2014, and SpaceShipTwo experienced 32 glide and 
cold-flow flight tests during the same period. SpaceShipTwo had four powered flight 
tests in 2013 and 2014, but was lost on the final test flight on 31 October 2014, when co-
pilot Michael Alsbury prematurely unlocked the “feathering” mechanism, causing the 
vehicle to break-up in flight, killing him and seriously injuring the pilot, Peter Siebold 
(Burn-Callander, 2015; Malik, 2014). Virgin Galactic built a second SpaceShipTwo that, 
as of November 2017, experienced four captive carry and seven glide or cold flow flight 
tests. All SpaceShipTwo flights were conducted at an altitude between 15 and 25 km (15 
km is the approximate altitude at which SpaceShipTwo is released by the 
WhiteKnightTwo carrier vehicle). Blue Origin has also conducted an extensive set of 
tests on different configurations of its HSSTI vehicle. The first test vehicle, named 
“Goddard,” had a single flight test in 2006. Blue Origin tested an early version of its 
propulsion module twice in 2011. The actual HSSTI vehicle, named New Shepard, has 
undergone seven powered flight tests to high altitudes (greater than, or equal to, 91 km) 
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as of December 2017. Blue Origin also tested a crew capsule abort engine as part of their 
orbital space transportation system work. Although the crew capsule test did not originate 
from their HSSTI program, the operational experience gained from this test was valuable 
for their suborbital vehicle. 
4.3.2 Innovation Network and Resource Channel Activities 
The Innovation Network and Resource Channel Activities second-order element 
include third-order elements of the Appropriation of Common Goods, and Vendor-
Supplier-Distributor Channels. This section describes both as they apply to the HSSTI. 
Common goods include government activities, such as regulatory decision-making 
and enforcement, the resource endowments of knowledge, financing, and labor (Van de 
Ven & Garud, 1989), and access to multi-user infrastructure facilities (such as 
spaceports). Often times, “it appears that the burden of creating other common goods 
rests with the first mover in the industry” (Garud & Van de Ven, 2000, p. 513). The 
Appropriation of Common Goods third-order element includes events associated with the 
acquisition of these common goods. Without access to such goods, disruption of the 
resource channel is possible. One of the predominant methods by which HSSTI industry 
members gain access to common goods is through the SAAs with NASA, as described 
above in the Institutional Arrangements IIE. These SAAs have provided more than 
legitimacy through association with the government agency. They have also given the 
participating firms access to important information, facilities, equipment, and tacit 
knowledge of the NASA personnel. Common goods not created by government are rare 
in the HSSTI, primarily because none of the firms have yet entered the market, so there 
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are no “first movers.” Presumably, both Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin are in the 
process of creating these resources that will benefit future HSSTI firms. 
The last third-order element, Vendor-Supplier-Distributor Channels, includes 
“upstream” and “downstream” channels of HSSTI firms. Results of the ISA identified an 
HSSTI network of supporting industries, as shown in Figure 9. Typically referred to as an 
industry “chain,” with industry groupings called “tiers,” this research tries to avoid 
terminology or imagery that may lead to the implication of linear and sequential external 
relationships by depicting the network as a set of closely clustered tiles.  
Figure 9. HSSTI network of supporting industries 
 
The different categories of industry capabilities and functions include raw materials, 
infrastructure, supporting communities, subsystems, systems, vehicles and equipment, 
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retails services, and end-use markets. An important characteristic of the entire network of 
firms that comprise and support the HSSTI is the extent to which the current HSSTI firms 
have incorporated different capabilities and functions “in-house” (within the boundaries 
of the firm). All three HSSTI firms (including XCOR, before it exited from the field) 
share a common “core” of capabilities, including some sub-systems, all major systems, 
all vehicle and support equipment capabilities, and vehicle operations. Beyond this set of 
“core capabilities,” some firms also included the “retail services” function of ticket sales 
within the firm’s boundary. In addition to ticket sales, Virgin Galactic also internalizes 
other major retail service functions, upon which the overall Virgin brand rests, including 
training, hospitality, and customer service. Besides the “non-core” sub-system functions 
(which includes plumbing and electronics), the only “raw material” function that Virgin 
Galactic performs in-house is partial provision of financial resources. As mentioned 
above, Virgin Galactic has entered into a joint-venture with aabar Investments to meet 
their financial resource needs. More recently, Virgin Galactic has received a substantial 
investment in their suborbital venture from the royal government of Saudi Arabia 
(Masunaga, 2017). Like Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin also partially relies on external 
sources for some sub-system capabilities. However, Blue Origin receives 100% of their 
financial resources from the company owner, Jeff Bezos, thereby incorporating this 
important resource within the firm’s boundaries. Additionally, Blue Origin stands alone 
among the HSSTI firms because it operates its own private-use spaceport, from which it 
performs all its flight testing. 
Another aspect of the Vendor-Supplier-Distributor Channels third-order element are 
the shared or joint functions that may be available from, or provided by, parent 
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companies to the HSSTI firms. Lacking specific information or data, it is hard to resist 
the temptation of seeing connections between Jeff Bezos’ Amazon.com enterprise, or any 
of the transportation and aviation-related companies that are part of the Virgin Group. 
However, some firm insiders discount those perceptions: 
“I think it’s probably less relevant to ask how does Virgin Atlantic or 
Virgin hotels or Virgin cruise ships relate to Virgin Galactic. I think that 
the primary connection is probably Richard’s tremendous enthusiasm for 
the project and his passion for excellence and customer service. I think 
those things, which are common to all the Virgin companies, are the 
connective tissue between all things Virgin.” – HSSTI Firm Executive 
A special aspect of the supplier channel is the spaceport. Spaceports, established by 
state, county, and municipal-level governments, can be a “common good” if they are 
available for use by any HSSTI firm, such as the Mojave Air and Space Port from which 
Virgin Galactic operates, and XCOR operated (before it exited the industry). Spaceports 
are essential facilities to the HSSTI because no firm can operate without one. All firms 
are associated with at least one spaceport, but not all spaceports are associated with 
HSSTI firms. There are currently seven HSSTI spaceports, six of which had a valid 
“launch site operator’s” license at one time. At the time of this writing, one spaceport (the 
Oklahoma Space Industry Development Authority) has allowed its license to lapse for 
lack of sufficient company activity. An earlier section (covering the Governance second-
order element of the Institutional Arrangements IIE) discussed the initial granting of 
these licenses, and their subsequent extensions. In most cases, licensed spaceports were 
pre-existing facilities (military, in most cases) that had the necessary buildings, runways, 
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taxi ways, support services (e.g., emergency response), and propellant storage sites, that 
could support spaceport operations. In some cases, the infrastructure was usable without 
modification, and in other cases, spaceport licensing requirements imposed additions or 
modifications to the facilities. Mojave is a favorable location for a spaceport because of 
its history as the home of the National Test Pilot School, attracting highly-skilled pilots 
who are accustomed to operating experimental aircraft. Mojave is also located in a 
relatively remote location (the Antelope Valley desert), which is good for safety 
considerations, yet it is only an hour drive from a high concentration of aerospace 
workers (engineers, technicians, etc.) in the Los Angeles area. Mojave’s remote location 
is not necessarily good for secretive operations, since many competing companies also 
reside there. Competitors can observe the flight operations conducted in publicly 
accessible areas (e.g., tarmacs, runways, skies overhead, etc.). Blue Origin operates its 
own “private use” spaceport in Van Horn, Texas, for use only by Blue Origin vehicles, 
therefore, it requires no license for its operation. This location is remote, which is good 
for safety considerations as well as secretive operations.  
4.3.3 Market Creation and Consumer Demand 
The Market Creation and Consumer Demand second-order element of the Proprietary 
Functions IIE includes the third-order elements of Marketing, Cultural Norms, and 
Consumer Demand. This research added a third-order element of Competition, denoted 
by the HSSTI population ecology, as an indication of the supply side market creation 
events. This section describes each of these elements below. 
Marketing activities take on many forms in the HSSTI, including special events (e.g., 
the unveiling of a vehicle), the announcement and creation of new programs, the 
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announcement of contests and raffles for winning prizes of suborbital flights, and 
predictions of first test flights, first commercial flights, etc. First flights of pre-production 
vehicles are marketing events because they publicize an HSSTI firms progress toward 
flight operations. To balance the need for corporate secrecy and the desire for heightened 
public interest, companies have typically only released a small number of photographs of 
their vehicle while it is under construction. When the vehicle is ready to undergo 
preliminary ground testing, keeping it behind closed doors of a spaceport hangar is no 
longer possible, and the operator conducts an “unveiling” ceremony or celebration. 
Virgin Galactic held elaborate events, inviting a large number of industry actors to attend, 
and unveiling the vehicle in dramatic fashion. One of the most-used forms of marketing 
in the HSSTI has been the announcement and execution of contests open to the general 
public, for which the grand prize is a ride aboard the particular vehicle. In total, different 
organizations announced 52 contests of this sort world-wide. Many prize competitions 
were based on vehicles that never materialized. Figure 10 below shows the number of 
competitions announced each year from 2005 to 2015, and it differentiates between the 
HSSTI firms (those companies included in this research) and other, less realistic, 
suborbital firms.  
Publicity was not the only benefit of these contests for the firms. Participating in 
these contests also provided the firm with economic, market creation, and legitimization 
returns: 
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 “almost all of those, or every single one of them produced revenue, which 
was important. Some of them produced a lot more revenue than others... 
so first was revenue, second was marketing, these companies put a lot of 
effort behind the activities. One that was particularly good, ... they paid 
for the ticket and we did a thing at Comic Con and they followed it up with 
a lot of push in the news like Entertainment Tonight and TMZ covered 
it. ... So yeah, second point was obviously free media. And the free media 
begets ticket inquiries... Which hopefully turn into sales ... And the fourth 
one, which people don’t realize is when you’re at a company that is 
funded the way we were funded, those sorts of activities can really help 
Figure 10. Suborbital flight prize competitions 
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with moral of the employees. And they see validation in what they’re 
doing. So, it was always helpful just to have those things going on and 
people coming through and ... them giving a summary of their work. It’s 
amazing when you have an intern or a first-year engineer who’s asked to 
well, show this person what you’re working on. And then they find out 
later that that’s the number 2 producer at The Big Bang Theory, their 
favorite TV show.” – Former HSSTI Executive 
A third form of marketing came in the publicity surrounding the predicted dates of first 
flight tests and first customer (revenue generating) flights, used most prominently by 
Virgin Galactic. This was a common question that industry observers or reporters often 
asked of Virgin Galactic officials. Whenever Virgin officials responded to these 
questions, media outlets publicized this information, raising expectations of industry 
observers and potential customers, thereby bringing attention to the firm. Between 2006 
and 2015, there were at least seven publicized predictions for the start date of powered 
flight tests of SpaceShipTwo. Between 2005 and 2017, there have been more than twenty 
publicized start date predictions of Virgin’s revenue-generating flights. Just prior to the 
accident in October 2014, start dates estimates had fallen to within the 6 months 
following the date of prediction. Since the accident, Virgin Galactic officials have been 
hesitant to begin making predictions again, but most recently, Sir Richard Branson has 
set 2018 as the earliest possible date for first customer flights (Quinn, 2017). 
Resources within the Cultural Norms third-order element are difficult to define, 
although from a very limited perspective, it is “best exemplified in the reasonable person 
standard of care in common tort law” (Van de Ven & Lifschitz, 2013, p. 159). An earlier 
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section of this thesis discussed the institutional norms, and these typify the space industry 
as a whole. Cultural norms in this analysis mean the norms of behavior that are specific 
to the HSSTI, a subset of, or deviation from, the overall space industry norms. There is an 
inherent difficulty, in this specific case, of trying to draw generalizations from a very 
small set of HSSTI firms. It is possible that the establishment of the Personal Spaceflight 
Federation, later renamed to the CSF, was an attempt to establish norms of all 
commercial space industry segments, not just that of the HSSTI. To date, the CSF 
member firms have adopted some common industry standards, but that is the extent of 
the norms they’ve helped to create across their membership. It is possible that there is an 
attempt by HSSTI entrants to create a new “paradigm” for human spaceflight companies. 
Whereas the traditional space industry norm would allocate a budget in the range of 
hundreds of millions of USD for the development of a new suborbital vehicle to carry 
humans as a business venture, a differentiating characterization of HSSTI firms is the 
attempt to develop these capabilities on a budget, starting in the tens of millions of USD. 
To date, however, every attempt to create a “low budget” HSSTI company has been 
unsuccessful. 
The last third-order element of the original accumulation model framework is 
Consumer Demand. At the time of the writing of this report, there has been no operation 
for compensation or hire by any HSSTI firm. Therefore, no data of sales to customers in 
return for HSSTI services yet exists. Well-respected industry analysis firms have made 
market forecasts (Futron Corporation, 2002; Tauri Group, 2012), but the results’ 
credibility is questionable because, for entirely new industries like the HSSTI, “experts’ 
forecasts will always be wrong” (Christensen, 1997, loc. 1882). However, it is possible to 
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track proxies for actual consumer demand, including government funding of HSSTI firms 
for industry development purposes (not for purposes of a governmental mission), and 
announcements by HSSTI firms of ticket “pre-sales” (economic transactions completed 
prior to initiation of commercial operation). The NASA FOP, and its precursor, the 
Commercial Reusable Suborbital Research program, have demonstrated government 
demand for HSSTI services. Both these programs executed contractual relationships with 
the HSSTI firms for the purpose of flying scientists with their experiments on suborbital 
flights, but so far, no flights with people aboard have occurred. NASA has paid a fraction 
of the total contract awards to reserve these flights (up to 40% of the agreed-upon price), 
but still unpaid is the remaining fraction of the contract amount, reserved for after the 
successful completion of human suborbital flight. Specifically, between 2011 and 2014, 
the NASA FOP awarded contracts in the amount of 3.24 million USD to HSSTI firms, 
with an estimated maximum of 1.3 million USD paid to the companies, but only upon 
actual flight reservation. There has also been a demonstration of non-government demand 
for HSSTI flights. XCOR officials have often reported the number of paid reservations 
for flights on their Lynx vehicle on the order of 200 to 250 tickets. Virgin Galactic has 
reported a number between 700 and 800 pre-flight reservations made, with different 
percentages of down-payment, from as low as 10%, to as high as 100% pre-paid by 
customers who want to fly to space. Although the number of pre-sold tickets may not be 
a perfect proxy for actual market demand, it is considered to be a benchmark for the 
survey data that has been collected to date (Futron Corporation, 2002; U.S. Congress, 
2012). 
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This research added a third third-order element, Competition, comprised of the 
HSSTI population ecology, to document the number and dynamic nature of the HSSTI 
service suppliers. The pool of HSSTI firms used in this research includes only those 
companies that have designed their vehicle for commercial operations and have actually 
started building a flight vehicle. This study excluded some groups, like Copenhagen 
Suborbitals, who have designed vehicles to carry a human occupant, and have built and 
tested vehicle hardware, but never planned to be commercially viable. This research 
excluded other firms, such as Sierra Nevada, who has built and is testing flight hardware 
that is capable of carrying humans, because its primary purpose is for orbital flight, 
although they briefly discussed the idea of using their vehicle for suborbital flight. As 
Figure 11 shows, only two of the five HSSTI firms included in this research is in 
operation as of December 2017. 
Figure 11. HSSTI population ecology 
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4.4 IIE INTERACTIONS 
Information and actions move between the three IIEs, as well as within them. In the 
discussion of the original accumulation model framework, three primary linkages 
between IIEs were identified: the balancing act between the forces of “technology pull” 
and “technology push,” the process of transforming knowledge into a commercial 
product, and the creation of industry standards (Van de Ven & Garud, 1989). This section 
will identify and discuss the types of interactions observed in the HSSTI emergence 
study, and compare them with the findings in the original study. 
4.4.1 Institutional Arrangements-Resource Endowments Interactions 
Interactions are bidirectional between the Institutional Arrangements and Resource 
Endowments IIEs. The majority of the interactions from the Institutional Arrangements 
IIE to the Resource Endowments IIE were policies established, laws passed, and 
regulations enacted. For example, federal agencies made an effort to work with the 
HSSTI firms to provide contracting opportunities as a matter of policy, enacted new 
federal policies, and created new federal laws specifically to give the regulatory agency 
special tools to encourage HSSTI emergence activities. State and local government 
organizations passed legislation that provided financial incentives to attract industry 
actors (and jobs) to a specific location. These policies and laws were positive signals to 
the private finance providers (both individuals and organizations) regarding the stability 
and future of laws and regulations affecting the HSSTI. The HSSTI “common goods” 
(public domain research results, financing opportunities, knowledge sharing events, and 
spaceport facilities) are all positively impacted by these policies and laws, as well. An 
increased level of institutional acceptance for the HSSTI resulted in more Institutional 
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Arrangements-Resource Endowments interaction, thereby leading to increased activity 
toward overall industry success. This activity encourages students to enter fields of study 
needed to get a job in the industry, thereby enriching the Human Competence Pool 
second-order element. Favorable policies and laws encourage the start of new 
infrastructure projects, and additional funding promotes conferences, education, training, 
or research on industry-related subjects. 
Activities conducted in the Resource Endowments IIE encourage a general public 
awareness of the new industry. When observed by Institutional Arrangements actors, 
private investment in new entrant firms assure government leaders at all levels that the 
new industry is worthy of supportive laws and policies. For example, the state of 
Oklahoma passed a transferrable tax credit bill for Rocketplane after the firm received a 
private investment of ten million USD. Other activities also provide positive signals of 
the new industry’s worth, including conferences and other events that feature respected 
guest speakers from government and industry. The establishment of education and 
training programs, enrollment and graduation of students from these programs, 
employment of these students in the industry, and preproduction, publicly visible flight 
operation events, can also increase awareness of the industry by the Institutional 
Arrangements actors.  
4.4.2 Institutional Arrangements-Proprietary Functions Interactions 
Not surprisingly, many forms of interactions also exist between the Institutional 
Arrangements and Proprietary Functions IIEs. Regulatory actors provide permissions to 
new entrant firms to conduct flights of their vehicles every time the FAA AST issues an 
experimental permit or launch license to a vehicle operator. Regulators also provide 
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licenses to spaceport operators, permitting them to conduct launches, landings, and 
recoveries as per the terms of their licenses. FAA AST grants safety approvals to various 
HSSTI firms who want to “pre-qualify” their product for use on a licensed vehicle. In 
support of the Proprietary Functions actors, the HSSTI regulators also perform “pre-
application consultations,” to prepare future operators for the regulatory process, and to 
make sure the government has all the information it needs to proceed with its different 
reviews (i.e., environmental, policy, safety, financial liability, and payload). Other 
government agencies, most notably NASA in the HSSTI case, enter into formal 
collaborations with individual firms to facilitate the transfer of technical experience, 
access to unique testing facilities, and sometimes funding from the government to the 
private-sector. The nature of the collaborations varied, and some SAAs were 
reimbursable (where the firms paid for access to the expertise), and others were non-
reimbursable. 
There are also numerous examples of Proprietary Functions actors initiating activities 
that impact the Institutional Arrangements IIE. With respect to obtaining regulatory 
permission to operate, whether it is for a permit to make experimental flights or a license 
to advance toward flights for hire, firms receive regulatory approval by taking the 
necessary steps of application and evaluation. Policies and laws, adopted and passed in 
support of the HSSTI, increase the amount of interaction between private firms and 
government organizations. This increased interaction helps familiarize government 
employees about how to work with the new industry firms. Private-sector firms also 
initiate interactions with institutional actors in the form of political activity. Firms do not 
necessarily intend to apply direct pressure on law makers for the passage of favorable 
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laws through their actions. Firms, or contractors representing them, often provide 
information to policy-makers (in both the executive and legislative branches) to educate 
and inform the government officials of their activities (current and planned) and 
preferences (with respect to policy issues).  
Government activities established the identify of suborbital flight in the 1960s. More 
recently, however, actions on the part of HSSTI Proprietary Functions actors signal an 
attempt to create a new identity for non-governmental suborbital flight. An industry 
conference, hosted by the regulatory agency (FAA AST), promoted the HSSTI concept in 
1997: 
“At the first AST conference in 1997, I was one of the speakers, and I 
rattled a whole lot of cages by having this slide deck that showed - this is 
before anybody thought tourism was a market - and I was showing tourism 
vehicles, I was showing FedEx global fast package delivery, I was 
showing military applications of suborbital spaceplanes, I had all kinds of 
things that were future theoretical applications of what you could do with 
a high-Mach, suborbital spaceplane.” – HSSTI Executive 
More recently, Proprietary Functions actors actively promote the new identity of a 
“suborbital space scientist:” 
“it’s hopefully going to be our time, finally, as space scientists. We’ve 
watched the marine geologists go down to the bottom of the ocean in 
submersibles, we’ve seen the field biologists go off to remote valleys in 
distant places on the planet to do their research, and this is the chance for 
us, as space scientists, to finally get to our environment to do our job 
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ourselves. And that’s what this capability [the HSSTI vehicles] finally 
offers us.” – HSSTI Scientist 
An unexpected development between the Proprietary Functions and Institutional 
Arrangements IIEs occurred when individual firms began developing the concepts of 
identity for their future customers. The regulatory authorities refrained from using the 
term “passenger,” and instead refer to customers as HSPs. HSSTI firms use alternatives 
to both these terms, however, perhaps for marketing reasons. One firm refers to future 
customers as “astronauts,” and although this might increase the level of public awareness 
(by equating the customers of this new activity with a pre-existing, well-known, and 
highly respected occupational category), this has had a potential negative effect on the 
new industry’s reputation within the established space community:  
“there were indications that they [NASA astronauts] were pissed off that 
these people [HSPs] were calling themselves astronauts… [the HSSTI 
firm was] taking some of the glamour off of being an astronaut, since they 
[NASA astronauts] had earned it the ‘right way’ by demonstrating ‘the 
right stuff,’ and almost anybody could just buy a ticket to space. They 
[NASA astronauts] were very unhappy that “astronauts” weren’t as 
special or elite as they used to be.” – Industry Analyst  
4.4.3 Resource Endowments-Proprietary Functions Interactions 
Finally, this section presents the results of Resource Endowments and Proprietary 
Functions IIE interactions, as identified through the HSSTI case study. Individual and 
organizational investors provide funding to HSSTI firms to execute Proprietary Functions 
activities, such as building specialized capabilities, developing the supply network, or 
 123 1-Jun-18 
performing initial design, manufacture, and assembly of the HSSTI vehicle. Examples of 
organizational financing by Resource Endowments actors to HSSTI firms include equity 
funding by the Virgin Group or aabar Investments to Virgin Galactic. Funding by 
individuals includes the self-funding of Blue Origin by Jeff Bezos, or Paul Allen’s 
support of Scaled Composites participation in the X PRIZE competition. Public 
(government) funders provided resources to HSSTI firms through contracts (both fixed-
price and cost-plus) and grants (including SBIR and research grants that required 
matching funds) to conduct research in HSSTI technologies, including human suborbital 
flight, vehicle reusability, and vertical take-off and landing. Government grantors also 
provided funding for the development and improvement of spaceport facilities. State and 
municipal governments also supported the industry financially, often with preconditions, 
to attract HSSTI firms to specific regions with the hope of generating jobs and economic 
development. A final interaction from the Resource Endowments IIE to the Proprietary 
Functions IIE includes the transfer of the pool of human capital as employees for the 
benefit of Proprietary Functions actors. 
Proprietary Functions actors also initiated interactions with the Resource 
Endowments IIE. HSSTI firms demonstrate technical accomplishments to their investors 
with the hopes of securing additional funding, and investors witness these events as 
possible evidence of future economic returns. Commonly, HSSTI firms communicate test 
results to the investors privately. However, if the test results are openly visible to the 
public at large, the Proprietary Functions-Resource Endowments linkage has more impact 
on society at large. These demonstrations of technological capabilities increase the level 
of interest by the general public, thereby attracting more students to fields that can lead to 
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a career in the new industry. This, in turn, increases the amount of human capital that 
chooses to participate in the industry. An interesting reversal of expected interactions 
occurred with respect to pre-production marketing. Investment funding provides the 
opportunity to market the product prior to revenue generating activities, but in the case of 
Virgin Galactic, the pre-production sale of tickets started as a condition of receiving 
funding from the Virgin Group, to prove a market really existed.  
To maximize the generalizability of results, this discussion presented the study results 
so far without significant inclusion of the events stimulated by the X PRIZE competition. 
The following section, however, focuses exclusively on the impact of the prize upon 
HSSTI events, within and between each of the IIEs.  
4.5 THE INFLUENCE OF PRIZES 
The effect of the X PRIZE on events in the Institutional Arrangements IIE was 
significant. When first announced in 1996, the X PRIZE featured prominent government 
and industry members whose very presence was a tacit endorsement of the activity. In 
response to activities performed to win the X PRIZE, regulators conducted workshops to 
ensure that competitors were aware of their regulatory obligations prior to being able to 
conduct flight testing. Spaceport facilities, from which competing vehicles would fly, 
were subject to FAA AST regulations, so the application for, and receipt of, a spaceport 
license was an important event stimulated by the X PRIZE. The impact of the prize event 
on the Resource Endowments IIE was also significant. The announcement of the X 
PRIZE competition stimulated private investment in HSSTI firms, as was the case with 
Paul Allen’s investment of 30 million USD to Scale Composites, for the design, 
assembly, and operation of WhiteKnightOne and SpaceShipOne. The prize organization 
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also organized and executed multiple meetings for all the teams to train the teams, and to 
provide consistent messaging and information about the competition. Finally, the prize 
event manifest itself on the Proprietary Functions IIE in many ways. First, the X PRIZE 
announcement stimulated the creation of many entrants to the competition. Although 
many of these never became viable firms, the founders of these firms felt sufficiently 
emboldened to announce their intention to compete, even if nothing more ever emerged. 
The initiation of the X PRIZE competition also stimulated the entry of pre-existing firms 
into the HSSTI, as was the case with Scaled Composites. Prior to the X PRIZE 
competition, Scaled Composites did not design, manufacture, assembly, or operate 
spacecraft of any kind. It was only due to the competition that the company’s founder, 
Burt Rutan, pursued spaceflight as part of his company’s activities. Furthermore, the X 
PRIZE required firms to perform test flights in a very public setting in pursuit of winning 
the purse. Normally, firms will avoid widely publicized test flights, when possible, to 
avoid the possibility of negative publicity, should something go wrong. 
Prizes also had an effect on the interactions between IIEs. Between the Institutional 
Arrangements and Resource Endowments IIE, the U.S. Congress passed laws that 
authorized the establishment of government-sponsored prize competitions. A contest that 
directly promoted innovation and achievement for HSSTI technologies was part of the 
NASA Centennial Challenges program, called the Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander 
Challenge. Also, the establishment of the X PRIZE competition stimulated industry to 
pursue commercial spaceflight activities despite legal and regulatory gaps. Progress made 
by X PRIZE teams increased pressure on policy-makers to fill these gaps, providing the 
necessary regulations and laws that would permit qualifying flights to take place.  
1-Jun-18 126  
This section has discussed the results of the HSSTI case study. The next section 
discusses these results and proposes specific processes of HSSTI emergence within each 
IIE. This research used the accumulation model as an analytical lens with which to 
interpret the results of the HEA. This lead to a deep understanding of industry actors and 
major emergence events. Some of the interactions between IIEs described above 
involved, or were the result of, prize competitions. Although prizes played a very 
important role in the increased and recent HSSTI emergence activity, they are not a 
common contributor to the emergence of most new industries. Therefore, this research 
treats prizes as a special policy, implemented to stimulate industry. First, the processes 
proposed will describe industry emergence events and relationships without prize effects. 
Subsequent to that, this report will propose industry emergence processes resulting from 
prizes, distinct from the other proposed processes.  
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5. DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the results presented in the preceding chapter with the goal of 
understanding HSSTI emergence processes through the lens of the accumulation model. 
This discussion follows the same order of IIEs as before: Institutional Arrangements, 
Resource Endowments, and Proprietary Functions, followed by the interactions between 
all three IIEs. Processes without prize effects will be described first, and prize-related 
processes will be proposed second. 
5.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS DISCUSSION 
Within the Institutional Arrangements IIE, the first second-order element to be 
discussed is Legitimation. The policy of the U.S. government is to allow the HSSTI 
industry to emerge without the burden of certification. So far, it appears that the industry 
reaction to AST’s mandate to “regulate only to the extent necessary” is positive, although 
the relationship could benefit from better communication: 
“I do think that the light touch regulatory side is a net benefit… since 
2006, when the first set of regs came out, and everything that's come along 
since then has helped legitimize the market.” – HSSTI Executive 
“[The relationship between industry and regulators has] seldom been 
adversarial, but it’s often been very frustrating. It’s not been the story of 
the industry and its enemies. It’s been the story of the industry and its 
well-intentioned, but not always very informed, friends.” – Former HSSTI 
Executive 
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There is discussion within the European community about requiring the certification 
process for HSSTI firms before they can operate there. Many U.S. HSSTI firms oppose 
this decision, saying it will keep them out of the European market, since they do not plan 
on going through the certification process with their vehicles in the U.S. in the 
foreseeable future. Many HSSTI actors see such guarantees as being an unnecessary 
entry barrier. Potential HSSTI firms in the European Union favor certification because 
they feel it is a “conditio sine qua non to reach the market” (Booz & Company, 2013, p. 
27), with the potential to damage their reputation of safety if they operated with anything 
less. The U.S. regulatory framework does have limited guarantees in the form of safety 
approvals, but they do not encompass the entirety of a vehicle design. All safety 
approvals issued by the FAA AST through 2017 were for HSSTI equipment, facilities, 
services, or training. The number of safety approvals issued may be a proxy for private-
sector level of activity within supporting industries of the HSSTI. Between the years of 
2009 and 2017, FAA AST issued safety approvals at a nearly-constant rate of 
approximately 1.4 per year, but since the sample set of data is small, drawing conclusions 
is not possible. An increasing rate of experimental permits, launch licenses, or launch site 
operator’s licenses could indicate an increase in the emergence of the HSSTI. The 
issuance of only ten experimental permits and eight launch licenses to HSSTI firms since 
2004, however, reinforces the inconclusive nature of the evolutionary state or path of the 
industry. The private-sector has not yet adopted widespread industry regulations, despite 
some initial attempts, and the prompting by FAA AST. The actions of several 
government agencies have signaled their support of the HSSTI through the execution of 
multiple agreements, effectively permitting the use of the agencies’ symbols (e.g., name, 
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logos) to increase the legitimacy of the private-sector partner (Rao, 1994). Direct 
association of a firm with major government agencies, such as NASA or the FAA, 
provided the industry members with a high level of legitimacy:  
“having the kind of endorsement, if you will, and the backing of the 
federal government, does help a lot of these companies, and it helps 
advance them.” – HSSTI Trade Association Executive 
“The association with NASA, the association with FAA, does seem to 
carry a lot of weight.” – HSSTI Firm Employee 
On the one hand, these agreements impact a wide audience, including public-sector 
organizations, private-sector firms, and the general public, thereby helping to build both 
sociopolitical and cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). On the other hand, 
private-sector (self-)endorsement activities takes the form of political action, signaling 
their capabilities and activities, intended to develop sociopolitical legitimacy primarily 
with public-sector organizations that influence the business environment in which they 
operate.  
Within the second-order element of Governance, a detailed discussion of each of the 
space industry norms explored is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but some common 
findings about them are worth noting. Although the perception of government as the only 
reasonable-risk customer may hold true for orbital human spaceflight, the presale of 
approximately 700 tickets on the Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo vehicle is evidence that 
a non-governmental demand for suborbital human spaceflight exists. The importance of 
safety considerations in human spaceflight is an international norm in the space industry 
(Howard, 2014), and although enthusiasm for a new industry technology is common, as 
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with the automobile industry in the late 19th century (Rao, 1994), many in the space 
industry are themselves, or perceive many in the industry to be, exceptionally 
enthusiastic. Interviewees generally agreed with the remaining norms identified, 
including the requirement of large amounts of capital, the desirability for international 
cooperation, and governmental involvement in support of the industry. The HSSTI 
regulatory regime in the U.S. is not unique in the world, nor can it claim to be “the first.” 
Although HSSTI firms are first appearing in earnest in the U.S., countries in which their 
space industries are entirely or partially state-owned, controlled, and operated, have their 
regulatory agencies “built-in” to the industry member. In these cases, the government is 
“overseeing industry operations” because they own the industry, and this is the definition 
of the regulatory function required by the outer space treaty. Rules issued by FAA AST 
have also provided guidance (but not direction) to HSSTI firms. Regulations 
implemented in the U.S. limit the burden imposed on the industry. At the federal level, 
there were only three major regulatory acts passed over a period of 30 years, with two of 
these bills passed in the last decade (reflecting the increased level of non-governmental 
space activity). Many laws, on the other hand, have passed at the state level, primarily in 
six states (California, Florida, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia).  
The last second-order element of the Institutional Arrangements IIE is Technology 
Standards. The lack of progress in the development of technology standards may be due 
to the small number of HSSTI firms that are in full operation. The small number of active 
firms, each pursuing a very different vehicle design and mission profile, limits the areas 
of potential standardization to technical domains that do not involve, or interface with, 
each firm’s unique design or operations. This explains the limited adoption of standards 
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to date (regarding propellant tank siting and propellant handling), whose impact is not 
unique to the design or operation of either firm. In fact, there has been strong sentiment in 
the industry against the establishment of standards. HSSTI firms have employed many 
veterans from the established space industry actors, including both the private and public 
(civil and military) sectors, however. These individuals have brought with them the best 
practices, and industry standards, as it pertains to their areas of operation. In this way, 
HSSTI firms have collectively, albeit inadvertently, incorporated best and standard 
practices of the space industry at large. With such a limited field of firms, and with no 
actual market operations at present, the technology standards as applied to each operator 
seems highly customized to each firm (thereby defeating the concept of standardization). 
Once these firms are able to demonstrate continued and repeated operations with paying 
customers, mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) would be expected to 
occur on the part of new entrants, thereby aiding with the creation of de facto industry 
standards. Until the time when more firms are operating within the same industry, 
industry-wide standards may be more of a distraction than a useful component of the 
accumulation framework. 
5.2 RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS DISCUSSION 
Scientific and Technological Research is the first second-order element presented 
here within the Resource Endowments IIE. Since 1996, government-funded research 
received by HSSTI firms totaled approximately 12 million USD in SBIR grants, and one 
million USD in contracts. All the SBIR grants went to the HSSTI firm that had the least 
financial resources. Perhaps that firm more actively pursued, and received, external 
funding that aligned with their internal research efforts. It is unknown how much of the 
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DARPA XS-1 contract funding the HSSTI firms actually received, but it is clear that the 
level of effort spent on this and some NASA programs was not contributing to the HSSTI 
emergence. For HSSTI firms with large workforces, this non-HSSTI activity may not 
have impeded their progress on their suborbital projects, because the orbital and 
suborbital activities may be separately staffed and supported. For the “smaller” HSSTI 
firms, however, the only way to work on activities that were not related to the HSSTI was 
to reduce the resources dedicated to the HSSTI emergence activities. This is an example 
of “opportunistic” versus “responsible” behavior that differentiates the dependence 
relationship from the accumulation relationship. The potential diversion created by 
government contracts, manifest by the pursuit of government goals (in exchange for 
financial resources) that are different from company goals, should be greater than the 
diversion created through the execution of research grants. This is because contracts and 
grants are two different acquisition instruments, and the level of control that government 
imposes for a grant is less than the level expected for contracts. However, the desire of a 
recipient to satisfy the funding agency creates the possibility for a significant level of 
influence and control by government over the firms, even when using a grant. There are 
cases when other actors (not the government) fund the HSSTI firms. This leads to a 
discussion of the next second-order element of the modified accumulation model 
framework, Financial Arrangements. 
In addition to the government contract and grant sources of funding already 
mentioned, Financial Arrangements also includes non-equity investments, equity 
investments, and industry-wide stimuli. The extent of non-equity investment in the 
HSSTI totaled approximately 23 million USD, split fairly evenly between the two 
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smallest HSSTI firm, Rocketplane and XCOR. These investments originated from three 
different governmental (non-federal) entities, each of which was pursuing a modern 
version of the strategy known as “smokestack chasing” (Pages et al., 2003). The total 
investment in exchange for equity, on the other hand, was almost 50 times greater, with 
just over 1.25 billion USD, distributed primarily to Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin, 
although XCOR and Rocketplane also benefited to a much lesser degree. The X PRIZE 
was the industry-wide stimulus that sparked the increase of investment and technological 
innovation observed in the HSSTI. Although the winning of the X PRIZE competition by 
Scaled Composites led directly to the public announcement by Sir Richard Branson of the 
creation of Virgin Galactic in 2004 (although the first mention of “Virgin Galactic 
Airways” was in 1999 [F. Nelson, 1999]), Blue Origin had already been operating since 
2000. Although the government contributed in some ways to the industry emergence, in 
the form of non-equity investment and by sponsoring subsequent prize competitions, the 
private-sector was seen as the predominant contributor to the current HSSTI emergence. 
The last second-order element of the Resource Endowments IIE is Human 
Competence Pool. Not including the typical university aerospace, aeronautical, or 
mechanical engineering programs, educational programs specifically designed for the 
space industry have existed since the late 1980s, but those specifically targeting the 
HSSTI only began emerging in the 2010 timeframe. HSSTI training opportunities 
evolved to meet emerging demand in the mid-2000s, first with the extension of existing 
military and civil aviation training facilities, to include suborbital spacecraft. The number 
of conferences and meetings organized to discuss HSSTI topics as a primary (or only) 
focus are still relatively rare, although the level of activity has increased in the past, 
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especially when industry events (such as flight testing) occurred. The number of citations 
found in a search of google scholar shows an increase in publication activity, although 
conference proceedings from the two major space conference events, not highly attended 
by employees from HSSTI firms, do not reflect an active discourse about suborbital 
tourism in the more established industry communities. The low attendance by HSSTI 
firm employees aligns with the firms’ desires to protect trade secrets, and only to expose 
information in a very controlled way.  
5.3 PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS DISCUSSION 
Within the Proprietary Functions IIE, the Technological Development Functions 
second-order element is the first for discussion. Although most details about the HSSTI 
proprietary research are based on conjecture, each firm has conducted, or is conducting 
extensive research, since the industry is still in its early stages of emergence, and the 
innovations upon which the industry is based, are still under development. Each HSSTI 
firm included in this research had at least preliminary manufacturing achievements, 
although some HSSTI firms were not able to survive past this phase, due primarily to a 
lack of sufficient funding. The remaining firms have completed the manufacturing and 
assembly of their vehicles, and have progressed to the flight testing phase of business 
development. Scaled Composites chose to exit the industry after this phase (after winning 
the ten million USD X PRIZE purse), licensing the intellectual property for 
SpaceShipOne to Virgin Galactic. Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic are still conducting 
flight testing of their vehicles. If these companies can successfully complete these tests, 
they would then progress to the production phase, selling tickets to customers, and 
providing suborbital flight services. 
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Innovation Network and Resource Channel Activities are the next second-order 
element presented here. NASA has been the primary government agency providing 
access to knowledge, facilities, and equipment through the SAAs, which are a special 
acquisition instrument, authorized under the category of “other transactions.” As 
described earlier, categories of these agreements include “funded” (where NASA funds 
the firm to demonstrate a capability or achieve predetermined milestones according to an 
agreed-upon schedule), “unfunded” (where there is no exchange of funds between the 
parties), or “reimbursable” (in which the firm pays NASA, for example, for access to 
facilities, the use of equipment, or the time of government employees). Some of the 
NASA facilities are one-of-a-kind, or unique in their performance capabilities, so the 
access and operational expertise made available to HSSTI firms is an extraordinary 
opportunity. A common vendor-supplier-distributor network characterizes the HSSTI 
(Figure 9 on page 108). Each firm, however, includes portions of each network node 
within its boundaries. The spaceports included in this research are only those that have 
the potential to service U.S. HSSTI vehicle operations. This research excludes other 
existing spaceports in the U.S., licensed for vertical take-off (and vertical landing, in 
some cases) rockets that transport payloads to Earth orbit. For over a decade, there have 
been many plans for the design and construction of spaceports in China, the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia (Boyle, 2006; Ruddick, 2009). More recently, there have been discussions 
about possibly putting spaceports in such regions as the United Kingdom, Europe, 
Scandinavia, and Japan (Clark, 2009; Lauer, Harillo, & Onuki, 2013; Moro-Aguilar, 
2015; Onuki, Ito, Watanabe, & Lauer, 2009). 
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Market Creation and Consumer Demand is the last of the second-order elements of 
the Proprietary Functions IIE. Of the 52 raffles, drawings, and other competitions created 
that featured HSSTI-related prizes, only a small number ever announced a winner, and 
just under 50% were associated with the HSSTI firms included in this research. In other 
words, over half of the contests offered rides on vehicles that never reached the 
manufacture stage. The marketing value of these activities came at a very small cost to 
the companies, and sometimes even generated income. It is interesting to note that Blue 
Origin participated in no prize competitions because, prior to March 2016, the firm was 
very secretive about its progress and operations. Therefore, Virgin Galactic and XCOR, 
starting in 2005 and 2011, respectively, were the HSSTI firms capitalizing on this form of 
marketing. The timing of Virgin’s participation in contests may have been to retain some 
level of public visibility during the interim period between the end of SpaceShipOne 
operations and the beginning of SpaceShipTwo tests in 2010. XCOR also needed 
increased visibility in the public eye to boost ticket sales, and to successfully close on 
funding rounds that were undoubtedly in negotiation prior to the public disclosure date of 
2012. The type of marketing created by prediction of start dates for revenue-generating 
operations carries certain risks, because there can be negative effects if the predictions are 
incorrect. Repeatedly missing the predicted start of operations erodes credibility and 
legitimacy. As mentioned above, Virgin Galactic is the only remaining HSSTI firm that 
has accepted these risks, potentially due to pressure from the investment partners. Blue 
Origin has only recently begun making predictions of operations start dates. 
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5.4 IIE INTERACTIONS DISCUSSION 
In the development of the original accumulation model framework by Van de Ven 
and Garud (1989), the following processes were described as linkages between IIEs: the 
allocation of resources for research (the balance between technology push and pull), the 
conversion of scientific knowledge into a commercial product (the process of 
innovation), and the creation of standards for the new industry. Observations from the 
HSSTI case study provided evidence of these processes between IIEs. 
Firms decide whether to invest their resources in solving questions that are directly 
applicable to their operational goals, or to promote more generic, “basic” research, that 
has the potential to benefit other firms in the industry as well. Prior studies (Illinois 
Institute of Technology, 1968; Mirowski, 2011; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979; Sherwin & 
Isenson, 1969) asked if technological advancement is fastest when promoting 
advancement in general fields, driven by scientific advances (technology push), or by 
concentrating on specific problems that may be economically driven (technology, or 
demand, pull). These studies yielded inconclusive results. The results of this study do not 
identify any firm-funded basic research in support of the industry, hinting at a 
predominant tendency for “technology pull” over “technology push.” There were, 
however, instances of HSSTI firms participating in research activities when funded by 
the government, either through research grants, SBIRs, or contracts. 
The process of converting scientific knowledge into a commercial product is not very 
well understood, and has been described as “long, complex, and highly uncertain 
journey” (Van de Ven & Garud, 1989, p. 214). Financial investment in HSSTI firms by 
individuals and organizations from the Resource Endowments IIE is the primary impetus 
1-Jun-18 138  
behind the innovation process conducted within the Proprietary Functions IIE. To date, 
there is no evidence of a successful innovation process, because no HSSTI firm to date 
has yet begun commercial operations. The strongest evidence of commercial demand in 
the HSSTI are the 700 reservations taken by Virgin Galactic for future flights on their 
SpaceShipTwo vehicle. 
The Institutional Arrangements second-order element of Technology Standards is one 
of the least developed in the entire HSSTI framework. The small number of firms directly 
involved does not promote a great desire for standards because of the very different 
vehicle designs and mission profiles between them. The industry trade association 
initially coordinated standards development regarding upstream activities of vehicle 
operations, such as for propellant handling. More recently, ASTM International, an 
official standards creation organization, has assumed the lead role in this activity. 
Industry veterans, previously employed in the established space industry, have brought 
best practices to HSSTI firms, and this may lead to adoption of de facto standards. 
Finally, the linkages between IIEs may transcend the market of one country and 
extend into another. For example, the FAA AST openly discusses the intent and structure 
of the U.S. regulatory framework at international events, and other countries may 
construct similar, or related, governance structures for the HSSTI in their country. 
“Other people are picking up the message and using what the last ten 
years with AST has developed as a playbook, to move ahead with their 
own development and domestic regulations. I think that is a very positive 
government role.” – HSSTI Executive 
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Given these results and observations, this research next proposes processes within 
each of the three IIEs. 
5.5 INDUSTRY EMERGENCE PROCESS DIAGRAMS 
5.5.1 Industry Emergence Chart 
This research chronologically arranged all the events and industry information 
collected and detailed above in tabular form to graphically depict the HSSTI emergence, 
starting with the year 1955 through 2017. Appendix B shows a miniaturized (page-sized) 
version of the detailed chart. For the sake of clarity, color-coding differentiated the three 
major IIEs and their components from one another. The Institutional Arrangements are 
red, Resource Endowments are green, and the Proprietary Functions are blue. The 
detailed HSSTI industry emergence chart includes approximately 600 events identified in 
the HEA, and is supplemented with ISA and DIA results. The observation of common 
progressions of events (such as requesting, then receiving, regulatory permissions, or 
financial investment followed by experimental testing) helped generate a simplified 
process diagram that describes the detailed industry emergence events. The detailed chart 
shows that after the initial government research activity (depicted by an inset box that 
spans the years between 1955 and 1975), there was a low level of activity until 1996, 
after which time the number of significant events clearly increased with the 
announcement of the X PRIZE competition. This renewed activity began with the entry 
and creation of a number of private-sector firms, quickly followed by substantial amounts 
of private individual and organizational investment (within 3-5 years). Institutional 
activities at the state-level also began at approximately the same time as the 
announcement of the X PRIZE. National-level actors also began contributing to the 
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industry emergence within 3-5 years after the private-sector investment events. As further 
evidence of a vibrant industry emergence, the popular press frequently reported on 
HSSTI events, across the private- and public-sectors, by the time the X PRIZE was won 
in late 2004.  
The development of process diagrams based on the HSSTI emergence chart began with 
the original depiction of the accumulation model, first created to show the three IIEs with 
the inter-element linkages (Figure 12). The industry emergence chart identifies 
interactions between IIEs as boundary-spanning arrows, and their content is based on the 
results of the HEA. The bridge between Institutional Arrangements and Resource 
Endowments primarily includes legitimacy signaling activities by actors building the 
Resource Endowments infrastructure, and the passage of enabling laws and policies by 
actors contributing to institutional arrangement resources. Resource Endowments actors 
are involved with creating new scientific knowledge (“technology push”) and providing 
different types of resources, in exchange with Proprietary Functions actors providing 
capabilities and (potentially) economic returns to the resource providers. In return, 
Proprietary function actors conform their product to regulatory requirements 
(“technology pull” behavior) of Institutional Arrangements actors, and also engage in 
technology standard development (also “technology pull”), political activity, and 
relationship-building with Institutional Arrangements actors. In exchange, industry actors 
receive regulatory permission to operate. The perspective in Figure 12 is quite 
macroscopic, and the objective of the next section is to propose the details of processes 
that take place within each of the major IIEs. Since prize competitions are not common to 
the emergence of most industries, the following discussion defers the impact of prizes 
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upon the HSSTI emergence until after the proposition of more generalizable, 
microscopic, industry emergence processes. 
Figure 12. Original accumulation model process diagram 
 
5.5.2 Process Flow Diagrams 
This section proposes and describes a process flow diagram of the industry 
emergence. The bases of these processes are the inductive research of the HSSTI case 
study described to this point. This section first describes the accumulation model process 
diagram within each of the three IIEs, and afterwards, discusses the relationships between 
each IIE.  
In the processes that follow, different forms of legitimacy are proposed to be a major 
result of the resource accumulation efforts. Multiple observations, made during the 
HSSTI emergence research, triggered the explicit inclusion of legitimacy to the 
accumulation model process diagram. First, a subtle inconsistency noted was in the IIE 
framework at the second-order level. Based on the data collected in the HSSTI 
emergence chart, most second-order elements denoted or inferred the construction of 
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objects or events. For example, in the Proprietary Functions IIE, the Technological 
Development Functions second-order element inferred the development of technologies, 
the Innovation Network and Resources Channels second-order element consisted of 
network elements, and the Market Creation and Consumer Demand second-order element 
resulted in market emergence indicators (firm entrances, exits, and ticket reservations 
taken). In the Resource Endowments IIE, the Scientific and Technological Research 
second-order element consisted of research programs and values, the Financial 
Arrangements second-order element tracked investments, and the Human Competence 
Pool second-order element contained education and training programs, meetings, and the 
number of published articles. Finally, the Institutional Arrangements IIE Technology 
Standards second-order element consisted of adopted technology standards, and the 
Governance second-order element counted permits, licenses, and safety approvals. The 
Legitimation second-order element in the original accumulation model framework, 
however, broke this pattern. Legitimation is the action of creating legitimacy, but the 
framework does not explicitly include legitimacy. It seems clear the industry emergence 
processes should contain it, even if the framework did not. In addition to this, and to 
foreshadow an upcoming discussion at the end of this chapter, fundamental 
characteristics the HSSTI (specifically, high cost, high technical complexity, and high 
risk of personal harm) indicate that this is an industry highly sensitive to legitimacy. To 
highlight legitimacy, and its creation, this research proposes that the resources 
accumulated within the Institutional Arrangements and Resource Endowments IIEs all 
contribute to the development of industry legitimacy. Using the two-part legitimacy 
typology by Aldrich and Fiol (1994), this research proposes that the Institutional 
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Arrangements resources contribute to the development of sociopolitical legitimacy, and 
the Resource Endowments resources support the creation of the industry’s cognitive 
legitimacy. The following discussion provides details for the processes that comprise the 
accumulation model’s three IIEs. 
As mentioned above, this section presents conclusions for the IIE element groupings 
identified in this research in lieu of using the original framework typology. To emphasize 
the contribution by all Institutional Arrangements IIE second-order elements to 
legitimacy, the Legitimation second-order element in the original framework was 
renamed Endorsements. The purpose of the relabeling was to align this discussion with 
the process diagrams described above. Gray cells in Table 3 show the differences 
between the original and new categorizations. 
Table 3. Modified Institutional Arrangements IIE second-order elements 
Original 2nd-order 
Institutional Arrangements 













Governance Norms, Rules Governance 
Regulations 
Laws 
Technology Standards Gov’t Regulatory Mandates Technology 
Standards Cooperative, Voluntary 
Industry Standards 
Market-driven, de facto 
Standards 
   
 Predominant events within the Institutional Arrangements IIE that contribute to the 
Governance resources of the HSSTI include the adoption of, and adherence to, industry 
norms and rules, the creation of new regulations, the augmentation of existing 
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regulations, and the enactment of policies and laws through the legislative process at all 
levels. Municipal and state legislatures passed laws to permit the creation of spaceports 
(major supporting infrastructure facilities), to better define liability responsibilities of 
companies, their subcontractors, of HSPs, and also to provide subsidy incentives for the 
newly-created HSSTI firms. The passage of multiple federal laws, and subsequent 
amendments, created a regulatory framework that was able to evolve along with the 
industry. These regulations resulted in Endorsement decisions that impacted the HSSTI, 
including the issuance of experimental permits and launch licenses. Experimental permits 
allow firms to conduct important flight tests with the goal of building operational 
experience and collecting real-world performance data for their vehicles. Launch licenses 
give the vehicle operators the final permission to conduct operations that result in 
“compensation for hire.” Regulatory activities also included licenses for the operation of 
spaceports. The creation and implementation of supporting policies underpinned these 
laws and regulations. The issuance of these laws and regulatory instruments over time, 
plus the execution of partnership agreements between HSSTI firms and NASA, created 
an increased sense of sociopolitical legitimacy (Aldrich, 2005; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), or 
pragmatic-exchange legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Sociopolitical legitimacy is the 
establishment of institutional processes and identities that can include the new industry 
actors and characteristics. Activities such as the creation, application, and award of safety 
approvals, partnerships between public- and private-sector actors, the political activity 
(i.e., lobbying and contributions to political action committees) undertaken by the HSSTI 
firms themselves, all contribute to Endorsement resources, and enhance sociopolitical 
legitimacy. Although the IIE second-order element of Technology Standards is currently 
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less developed in the HSSTI case, these would also increase the level of legitimacy for 
the industry. There are three propositions that summarize the effects of Institutional 
Arrangements IIE components upon sociopolitical legitimacy, one for each of the second-
order elements. The first Institutional Arrangements proposition describes the creation of 
Endorsements objects and events, including guarantees offered by legitimizing 
organizations (such as government agencies), endorsements (e.g., government 
partnerships and political activity conducted by firms), licensing practices, and industry 
regulations: 
Proposition 1a: Endorsement objects/events of the Institutional 
Arrangements IIE are positively correlated to the establishment and 
accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy for the new industry. 
The next second-order element of the Institutional Arrangements IIE is Governance. 
Governance objects and events include all laws (municipal, state, and federal), 
regulations (such as space port licenses, operating permits and licenses, etc.), norms, and 
rules. 
Proposition 1b: Governance objects/events of the Institutional 
Arrangements IIE are positively correlated to the creation and 
accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy for the new industry. 
Finally, sociopolitical legitimacy is accumulated through the second-order element of 
Technology Standards. Objects and events in this element include voluntary industry 
consensus standards, government mandated standards, and de facto standards of the new 
industry. 
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Proposition 1c: Technology Standards objects/events of the Institutional 
Arrangements IIE are positively correlated to the creation and 
accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy for the new industry. 
As shown in Figure 13, these propositions describe positive correlations between the 
three Institutional Arrangements second-order elements and sociopolitical legitimacy. If 
laws increase the burden on HSSTI firms, if regulations make it harder for firms to 
operate, if government partnerships decrease, or if the effectiveness of political activity 
diminishes, the establishment or accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy can also 
diminish. 
Figure 13. Institutional Arrangements IIE processes 
 
As with the Institutional Arrangements IIE above, there were some modifications 
made to the Resource Endowments IIE framework to better represent the HSSTI case 
study results within the discussion of the processes proposed. Whereas the original model 
included no explicit third-order elements for the second-order element of Scientific and 
Technological Research, this research included third-order elements of research results 
from government contracts and grants. Also for this research, the second-order element 
title, Financing and Insurance Arrangements, was changed to Financial Arrangements. 
This research also expanded the third-order elements of Financial Arrangements to 
include government grants, contracts, private non-equity, and equity investments, and 
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industry-wide investment stimuli. Table 4 shows the new categorization for the process 
diagrams, with changes shown as gray cells.17  







(Van de Ven & Garud, 1989) 




No further delineation Gov’t Contract R&D Results* 
Gov’t Grant R&D Results* 
Financing and Insurance 
Arrangements 
Financial Arrangements 
Public Institutions SBIR Funding 
Gov’t Contract Funding 
Gov’t Grant Funding 
Non-Equity Investment 




Human Competence Pool Educational Training Programs Educational Programs* 
Recruitment & Training Recruitment & Training* 
Sharing of Knowledge Knowledge Sharing* 
* denotes inclusion in Common Goods categorization 
   
Since a grouping of resources, called Common Goods, is referenced in the upcoming 
Proprietary Functions discussion, it is necessary to identify the different resources 
included in this “category of convenience.” Common Goods includes all forms of 
government-funded research results and other resources, such as access to non-exclusive 
facilities (e.g., spaceports in the HSSTI case, not a part of the Resource Endowments 
IIE). For the sake of convenience, Common Goods is shown in the proposed process 
diagram in lieu of the Scientific and Technological Research second-order element. The 
modified second-order element of Financial Arrangements is the second grouping within 
this process diagram. A single HSSTI firm may receive many rounds of financing, in 
                                                 
17 The rephrasing of Sharing of Knowledge, to Knowledge Sharing, was deemed to be too 
inconsequential of a change to merit a graying of the cell. 
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many forms, and over a long period of time, from both private- and public-sector actors. 
Financing from the public-sector includes research grants and development contracts, 
primarily to take advantage of the firm’s capabilities in support of a government 
programs or projects. Financial subsidies, typically provided by state governments to 
attract firms with the desire for employment and growth for their region, is a well-
established strategy of economic development (Pages et al., 2003). Private capital 
markets, including individual, angel, and venture capital investors, are some of the major 
actors in this element. The second-order element of Human Competence Pool includes 
the third-order elements of Educational Programs, Recruitment and Training, and 
Knowledge Sharing events (i.e., all conferences, meetings, and publications) that pertain 
to, and support, the HSSTI. Although categorized here under Human Competence Pool, 
human capital is also possibly included as a Common Good since it is “under limited 
organizational control” (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2004, p. 503) and freely 
available to all industry actors. These three second-order elements provide a basis for the 
establishment and accumulation of cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
Cognitive legitimacy differs from sociopolitical legitimacy in that the latter distinctively 
acts upon the institutional segment of society, whereas the former permeates society in 
general, with the ultimate goal of achieving an unquestionable “taken-for-grantedness” 
(Tost, 2011).  
The second set of propositions of this research pertains to the Resource Endowments 
IIE process diagram. The first proposition associates the development of, access to, and 
utilization of Common Goods to the creation of cognitive legitimacy. Common Goods 
help build the store of cognitive legitimacy when it is positively utilized. 
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Proposition 2a: Common Goods objects/events of the Resource 
Endowments IIE are positively correlated to the creation and 
accumulation of cognitive legitimacy for the new industry. 
In a similar fashion, the next proposition relates the construction of new industry 
cognitive legitimacy to the Financial Arrangements third-order elements grouping. This 
group includes funding from the government for the conduct of research activities (e.g., 
through grants, or contracts), and other funding from private and public sources, whether 
in exchange for firm equity or not: 
Proposition 2b: Financial Arrangements objects/events of the Resource 
Endowments IIE are positively correlated to the creation and 
accumulation of cognitive legitimacy for the new industry. 
The last proposition addresses a grouping referred to as Human Competence Pool, 
including Educational Programs, Recruitment and Training Events, and Knowledge 
Sharing events, and describes their relationship with HSSTI cognitive legitimacy: 
Proposition 2c: Human Competence Pool objects/events of the Resource 
Endowments IIE are positively correlated to the creation and 
accumulation of cognitive legitimacy for the new industry. 
These proposed processes are shown in Figure 14. Constructive events in these three 
categories help build cognitive legitimacy for the HSSTI. Negative events, on the other 
hand, have a destructive effect on cognitive legitimacy. For example, organizers of 
conferences associated with space activities (including those of the HSSTI) were aware 
of the impact their actions had on their cognitive legitimacy, and they changed their 
customs and behaviors with the expressed intent of increasing their cognitive legitimacy.  
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Figure 14. Resource Endowments IIE processes 
 
The ISDC, run by a grassroots space advocacy community, practiced a whimsical 
tradition of “hall costumes,” whereby attendees would dress up as fictional or real 
characters from space movies, literature, lore, or history. Conference organizers, 
however, discouraged this practice early in the conference’s history as a means to 
increase the effectiveness of the organization’s political advocacy activities: 
“there was a big controversy because they said ‘no hall costumes,’ 
because you used to have [Ms. X] used to wear a stewardess outfit for like 
Pan Am Space or whatever else like that, and a lot of this came from 
science fiction events where you go and …[that] used to be called hall 
costumes. So I remember one of the first ISDCs, one of the rules was no 
hall costumes, and that did not go over well with people.” – Former 
HSSTI Employee 
A strong motivation to increase the event’s legitimacy was to attract potential investors: 
“we had to create events for investors to come to. … If you want people to 
invest in an industry, you have to act like an industry, so we were always 
the ‘other’ category when you’d go to these pitch events, so what we 
wanted to do was to create things that were our own.” – Former HSSTI 
Employee 
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The third element of the accumulation model framework, Proprietary Functions, 
describes the business development cycle of a firm, starting with an idea in the minds of 
one or more entrepreneurs, before the firms form. A new firm in this process enters the 
HSSTI, but it is possible that an already-existing firm expands into the industry, as was 
the case for Scaled Composites. As firms enter the industry, they begin to assemble the 
necessary capabilities to execute the many advanced and specialized capabilities 
(colloquially considered “rocket science”). A long process ensues, including performing 
the initial HSSTI vehicle designs, conducting all the reviews, having the components and 
subsystems manufactured in-house or through subcontract, and finally assembling the 
vehicle and all its supporting systems (test stands, tow vehicles, etc.). If the “trifecta of 
burdens” faced by firms trying to construct a new industry (Woolley, 2011b) is too great, 
the company may face “start-up failure” and be forced to exit the market. If the firm can 
succeed in its initial activities, attract sufficient funding, and experience the necessary 
growth, they can progress to pre-production activities. At this stage, the firm must acquire 
the necessary regulatory permits for the operation of their vehicle, that allow for the 
conduct of initial ground tests, and subsequently more advanced flight testing. The firm 
may begin marketing activities at this stage, as Virgin Galactic has, selling reservations 
for tickets aboard the vehicle, once commercial operations begin at some future date. The 
firm may also begin accepting government contracts for future flights. If the testing 
conducted at this stage leads to undesirable results, it may be necessary for the firm to 
perform initial HSSTI activities a second time, redesigning, manufacturing, and 
reassembling some, many, or all of the vehicle systems. If the funding and capabilities 
required for these additional activities are not available, the firm may exit the market due 
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to failure during this major testing phase (referred to here as “testing failure”). However, 
if results of the testing activities meet expectations, then the firm may progress to the 
production activity, and enter commercial operations. At this phase, the firm requires a 
full operating license to operate their vehicle to generate revenue (starting with the 
backlog of pre-sold tickets, if the firm engaged in pre-production marketing). In this final 
phase, the firm begins market creation activities in earnest, and they deliver on 
government contracts they may have won previously. If, during commercial operations, 
there are anomalies or other flight operation experiences that are undesirable or deadly, 
the firm returns to the pre-production phase of operations. During the production phase, 
the firm may not be able to attract enough customers to generate sufficient revenue for 
profitable operations. If this condition persists over time, the firm exits the market due to 
market failure. Finally, if the firm successfully builds a sufficient market of customers 
during the production phase to make the operation profitable, this should attract 
additional new entrants to the industry field, thereby restarting the cycle for the new 
company, and helping the industry emerge as a whole. In fact, this begins the cycle of 
“creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1947): 
“exemplified by entrepreneurs, financed by capitalists, who strike out, 
often in competition with other, like-minded entrepreneurs, to introduce 
new innovations which, if successful, provide opportunities to reap 
extraordinary profits for a temporary period of time. Imitators follow, and 
an avalanche of consumer goods pours onto the market which dampen 
prices, profit margins, and innovation investments. This, in turn forces 
reorganizations of production, greater efficiency, lower costs, the 
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elimination of inefficient, non-innovating firms, and the replacement of old 
products and processes with the new ones.” (Van de Ven, 1992, p. 218) 
Table 5 below shows how the third-order elements of the Proprietary Functions IIE 
correlate to the phases of industry development as depicted within the proposed process 
diagram. 










Applied R&D Initial Firm Activity 
Manufacturing 






Initial Firm Activity 
Vendor-Supplier-
Distributor Channels 
Initial Firm Activity 
Market Creation and 
Consumer Demand 
Marketing Pre-Production Activity, 
Production Activity 
Cultural Norms Initial Firm Activity 
Consumer Demand Production Activity 
Competition Production Activity 
 
This research proposes two ways that Proprietary Functions IIE resources contribute 
to cognitive legitimacy. Both involve the public demonstration of their capabilities. The 
first is during the pre-production phase of firm operations. Normally, operations 
conducted during this phase are not public, but sometimes the public demonstration of a 
capability is unavoidable. In those cases, positive public demonstrations of a firm’s 
capabilities help build cognitive legitimacy, and a negative outcome of these 
demonstrations can diminish it. Therefore, this research proposes that: 
Proposition 3a: Publicly visible, pre-production operations are positively 
correlated to the creation and accumulation of cognitive legitimacy. 
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Similarly, any operations conducted during the production phase of firm operations also 
contributes to cognitive legitimacy. Because all operations during this phase are 
nominally visible by the general public, these activities also contribute directly to 
building cognitive legitimacy of the industry: 
Proposition 3b: Publicly visible, production operations are positively 
correlated to the creation and accumulation of cognitive legitimacy. 
The majority of these Proprietary Functions processes, shown in Figure 15, are not an 
extension of theory, but a general description of the HSSTI business cycle.  
Figure 15. Proprietary Functions IIE processes 
 
Next, this discussion addresses the impact of both legitimacy types on the interactions 
between all three IIEs. The sociopolitical legitimacy created through accumulation of 
component resources of the Institutional Arrangements IIE can amplify the effects of 
interactions with the other two IIEs. An increase of sociopolitical legitimacy provides 
policy-makers, regulators, and other government officials with a better understanding of 
the characteristics and processes of the new industry actors. Regarding the bi-directional 
interactions between the Institutional Arrangements and Resource Endowments IIEs, 
increased sociopolitical legitimacy better positions government officials to enact new 
laws, implement new regulations, or execute acquisition instruments (i.e., contracts or 
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grants) that are more effective, supportive, or efficiently processed. Additionally, 
institutional actors more easily understand signals of new industry legitimacy, based on 
university research, investment histories, employment trends, and conference events. If 
these signals support the new industry, they reinforce and bolster the levels of 
sociopolitical legitimacy perceived by the institutional actors, and vice versa. Regarding 
the interactions between the Institutional Arrangements and the Proprietary Functions 
IIEs, the discussion above regarding the passage of new laws, regulations and 
administrative functions also applies, easing the legal and regulatory burden on new 
firms. Furthermore, through better understanding of the issues and actors of the new 
industry, increased sociopolitical legitimacy also promotes the efficacy of corporate 
political activity upon institutional actors. Therefore, the sociopolitical legitimacy built 
within the Institutional Arrangements IIE impacts the interactions with the other two 
IIEs. 
Proposition 4a: Increased sociopolitical legitimacy is a positive 
moderator of interactions between the Institutional Arrangements and 
Resource Endowments IIEs.  
Proposition 4b: Increased sociopolitical legitimacy is a positive 
moderator of interactions between the Institutional Arrangements and 
Proprietary Functions IIEs. 
The interactions between the Resource Endowments and Proprietary Functions IIEs 
are very important to the success of the industry emergence. Actors in the Proprietary 
Functions IIE can receive different types of vital resources, including advanced or 
specialized capabilities, partnerships that provide access to equipment, facilities, or talent 
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(both technical and managerial), and different forms of funding. Resource Endowments 
actors receive technical goods or services (in response to grants or contracts), and private 
capitalists in the HSSTI are still hoping for financial returns. The public demonstration of 
technical capabilities is an important interaction between the Proprietary Functions and 
Resource Endowments IIEs, because a broad range of resource actors (financiers, 
educators and trainers, students and researchers, supporting organizations), as well as the 
general public, witness these demonstrations. The Proprietary Functions actors also 
interact with the Institutional Arrangements actors. Firm representatives may conduct 
various forms of political activity, including informing and educating relevant executive 
and legislative branch actors regarding their vehicle and firm, or testifying at a 
Congressional hearing, etc. The interaction by the institutional actors with the proprietary 
actors includes granting of regulatory permissions, endorsements, or guarantees, in the 
form of licenses, permits, safety approvals, or SAAs. As mentioned previously, many of 
the interactions between the Proprietary Functions and the other two IIEs are critical to 
increasing the cognitive legitimacy of the fledgling industry. Public demonstrations of 
new technological capabilities (especially when successfully and dramatically performed) 
increase the cognitive legitimacy of the industry to anyone who witnesses them. These 
demonstrations of technological capabilities also increase the level of interest of the 
general public, thereby attracting more students to fields that can lead to a career in the 
new industry. This, in turn, increases the amount of human capital who choose to 
participate in the industry. The increased cognitive legitimacy also promotes a heightened 
level of confidence by the financing individuals and organizations, thereby leading to an 
increase of their investments in the industry. 
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Proposition 5a: Increased cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator of 
interactions between the Institutional Arrangements and Resource 
Endowments IIEs. 
Proposition 5b: Increased cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator of 
interactions between the Institutional Arrangements and Proprietary 
Functions IIEs. 
Proposition 5c: Increased cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator of 
interactions between the Resource Endowments and Proprietary 
Functions IIEs. 
Finally, when firms conduct successful test operations in the public view, an increase 
of cognitive legitimacy is the result. This also positively affects the perceptions by 
policy-makers, directly affecting the level of sociopolitical legitimacy. This, then, 
increases the effectiveness of political activity by the private-sector firms. This also leads 
to a subsequent passage of enabling laws and supporting regulations. This links the two 
forms of legitimacy in a one-way, moderated relationship (i.e., cognitive legitimacy 
moderates the level of sociopolitical legitimacy, but not vice versa). 
Proposition 6a: Cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator between 
Endorsements objects/events within the Institutional Arrangements IIE 
and the creation and accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy. 
Proposition 6b: Cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator between 
Governance objects/events within the Institutional Arrangements IIE and 
the creation and accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy. 
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Proposition 6c: Cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator between 
Technology Standards objects/events within the Institutional 
Arrangements IIE and the creation and accumulation of sociopolitical 
legitimacy. 
When combined, the process diagrams of each individual IIE provide an integrated 
image of industry emergence. As described, the institutional resources accumulate with a 
positive correlation to sociopolitical legitimacy. The sufficient/insufficient development 
of institutional resources can lead to a positive/negative impact on sociopolitical 
legitimacy. In a complementary fashion, cognitive legitimacy is positively correlated to 
the resources accumulated in the Resource Endowments IIE. The interactions between 
the Institutional Arrangements IIE and the other two IIEs are positively correlated with 
the sociopolitical legitimacy, which assists in the passage of laws and regulations to 
support the emerging industry. Furthermore, this interaction increases the efficiency of 
legitimacy signaling from the Resource Endowments IIE and political activities from the 
Proprietary Functions IIE. The cognitive legitimacy, primarily constructed within the 
Resource Endowments IIE, and assisted by publicly-visible operations within the 
Proprietary Functions IIE, supports interactions between all three IIEs, by adding 
foundational credibility to legitimacy signaling and political activities, increasing the 
level of interest of Resource Endowments actors, whether it be to encourage venture 
capitalists to invest in the industry, students to enter academic fields that can help them 
get jobs in the industry, or coordinators of conference and other knowledge sharing 
events to promote gatherings and meetings within the industry membership. Lastly, the 
cognitive legitimacy has a positively moderating effect on the creation of sociopolitical 
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legitimacy by the second-order elements of the Institutional Arrangements IIE. Figure 16 
below shows the integrated process diagram that graphically present these relationships. 
This is the complete set of generalized processes for industry emergence. Next, the 
special processes related to an industry-wide prize event on industry emergence are 
proposed. 
Figure 16. Accumulation model processes 
 
5.5.3 Process Flow Diagram with Prizes 
The process flow described above was based on the HSSTI data and analyses, but 
intentionally omitted prize events that may have accelerated the overall industry 
emergence process. In 1996, the X PRIZE Foundation announced the Ansari X PRIZE, 
and Scaled Composites won the competition in 2004 with SpaceShipOne. Shortly 
thereafter, the NASA Centennial Challenges program sponsored another prize 
competition, the Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge. Both of these competitions 
1-Jun-18 160  
promoted the development of technologies important to the HSSTI, and both were 
successful. A competitive Rocket Racing League formed subsequent to the X PRIZE, but 
it only conducted demonstration flights, and never held a racing event. The prior process 
discussion attempted to identify the industry emergence processes in the absence of these 
competitions. This section adds the effect of industry-wide incentives (prize competitions 
in this case) to the overall set of processes. The prize competition was an event that 
influenced all HSSTI actors, from both the public- and private-sectors, in all three IIEs. 
The discussion below continues the theory-building process and results in four additional 
propositions depicted in an amended process diagram, presented near the conclusion of 
this section. In all propositions, the phrase “prize competitions” assumes that these events 
are highly credible, and are “industry-wide,” meaning it is open to a wide range of 
competitors.  
To begin the discussion of the effect of prize competitions on the industry emergence 
process, the HSSTI case study demonstrated that prizes can contribute directly to the 
emerging industry’s sociopolitical legitimacy in a number of ways. For example, the level 
of visibility of the initial event announcement, and by the amount of public support given 
by well-known and respected individuals within the industry, directly impact 
sociopolitical legitimacy. For example, at the announcement of the X PRIZE in 1996, the 
press covered a public ceremony, and speaking at the event were many dignitaries from 
the institutional realm, including the NASA Administrator, the FAA AST Associate 
Administrator, and former astronauts: 
“in spring of ‘96, we announced the X PRIZE at a big public event under 
the Gateway Arch of St. Louis, which included NASA Administrator Dan 
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Goldin, and more than 20 astronauts, including Gemini, Apollo and 
Shuttle astronauts.” – X PRIZE Executive 
Leaders tend to use external signals and the opinions of their peers (emulation) when they 
themselves are unable to make a judgement themselves (Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Scott & 
Davis, 2007), so the association of respected industry individuals with an unknown prize 
competition and organization provides a symbolic endorsement of legitimacy. The 
following proposition describes the direct impact on the HSSTI sociopolitical legitimacy 
resulting from a gathering of such prominent public figures for the prize announcement: 
Proposition 7: Prize competitions are positively correlated to the creation 
of sociopolitical legitimacy. 
Industry-wide stimulus events, such as prize competitions, encourage technological 
innovation, financial investment, and the accumulation of other Resource Endowments 
components. For example, these events encouraged young students to pursue higher 
education in academic fields related to the prize competition. These events also 
encouraged the research of prize-related technologies, the construction of necessary 
infrastructure elements (such as HSSTI spaceports), the filling of legal and regulatory 
gaps by institutional actors, and the execution of conferences and meetings related to the 
prize subject (either among the contest competitors, the industry actors, or the general 
public). In the case of prize competitions, the encouragement of these resource creation 
events is not necessarily direct. For example, prizes don’t directly finance the activities of 
the contestants, but prizes do encourage financial investments in competing teams. 
Similarly, prize competitions don’t affect an increase in the human competence pool by 
directly educating new students, but the competition encourages more students to enter 
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the relevant fields of study, thereby increasing the pool indirectly. Keeping in mind that 
“organizational research have overlooked how certification contests legitimate 
organizations” (Rao, 1994, p. 30), this research proposes that prizes (and similar industry-
wide stimuli events) act as a moderator on the existing (and encouraged) resources as 
they help build cognitive legitimacy for the new industry. This is consistent with the 
observation that “certification contests are credentialing mechanisms that invest 
organizations with cognitive validity” (Rao, 1994, p. 30). The moderating effect is 
positively correlated with the prize event, so any positive/negative development toward 
claiming the prize will increase/decrease the amount of cognitive legitimacy earned. 
Additionally, for the stimulus event to have a discernable impact upon the Resource 
Endowments IIE components, it has to be credible. There are many ways to achieve prize 
credibility, such as by having a significant purse, support from recognizable and relevant 
personalities, or a goal that is both believable, but difficult to achieve at the same time. 
The results are three separate propositions, using the same groupings of Common Goods, 
Financial Arrangements, and Human Competence Pool, as described above:  
Proposition 8a: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between 
Common Goods objects/events within the Resource Endowments IIE and 
the creation of cognitive legitimacy. 
Proposition 8b: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between 
Financial Arrangements objects/events within the Resource Endowments 
IIE and the creation of cognitive legitimacy. 
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Proposition 8c: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between 
Human Competence Pool objects/events within the Resource Endowments 
IIE and the creation of cognitive legitimacy. 
In a less direct way, prizes also impact the general business cycle processes that 
comprise the Proprietary Functions IIE. Before a firm enters a new industry, the idea for 
the new company forms within the mind of the future entrepreneur. Over some period of 
time, a certain fraction of these ideas become a reality, and the “dreamers,” or “would-
be” entrepreneurs actually start a new firm within the new industry. In addition to the 
“regular” or “baseline” process of new firm creation that the new industry may instill 
within would-be entrants, the announcement of a prize competition may provide 
additional encouragement for these individuals to create a firm in the new industry. The 
additional element of encouragement provided by the prize event is, therefore, a 
moderator to the existing rate of new firm creation. In the case of the HSSTI, after the 
announcement of the X PRIZE, many new firms became part of the cadre of 23 teams 
participating in the competition. Only a small fraction of these firms was able to evolve to 
the pre-production activity phase described in the generalized business development 
process diagram. Nonetheless, the prize announcement had a positive effect on many 
people to act on the idea of new firm creation they had been considering. 
Proposition 9a: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between 
consideration of creating a firm and new firm creation. 
Subsequent to the creation of a new firm, the effect of a prize event can similarly 
encourage existing firms, who were working in some other industry prior to the event 
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announcement, to begin working in the new industry. For example, Scaled Composites 
specifically entered the HSSTI due to the X PRIZE competition: 
“even though Paul Allen put more money into the vehicle design and 
production than the prize awarded, I think that that base amount of money 
and the public spectacle that was created around the X PRIZE made all 
the difference. It clearly sparked Rutan’s inspiration to do it. He kind of 
acted like he thought about building a spaceship before, but I don’t think 
he would’ve seriously done it without the X PRIZE.” – HSSTI Analyst 
As described in the Proprietary Functions IIE section, “initial firm activities” include the 
development of internal firm capabilities, and performing initial design, manufacture, and 
assembly work. This highlights the idea that not all firms entering the new industry are 
necessarily “new entrants.” Variations of parent-company and diversifying new entrants 
(Helfat & Lieberman, 2002) are as likely to comprise the initial set of firms in the new 
industry. For example, the firm that ultimately won the X PRIZE competition, Scaled 
Composites, had dozens of successful experimental aircraft designs to its credit, but had 
never designed or built a space vehicle prior to the competition. The 1996 announcement 
caused a change in the mind of the owner, Burt Rutan, and the firm began to pursue the 
prize competition goals as a result. Therefore, announcement of a credible prize 
competition resulted in some pre-existing firms to change their organizational focus, with 
the intent of initiating HSSTI activities.  
Proposition 9b: Prize competitions are a positive moderator to motivate 
an existing firm from another industry to begin initial activities in the new 
industry. 
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In general, the pre-production activities of new firms are not publicized for fear of 
divulging trade secrets (W. M. Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987), or of 
the negative publicity that could result, should the activity not go as planned. An 
unsuccessful test could cause potential investors to withdraw support, and could cause 
relevant law-makers and regulators to increase their skepticism or scrutiny of the activity. 
During a prize competition, however, the activity performed to win the purse is, by 
definition, pre-production. Prizes specifically provide an incentive to elicit the earliest 
possible demonstration of untested technologies. Therefore, prizes are a positive 
moderator to pre-production activity.  
Proposition 9c: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between the 
processes of initial firm activity and pre-production activity. 
Pre-production operations are typically testing experimental designs beyond known 
operational limits, therefore, they possess an increased risk of failure. Because of the 
proposed relationship between pre-production operations and cognitive legitimacy, a 
failure at this stage can damage the firm and the industry. This is one of the reasons that 
firms will often conduct these operations out of public view. Prizes, however, encourage 
firms to conduct pre-production operations, increasing the likelihood that a firm will 
conduct them. Therefore, via the encouragement of the prize competition, pre-production 
activity conducted in public is part of the set of prize processes, instead of as part of the 
general business development processes. The resulting proposition is: 
Proposition 10: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between pre-
production operations and the establishment and accumulation of 
cognitive legitimacy. 
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Figure 17 shows the graphic depiction of the complete set of propositions related to 
credible, industry-wide prize competitions. Solid arrows and boxes depict the original set 
of processes that do not include prize effects. Dashed arrows and boxes depict the prize-
related processes. 
Figure 17. Accumulation model processes with prizes 
 
 This chapter discussed the results of the HSSTI data collection and analyses, 
resulting in a deepened understanding of the HSSTI emergence. Additionally, this 
research extended the original accumulation model framework by taking a microscopic 
perspective into the three first-order IIEs, and defining the processes within each. This 
research also slightly modified the original taxonomy of the accumulation model 
framework, as described in this chapter. The modified framework retained all the original 
second- and third-order elements, and added some new ones. Appendix K shows a side-
by-side comparison of the original accumulation model framework and the modifications 
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resulting from this research. In the case of the Institutional Arrangements IIE, the 
modification consisted of renaming one of the second-order elements. For the Resource 
Endowments IIE, the adapted framework included new third-order elements, and a slight 
renaming of a second-order element. Within the Proprietary Functions IIE, this research 
identified a general business cycle process, but only slightly changed the original 
taxonomy, with the addition of a single third-order element. This research extended the 
theory further by the proposition of processes, positively correlating Institutional 
Arrangements second-order elements to sociopolitical legitimacy, and Resource 
Endowments components to cognitive legitimacy. Processes proposed a correlation 
between the legitimacy components and the inter-IIE linkages. This research proposes 
that sociopolitical legitimacy is positively correlated to Institutional Arrangements-
Resource Endowments and Institutional Arrangements-Proprietary Functions linkages, 
whereas the cognitive legitimacy is positively correlated to all three linkage relationships 
(Resource Endowments-Institutional Arrangements, Resource Endowments-Proprietary 
Functions, and Proprietary Functions-Institutional Arrangements). This research also 
proposes that cognitive legitimacy positively moderates the establishment of 
sociopolitical legitimacy. The processes proposed up to this point describe the 
“generalized” industry emergence process. This research also proposed the effect of prize 
competitions on the overall set of processes, including that prizes are a positively 
correlated antecedent to sociopolitical legitimacy, but is a positively correlated moderator 
to cognitive legitimacy. This research also proposed that prizes also positively moderate 
the general business cycle processes of new firm creation, initial firm activity, and pre-
production activity. Finally, this research proposed the public execution of pre-production 
1-Jun-18 168  
testing, as a result of competing for a prize competition, positively correlates with the 
accumulation of cognitive legitimacy. The complete set of proposed processes, given in 
Appendix L, build upon the original accumulation model framework, and extend the 
theory in a way that identifies possible ways to verify and validate the proposed processes 
for future researchers in other industry contexts. But just how generalizable are these 
results to those other industry contexts?  
5.6 GENERALIZABILITY OF HSSTI RESULTS 
How generalizable are these results, based on a space industry, to other types of 
industries? It may be that the HSSTI does not exist within a “conventional market 
environment” (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979, p. 150), and is different from other 
consumer markets, being less suited for commercial environments, and better suited for 
government partnerships, because it is an off-shoot of the military and aerospace 
industries (Chakravarthy, 1985; Nelson, 1982). Healthy skepticism may consider these 
research results not generalizable because of the HSSTI uniqueness. Whether true or not, 
a constructive outcome of this industry’s unique characteristics is the emphasis on an 
aspect of the accumulation model that was underemphasized in previous studies to date. 
Researchers immediately encounter characteristics of the space industry that 
distinguish it as unique when compared to other “non-space” industries. An obvious 
characteristic of the HSSTI is the high capital requirement to make significant strides 
toward realistic (and profitable) operations: 
“operating a space business often requires substantial capital 
commitments with large minimum investments, long development periods 
and high fixed costs. Consequently, scale in the form of high market share 
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provides significant advantages. That ‘Space is Hard’ and cannot sustain 
high degrees of competition is not controversial among industry 
participants or investors. Three competitors is frequently unsustainable 
even a duopoly does not guarantee profitability. In space ‘Two is a Big 
Number’” (NASA, 2010, p. 50) 
High capital requirements, however, are common for many industries, including most of 
the transportation industries that carry the burden of ensuring passenger safety (e.g., 
railroads, aviation, maritime, etc.). It is interesting to note that the non-diversifying firms 
attempting to participate in the HSSTI with “small” investments (totaling less than 100 
million USD) have not been successful. Scaled Composites won the X PRIZE 
competition with an investment of “only” 30 million USD, but they were an established 
firm that diversified into the HSSTI, so most of the required know-how, facilities, and 
equipment already existed within the firm. The HSSTI firms with the smallest budgets 
engaged in a form of “frugal innovation” (Zeschky, Widenmayer, & Gassmann, 2011): 
“You’ve got regulated individualism, from an anti-establishmentary view 
of the world, combined with highly intelligent people, highly innovative 
people, people who didn’t have a lot of money so they had to be very 
innovative. And so, the [firms] who were always cash strapped, came up 
with the best innovations.” – Former HSSTI Executive 
Unfortunately, the two firms included in this research that were working with lower 
levels of investment funding, Rocketplane and XCOR Aerospace, both exited due to 
start-up failure. Second, it is also possible that the HSSTI emergence activity is 
sufficiently complex, in terms of integrating many advanced technologies, and 
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establishing the necessary channels of distribution and supply, and these complexities 
lead to very long periods of pre-production activities. To date, no HSSTI firms have yet 
begun commercial operations. Virgin Galactic has been in pre-production operations for 
at least 13 years, and Blue Origin for 17 years. This is a long time horizon with respect to 
return on investment for most investors. It may be that the audacity of the goal (the 
promise of space travel for ordinary people) tempers the impatience of this industry’s 
investors. A “side-effect” of the space industry norm of hyper-enthusiasm for space in 
general (mentioned previously), may be the perception that this activity is the realization 
of a dream for humanity, not simply a new product for near-term profit. Some industry 
observers, therefore, perceive the HSSTI entrepreneurs are not be market-driven, but 
philanthropy-driven. 
“As it turns out, we may not know whether this is a really viable market 
until we see a new entrant that doesn’t have a wealthy, patient backer, but 
someone that is more of a conventionally venture funded be able to enter 
the market, develop a vehicle, and then provide a return on their 
investments, and demonstrate that there really is a viable market, versus 
simply projects that are willing to be subsidized by people, like a Bezos or 
Branson, for other ends. They’re not looking at this from a strict return on 
investment question.” – HSSTI Analyst 
It may be misleading to use the phrase “philanthropy-driven,” however, because that 
could imply that there is no economic motivation to the activity. The established space 
industry emerged from a series of “cost-plus” contracts awarded to generalist contractors 
since World War II. This “opportunistic” behavior is consistent with the dependent 
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relationship, described in the functional goal motor of innovation development, between 
traditional internal and external space industry actors. In contrast, Richard Branson’s 
stated goal for Virgin Galactic is to pursue point-to-point suborbital flight (Masunaga, 
2017), and Jeff Bezos wants to create a system of space transportation infrastructure that 
could help save humanity if the earth becomes uninhabitable (Chuang, 2016). These are 
clearly demonstrations of “responsible” behavior on the part of space industry new 
entrants, characterizing the accumulation relationship. Therefore, analysts might better 
describe the HSSTI as currently motivated by visions requiring the relaxation of short-
term economic goals, in pursuit of activities that may be profitable in the future, while at 
the same time providing significant future benefits to society.  
Another unique aspect of the space industry in general, including the HSSTI, is that 
small problems can easily result in very significant failures (including the complete loss 
of a vehicle). Past studies have highlighted the elevated level of operating risks: 
“Operating a space business carries with it all of the normal risks of 
running a business plus many unique risks associated with operating in 
space (e.g. launch risk, catastrophic failure). This inherently higher level 
of operating risk generally means the space sector cannot sustain a large 
number of competitors over the long haul if it is to achieve investor 
returns commensurate with the assumed risk” (NASA, 2010, p. 50). 
Although mistakes that end in failure are common in high-technology industries, a minor 
mistake of a spacecraft’s design, manufacturing, assembly, or operation, of any system, 
subsystem, component, or subcomponent, can result in a catastrophic loss of the entire 
vehicle. HSSTI operators and customers pay for the cost of failures, and if they are on 
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board at the time of the mishap, they possibly pay with their lives. Disproportionately 
minor problems often cause these major failures, including very simple operational 
mistakes or design flaws. Therefore, the HSSTI is inescapably a very dangerous activity, 
with human safety, vehicle survivability, and long-term commercial viability relying on 
the near-perfect operation of many highly-complex systems. It turns out that these three 
characteristics, high expense, technological complexity, and personal danger, describe a 
special type of industry: 
“The creation of trust represents a particularly significant entry barrier 
for product innovations that are costly, technologically sophisticated, and 
whose purchase entails irreversible health or welfare situations for 
customers” (Van de Ven & Garud, 1989, p. 211). 
As stated previously, Van de Ven (Van de Ven, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c) equates “the 
creation of trust” with “legitimation,” and this research defines “legitimation” as 
“processes that create legitimacy.” Therefore, industries with these three characteristics 
are highly sensitive to the creation of legitimacy, and this provided validation for the 
addition of legitimacy into the original accumulation model framework. While these 
industry characteristics may highlight the unique nature of the HSSTI, and seemingly 
limit the generalizability of these research results, it also emphasizes the importance of 
legitimacy in a way that previous studies using this model did not. What implications 
does this have on the generalizability of the results of previous studies, and on the results 
of this study? 
The Introduction of this thesis discussed HSSTI analog industries, including the 
steamboat, railroad, automobile, aviation, and computer industries. Researchers can 
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debate whether the relative levels of expense or technical complexity for each of these 
industries are greater than, or less than, that for the HSSTI. This research, however, 
estimates the risk of personal danger18 is high for the HSSTI and civil aviation industry. 
This research also estimates the risk of personal danger to be moderate or low for all 
other analog industries presented in this research. In other words, among all these analog 
industries, the civil aviation and the HSSTI are most sensitive to levels of legitimacy for 
successful industry emergence. Similarly, regardless of the level of expense or 
complexity for the industries examined in past accumulation model studies (including 
cochlear implants, financial derivatives, umbilical cord blood banking, derivatives 
standards, nanotechnology, business school curricula, the U.S. carpet industry, and HPV 
tests, discussed earlier), this research estimates the level of personal danger in all of them 
to be lower than for the HSSTI. Therefore, when compared to the HSSTI, the industry 
contexts of all prior accumulation model research studies were relatively less sensitive to 
the legitimacy required for industry emergence. With the exception of civil aviation 
industry emergence, the same is true for the analog industries included in this research. 
The HSSTI is unique from most other industries discussed because of the level of 
personal danger it entails. As a result of this heightened sensitivity, this research proposes 
a central role for the creation of legitimacy in the accumulation model, as elucidated by 
the emergence of the HSSTI. 
                                                 
18 The phrase “personal danger” is shorthand notation for the phrase “irreversible health 
or welfare situations for customers.” Personal danger is present in vehicles that travel 
fast and/or high. 
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In the discussion above, a high level of personal danger distinguishes the HSSTI from 
past studies and other analog industries. This distinction has both a positive and negative 
impact on the generalizability of this research. On the negative side, skeptics may 
hypothesize that these research results have low generalizability based on the HSSTI 
distinctions described above. To test this hypothesis, researchers can compare the 
proposed processes against other industries that do not have the same combination of 
high expense, complexity, and personal danger characteristics. On the positive side, 
however, previous studies potentially underplayed the role of legitimacy creation, simply 
as a result of their less sensitive industry contexts. The unique nature of the HSSTI 
uncovered a central actor in the processes of industry emergence that was mentioned, but 
unfeatured, in previous studies. The HSSTI represents a limiting case of industry 
contexts, thereby highlighting the importance of legitimacy. In the proposed industry 
emergence processes, this research includes the creation of legitimacy because of the 
central role it plays. In previous studies, legitimacy’s role was, at best, on a par with other 
resources and, at worst, overlooked entirely. The industry contexts of previous studies 
simply did not feature legitimacy, because their industry contexts were not sensitive to it. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This final chapter of this research will first list all the conclusions, followed by the 
respective limitations, and then discuss possible future research in each area. This chapter 
also provides a discussion of the original model, and its relationship to the findings of this 
research, describing how the original and modified accumulation models agree and 
disagree, and explaining the extensions to the original model. Lastly, implications of this 
research are presented for entrepreneurs, managers, policy-makers, and more generally 
for the continent of Africa. 
6.1 IIE CONCLUSIONS 
This research proposes that all the second-order elements of the Institutional 
Arrangements IIE, including Endorsements, Governance, and Technology Standards, 
positively correlate to the creation of sociopolitical legitimacy. For the HSSTI, public- 
and private-sector actors construct and accumulate Endorsement resources, as evidenced 
by the number of regulatory safety approvals issued by the FAA AST to HSSTI 
supporting industries, the number of SAA partnerships between NASA and the HSSTI 
firms, and the amount of political activity conducted by HSSTI firms with government 
officials. There has been a deliberate evolution of regulatory authority during this time, 
and a much more aggressive pace of legal activity, especially at the state level. Specific 
supporting actions include the passage of enabling laws at the municipal, state, and 
federal levels, the enactment and issuing of regulatory permits and licenses, and the 
continuing activity by firms in pursuit of industry emergence. Similarly, there are also 
many examples of HSSTI actors constructing and accumulating Governance resources 
since 1967, although a majority of the activity has occurred since the mid-1990s. 
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Governance's third-order elements, including Norms and Rules, change more slowly than 
do Laws and Regulations. The least active second-order element of this IIE is 
Technology Standards. Actors of HSSTI supporting industries discussed and adopted 
some technology standards, as in the case of propellant handling and tank siting. Despite 
best efforts of industry or regulatory actors, however, the level of industry emergence 
may be too immature, and the competing entries too small in number, for the discussion 
of technology standards to be fruitful or meaningful at this time. Overall, this research 
estimates the level of Institutional Arrangements resources, and the resulting level of 
sociopolitical legitimacy, to be moderate, as evidenced by the constructive and supportive 
actions by institutional actors. The estimated resource level could increase with additional 
Endorsement and Governance resources, but the adoption of more technology standards 
is critical to elevating the Institutional Arrangements to a higher level.  
This research also proposes that within the Resource Endowments IIE, the second-
order elements positively correlate to cognitive legitimacy. The level of Common Goods 
resources that have been built-up and accumulated within the HSSTI is substantial, 
including scientific knowledge, human capital, and widely available infrastructure 
facilities. Scientific and technological knowledge results from government sponsored 
research, whether conducted by government entities or private firms under contract or 
grant. The government conducted a substantial amount of research pertaining to the 
HSSTI in the past, but current levels of government funding are far below former levels. 
Highly qualified human capital is readily available from public- and private-sector 
organizations for many reasons. HSSTI firms may hire young employees directly from 
school, or lure them from established private space companies with the excitement of a 
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new experience. More experienced employees of the private- and public-sector 
organizations are also among those joining the new firms, sometimes due to retirement, 
involuntary separation, or simply changing jobs. Finally, Common Goods includes 
facilities that are available for hire to HSSTI firms, including spaceports and training 
centers. The number of available spaceports within the U.S. is sufficiently large (there are 
currently six active licensed HSSTI spaceports), and these are available to any company 
desiring the use of their services. Similarly, Financial Arrangements resources are 
plentiful for the HSSTI. There have been government sponsored research contracts and 
grants awarded to HSSTI firms. Other sources of public funding are also available, 
mostly from state and local governments, that seek to lure HSSTI firms to their 
geographic location, with the hopes of establishing future, high-paying jobs. Ultimately, 
however, the private-sector has overwhelmed the industry with a high level of funding. 
Initially, the Ansari X PRIZE served as an industry-wide stimulus of financial and 
technical activity. Subsequently, Virgin Galactic received approximately 1.5 billion USD 
of funding from non-government sources, and Jeff Bezos single-handedly financed Blue 
Origin to the same level of funding. Finally, the Human Competence Pool element also 
includes many space-related, educational programs, training opportunities, conferences 
and meetings, all highlighting HSSTI activities. There are not, however, many events that 
discuss the HSSTI exclusively. These results provide evidence that could lead to the 
impression that the levels of accumulated Resource Endowments resources, and hence, 
the amount of cognitive legitimacy, is moderate to strong. Further evidence supporting 
this claim is Scaled Composite’s SpaceShipOne induction into the “Milestones of Flight” 
gallery in the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum after winning the Ansari X 
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PRIZE. This honor puts the defining event of the emerging HSSTI on par with other 
aircraft hanging there, including the Bell X-1 (the first vehicle to break the sound barrier), 
and Charles Lindbergh’s “Spirit of St. Louis” (the first plane to fly non-stop across the 
Atlantic Ocean). However, since the HSSTI is the type of industry (expensive, complex, 
and dangerous) that is highly sensitive to legitimacy, the current level of cognitive 
legitimacy may not be sufficient for successful industry emergence. This research 
estimates that until HSSTI firms have a respectable record of safe, revenue-generating 
flights, the level of cognitive legitimacy, though strong, remains insufficient to assure 
successful industry emergence. 
Given the progression from the design, manufacture, and assembly of HSSTI 
vehicles, to the conduct of flight testing, and finally to the provision of flights for 
compensation, the second- and third-order elements of the Proprietary Functions IIE 
describe the business development cycle. This research proposes that pre-production and 
production operations, conducted in the public view, directly contribute to the 
establishment and accumulation of cognitive legitimacy. One reason the level of 
cognitive legitimacy is not as high as it could be may be due to a low number of publicly-
visible flight tests. Of the five HSSTI firms that initiated the manufacturing process of 
their vehicles, only two have survived to the flight testing phase. Of the three firms that 
have exited the industry, two failed during the start-up phase, and one sold off its stake of 
the market to a currently active firm. It is difficult for external HSSTI observers to 
accurately identify the proprietary research, functional boundaries, and innovation 
network and resource channel developments of the internal firms. Sometimes, firms 
publicize partnerships with other firms, but these aspects also tend to be “trade secrets” of 
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industry. Regarding Market Creation and Consumer Demand, market forecasts provide 
minimal reliable evidence of industry emergence, but a number of market interest proxy 
indicators do exist. All HSSTI firms took advantage of dramatic events, such as public 
unveiling of their vehicles, to arouse public interest. Virgin Galactic and XCOR 
capitalized on multiple contests for which the grand prize was a ride in their vehicles. 
Predictive statements raised anticipation for the Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo start of 
commercial operations. Blue Origin chose not to participate in these marketing 
opportunities, and was very secretive for the first 15 years of their existence, perhaps 
because they are in the unique situation of not having to worry about financing. This 
provides them the luxury of waiting as long as necessary before they begin to widely 
publicize their activities. Although this research cannot directly observe the Applied 
Research and Vendor-Supplier-Distributor Channels elements for the two HSSTI firms, 
they are estimated to be at high levels, based on their continued survival and relatively 
strong, yet slow, demonstrations of technical performance. This research also estimates 
insufficient development of the Market Creation and Consumer Demand second-order 
element, since neither firm has begun commercial operations. Overall, therefore, this 
research estimates the levels of accumulated resources for the Proprietary Functions IIE 
to be moderate. 
There are a number of observed outcomes of interactions between IIEs. Interactions 
between the Institutional Arrangements and the Proprietary Functions IIE include the 
issuance of regulatory guidance, requirements, and permissions (e.g., permits and 
licenses) that allow the firms to test and fly their vehicles. Institutional actors also enter 
into partnerships with proprietary function actors, helping increase their sociopolitical 
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legitimacy. As companies become more experienced and develop plans for their future, 
they often visit the relevant legislative and executive branch actors in government to 
communicate their plans and needs, thereby increasing sociopolitical legitimacy. This 
increased sociopolitical legitimacy also enhances the communication by private-sector 
actors with institutional representatives, and that, in turn, results in the passage and 
implementation of favorable policies and laws for the industry (including both the 
Resource Endowment and Proprietary Function actors). Resources of finances, 
knowledge, and human capital flow to private-sector firms from the Resource 
Endowments to the Proprietary Functions IIE, with the beneficial returns of commercial 
products. Happening in parallel with these interactions, the industry actors also work with 
institutional actors to develop different sets of technical standards, by which all actors can 
optimize their interactions. Finally, increased interactions between the Resource 
Endowments and Proprietary Functions actors sends signals of cognitive legitimacy to 
the Institutional Arrangements actors, thereby indirectly strengthening the accumulation 
of sociopolitical legitimacy. 
This research proposes that prizes influenced the industry emergence processes of all 
three IIEs. First, this research proposes that prizes are positively and directly correlated to 
sociopolitical legitimacy in the Institutional Arrangements IIE. Second, prizes positively 
moderate the creation of cognitive legitimacy by all three second-order elements of the 
Resource Endowments IIE. Third, in the Proprietary Functions IIE, prizes positively 
moderate the creation of new firms, the accumulation of required capabilities to function 
in the new industry, and the growth from initial capabilities to pre-production operations. 
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Finally, prizes positively moderate the creation of cognitive legitimacy by encouraging 
firms to publicly conduct pre-production operations, instead of keeping them secret. 
6.2 IIE LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This section identifies limitations and possible further research for each of the 
individual IIEs before including a similar discussion for the linkages between them. A 
final paragraph will discuss general limitations or further research for the accumulation 
model as a whole. 
Research limitations in the Institutional Arrangements IIE include a lack of 
quantitative data to analyze legitimacy activities, and the qualitative assessment of 
partnership quality. The sample size of industry activity, related to the Guarantees 
second-order element, is insufficient to report any statistically significant findings for a 
variance study. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate the issuance rate of permits or licenses 
as an indication of legitimization activity levels. Furthermore, questions arise regarding 
the impact of partnerships between firms and government agencies on sociopolitical 
legitimacy creation. A simplifying assumption could be that all partnerships are of equal 
value, but that is probably not the case.  
Further research in the Institutional Arrangements IIE could encompass work on the 
space industry norms, technology standards, and the measurement of legitimacy. 
Regarding space industry norms, multiple observations provided some validity for the 
industry norm results found in this research, but more focused research could explore 
each norm in more depth, and possibly include a longitudinal component. Researchers 
could also conduct studies in the domains of accepted standards, and the way the hiring 
and movement of personnel affects the diffusion and adoption of standards, from the 
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established industry to the emerging industry segment, and between firms of the 
emerging segment. Research that could benefit policy and industry leaders includes the 
appropriate timing for technical standard development, and the negative repercussions of 
premature standardization. Currently, HSSTI actors are pursuing technology standard 
development based on their past experiences in the established industry. It is possible that 
the approach employed in the past may not be well-suited to an emerging industry. Future 
measurement of legitimacy could also be researched. Qualitatively, research could 
employ survey and interviewing methodologies to collect perceptions of public- and 
private-sector industry actors to assess the sociopolitical and cognitive components of 
HSSTI legitimacy. Quantitatively, further research could include variance studies of 
legitimation events once the degree of activity increases to a level that provides statistical 
significance.  
The data collected for elements of the Resource Endowments IIE were qualitatively 
complete, but quantitatively lacking for many reasons. It was possible, through public-
facing web sites, to access most of the information regarding the existence of some 
government contracts and grants, the number of infrastructure facilities, and the types of 
available educational and training programs. Getting reliable values for any specific item, 
however, was not straight-forward. Even when total contract values were available for 
government procurement events, it was often not possible to know how much money 
government had actually paid to the firm, and when. This research assumed that the firm 
used that money exclusively for HSSTI-related activities, although that may not be the 
case. For example, if NASA signed a ten million USD contract with a company, there 
was not necessarily any funding actually transferred from the government to the firm. It 
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is possible there was a small percentage provided to the firm at the time of signing (or 
shortly thereafter), but the remainder of the funding would be withheld until successful 
completion of pre-determined (and sometimes proprietary) performance milestones. 
Similar limitations existed regarding public and private financing deals for HSSTI firms. 
Although there was consistency in reporting of funding amounts, the validation of report 
accuracy was not possible. This calls into question whether the data set collected is 
complete. The uncertainties introduced span from knowing some information is missing 
but not realizing what the values of that information are, to having no information at all. 
In either case, and particular to this type of financial investment data, the results are 
approximations at best, and are probably under-estimated. When identifying the timing of 
specific partnership or funding events, it is normal to rely upon secondary source 
reporting. These sources can be incorrect, or they may sacrifice accuracy for 
understandability, thereby giving approximations of timing or monetary values to make 
their writing more accessible and understandable to the lay-reader. This research sought 
validation through corroboration with primary source data whenever possible. Finally, 
regarding the Human Competence Pool resource, due to the wide applicability of generic 
education and training programs in general, identification of the complete set of these 
opportunities that are specific to the HSSTI is prone to under-estimation. This research 
has included all of the major activities that are engaged in the larger space community 
events, but included smaller “boutique” education and training organizations only when 
publicized or recognized at the better-known space industry conferences or meetings.  
Since some contract awards were made to teams of firms (comprised of firms both 
within and outside the HSSTI), it was not always possible to tell what fraction of the 
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funding went to the HSSTI firm alone. Through primary data collection, further research 
could try to quantify the amount of funding awarded to individual HSSTI team members. 
Further research into the Financial Arrangements element of the HSSTI emergence could 
include gathering more detailed information about all public and private investments 
received by the HSSTI firms, through interviews with the firm members and/or the 
investors themselves. If the researcher can guarantee anonymity to the interviewee, and if 
interviewees share relevant information, better information may result. Finally, further 
research regarding the development of the HSSTI Knowledge Sharing could include in-
depth analyses of this portion of the event chronology, including bibliometrics of the 
HSSTI. As mentioned in this research, conferences and meetings were very broad in their 
scope, and covered many segments of the space industry within the same program. Future 
studies, tracking how the content of these events changes over time, may fix this 
limitation, thereby identifying HSSTI-specific themes within the more general 
conferences and meetings, and tracing, with more accuracy, the evolution of industry-
building events for the HSSTI. It is also possible for future researchers to pursue 
quantitative estimations of the cognitive legitimacy created in the Resource Endowments 
IIE. Data collection via survey or interview, or from the general public (for example, 
visitors to the National Air and Space Museum), can assess cognitive legitimacy of the 
HSSTI. Finally, the conduct of bibliometric analyses, in the trade and popular press, can 
also assess occurrences of symbols, signals, or levels of awareness, as indicators of 
industry legitimacy and reputation. 
Regarding the Proprietary Functions IIE, there were difficulties encountered in 
identifying the Applied R&D by HSSTI firms in support of technology development and 
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intellectual property. This limits the insights by industry observers and policy-makers 
regarding how to help solve those problems. Also, although some of the Market Creation 
and Consumer Demand third-order elements lent themselves to quantification (e.g., the 
population ecology of competition, the number of pre-production ticket sales, etc.), there 
is a large amount of uncertainty surrounding these data, resulting from the levels of 
secrecy that each firm maintains, the accuracy of the data that is available, and the 
assumptions made (e.g., that pre-production ticket reservations are a good proxy for 
consumer demand). To maximize the internal and external validity of the data, this 
research took care not to over-reach in drawing conclusions from the information 
collected. 
Topics of further research in the Technological Development Functions third-order 
element could investigate how much Applied R&D firms conducted based on publicly 
available information about the research results. Regarding the HSSTI Innovation 
Network and Resource Channel Activities, additional studies could attempt to draw 
accurate firm boundaries over the complete set of support industry functions. This 
research of firm boundaries could also investigate how these boundaries change over 
time, and the impact upon the level of cooperation and competition between firms within 
a common industry. This might be able to highlight solutions to the paradox of engaging 
in one strategy over the other. Finally, further research into the Market Creation and 
Consumer Demand second-order element of the HSSTI could include comparative 
studies to check the assumption of pre-production ticket reservations as an indicator of 
the actual demand that may emerge once flights start. 
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Future research regarding the accumulation model interactions may be able to 
propose processes for the linkages between the IIEs. For example, how do specific 
corporate political activities vary as a function of new entrant type (e.g., entrepreneurial 
start-up, parent company spin-off, de aleo diversification, etc.)? Or, what are the specific 
mechanisms, engaged by the passage of enabling laws and policies, that encourage the 
accumulation of Resource Endowments elements? Similarly, is there a way to reasonably 
track economic and non-economic returns, provided by Proprietary Functions actors, in 
exchange for the capabilities and resources they receive? 
Lastly, limitations of the overall accumulation model also provide ideas for further 
research. One general limitation, as noted repeatedly above, and not limited to this 
specific research, was the qualitative nature of the data collected and analyzed. Credible 
results in the social sciences require objectivity, reliability validity, generalizability, 
reproducibility, and ethicality (O’Leary, 2007). This research made every attempt to 
achieve these criteria in this research. There still exists, however, a bias toward 
quantitative data in the social sciences, however misguided that perspective may be: 
“Personally, I fear more the faith that lay persons, policy makers, and 
even scholars, often show in quantitative conclusions drawn from shaky 
models and data than I do conclusions that are explicitly qualitative and 
judgmental” (Nelson, 1982, p. 482). 
The model employed in this research is robust, stable, and well-founded, and while not 
perfect, the results based on the qualitative data collected are as reliable as practicable. 
Although the model generally provides the framework to identify the creation of 
necessary resources, because the data is qualitative, there is no way to quantitatively 
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assess whether the amount of any given resource (individually) or resources (in some 
combination) are sufficient for industry emergence. In other words, when would industry 
members know when to stop creating a given resource (or combination of resources) 
because there is a sufficient amount? Identifying the determinants, antecedents, and any 
possible moderators or mediators for these limits could be an important indicator for 
practical application of the accumulation model by entrepreneurs, managers, and policy-
makers. It is unlikely that “sufficient” resource levels are knowable, however, especially 
when considered in isolation from others within or among any or all of the three IIEs. In 
other words, the identification of “sufficient levels” of any given resource is probably 
dependent upon the other resources. Such research will likely result in a variance study to 
hypothesize and test some combination of nonlinear, multi-covariate set of equations, 
including some, many, or all of the different third-order elements as the independent 
variables. Furthermore, no indication exists whether the process is controllable in any 
way. Etzioni posed exactly this same questions over fifty years ago:  
“Where does the power lie that controls the process - is it evenly 
distributed among the participant units or is it concentrated in the hands 
of elites? Are the power-holders members of the new emerging 
communities or outsiders?” (1963, p. 421).  
It may be that the interdependencies are so complex (i.e., covariate, multivariate, non-
linear, etc.) between the different first-, second-, and third-order resource elements, that 
qualitatively estimating their status is still the best we can do. This limitation could be the 
basis of valuable future research. Finally, as mentioned above, the HSSTI may be 
sufficiently unique, such that the results of this research are not generalizable to other 
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industries. It is possible for future researchers to test process generalizability, comparing 
these results with those of other accumulation model studies identified in the literature 
review when possible. Although some of the IIE interactions for the HSSTI may be 
unique, the interactions observed may be able to broaden the possible linkage outcomes 
that future researchers may observe, thereby expanding the number of commonalities 
between this and other industries. 
6.3 COMPARISON WITH ORIGINAL ACCUMULATION MODEL 
In a description of the original model, Van de Ven and Garud (1989) explained that 
the linkages between IIEs were evidence of three phenomena: the balance between 
technology push and pull, the innovation process (the creation of commercial products 
from scientific knowledge), and the creation of industry standards. The first of these, the 
balance of technology push and pull, manifests itself between the Resource Endowments 
and Proprietary Functions IIEs, and between the Institutional Arrangements and 
Proprietary Functions IIEs, respectively. The innovation process also involves the 
transference of knowledge from the Resource Endowments IIE to the Proprietary 
Functions IIE, but involves substantial support from, and interaction with, Institutional 
Arrangements IIE actors. Finally, the development of technology standards requires 
collaborative efforts between the Proprietary Functions and Institutional Arrangements 
IIEs, assuming the government does not mandate these standards unilaterally. 
This research identifies evidence of technology push (primarily in the form of the 
creation of new knowledge from the Resource Endowments IIE, to the Proprietary 
Functions IIE), and technology pull (in the form of regulatory and legal requirements 
generated within the Institutional Arrangements IIE, and fulfilled by the compliance of 
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Proprietary Functions IIE actors). There was a substantial amount of technology push 
activity in the 1955-1975 timeframe, funded exclusively by the government, before it 
ceased. There were a few new programs that began in the 1990s, but the funding level 
they received never matched those of the mid-20th century. With the relative withdrawal 
of the “technology push” impetus for innovation, this left the “technology pull” forces to 
stimulate progress. At the request of the HSSTI industry members, and as directed by the 
U.S. Congress, the authorization language for the regulatory agency minimizes the effects 
of regulatory requirements, however, by explicitly stating that industry members should 
be regulated “only to the extent necessary” (Commercial Space Launch Act, 1984). The 
interactions described in the original model are well-suited to the HSSTI context. It may 
be, however, that HSSTI emergence would benefit from additional “technology push” 
programs, including federally-funded, non-proprietary research, to be successful. In 
addition, and counter-intuitively, increased regulatory requirements, that strengthen the 
"technology pull" forces, may also benefit overall industry emergence. 
The innovation development process is defined as “the temporal sequence of events 
and activities that occur to create and transform basic scientific knowledge into 
commercially viable products or services delivered to customers” (Van de Ven, 1993a, p. 
26). For the innovation process to be successful, scientific knowledge resources must 
migrate from the Resource Endowments IIE to firms in the Proprietary Functions IIE. As 
firms develop their products, they demonstrate and publicize their goods at Knowledge 
Sharing events in the Resource Endowments IIE. As customers decide to purchase, they 
provide funding to the firms. There is a substantial role for Institutional Arrangements 
actors in the innovation development process, too. At the very least, governments pass 
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laws to ensure the stability of the economic environment, guaranteeing intellectual 
property rights and protecting against the formation of cartels, etc. Similarly, industry 
regulators collect information they need to evaluate the impact of the product or service 
on society. Providing these assurances and oversight is an important aspect of the 
innovation process. Marketing is also an important part of bringing a product to market. 
Consequently, the number of publicity events, at which HSSTI firms presented, 
explained, and demonstrated their products, has evolved over time. Although Blue Origin 
has refrained from pre-production offerings, the success of Virgin Galactic in selling 
reservations for future flight opportunities demonstrates partial success of the innovation 
process to date. 
Finally, there has been some activity within the HSSTI for the creation of standards, 
but the industry has not yet accumulated enough resources to be able to claim any 
significant accomplishments in this area yet. During the initial rounds of standards 
creation activity, there were interactions between the HSSTI firms in the Proprietary 
Functions IIE and the industry trade organization in the Institutional Arrangements IIE. 
More recently, the HSSTI enlisted an international standards-setting organization, 
another Institutional Arrangements IIE private-sector actor, to assist with the standards 
creation process. Initial efforts are currently underway to identify a taxonomy of working 
groups to help focus the work, and this is an indication that the collection of interests may 
be too diverse, when considered as a whole. The network of supporting industries 
identified in this research (Figure 9 on page 108) may provide a starting point to identify 
the capabilities and functionalities, both upstream and downstream of the specific vehicle 
operations, that may be receptive to technology standards development at this time. 
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6.4 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The paragraphs above, describing possible further research, presented implications of 
this work for the academic community. To conclude this work, we continue the 
discussion by focusing on possible ways additional communities can benefit from this 
research. First, however, we identify how the HSSTI case study reflects the basic tenets 
of the original accumulation model, and the status of the HSSTI based on the analysis 
supporting this research. The next section discusses the questions posed in conjunction 
with our primary research question: Why do industries take so long to emerge?, and what 
can be done to accelerate this process?  
6.4.1 Basic Tenets of Accumulation Model 
The accumulation model includes basic elements, such as the contribution to IIEs 
through the individual and collaborative efforts of multiple players, across both the 
public- and private-sectors. It is not only the public-sector actors that help develop the 
resources of Institutional Arrangements, and it is not uniquely private-sector actors 
contributing to the Proprietary Functions resources. Second, the accumulation of 
resources does not seem to follow a scheduled order or pattern, and the accumulation 
rates are not equal between the IIEs. Third, the results of an HEA identify deficiencies of 
IIE resources impeding successful industry emergence. This research observed all three 
of these basic elements in the HSSTI case. 
The first basic element of the accumulation model is that actors from both the private- 
and public-sectors contribute to the development of all IIE resources, individually and 
collectively. The public-private collaborative nature of accumulating resources in all 
three IIEs reflects the Institutional Arrangements IIE as a “polity,” consisting of both 
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public- and private-sector actors. Similarly, the “economy” is not solely the purview of 
the private-sector, but relies on vital contributions from public-sector actors as well: 
“The polity is related to government in approximately the same way that 
the economy is to ‘business’” (Parsons & Smelser, 1956, p. 48).  
For example, the actions of public-sector actors of the Institutional Arrangements IIE 
(including legislative and executive branch actors) primarily develop laws and 
regulations that affect HSSTI emergence. Private-sector actors in the Resource 
Endowments and Proprietary Functions IIEs, however, influence the content of those 
laws and regulations, through political action and legitimacy signaling. Of course, 
collaborations between the public- and private-sectors requires participation from both 
sectors. It is possible that private-sector actors develop technology standards solely in a 
voluntary, consensus manner. It is equally as possible that institutional actors unilaterally 
mandate the technology standards. The ideal situation, however, is for a collaborative 
effort between them, resulting in a set of standards that considers all parties’ concerns. 
Similarly, the creation of scientific knowledge often requires the collaboration of public-
sector funding and private-sector capabilities. Knowledge sharing events, conducted by 
both the public- and private-sectors, often feature speakers and information from the both 
sectors. Also, financial investments come from both the public- and private-sectors. 
When the investments, however, reach substantial levels (on the order of hundreds of 
millions of USD), the private-sector tends to take the lead in their participation. Finally, 
even in the Proprietary Functions IIE, although the private-sector conducts most of the 
activity, there is substantial HSSTI activity funded by state governments, to establish 
(and sometimes, build) spaceport infrastructure. Embellishment of these spaceports with 
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supporting services (such as fire and emergency response equipment and personnel) often 
relies on public-sector (federal government) grants. 
As described in the original accumulation model description, there is no set order of 
resources in each IIE. Garud and Van de Ven state, however, that non-proprietary 
research “provides the foundation of knowledge that makes possible the commercial birth 
of a technology” (2000, p. 494), and thereby often precedes the innovation process 
activities. Other temporal observations, adapted for industry emergence from work by 
Deutsch (1957) on the development of international organizations, include the creation of 
rewards or benefits during the industry development process preceding the acceptance of 
associated burdens or responsibilities, and the provision of consent to meeting industry 
development obligations preceding compliance with imposed standards. Parsons and 
Smelser (1956) address the “chicken and egg” question of which comes first, investment 
or innovation, proposing that innovation ideally precedes investment during the early 
stages of industry emergence: 
“… which of the two categories—the primary input of capital funds for 
investment through credit creation or the “encouragement of 
enterprise”—is more crucial for institutional change? We suggest that in 
the earlier stages of a “growth cycle” input of capital funds is not of 
primary importance; without any prospect for use, this might cause a glut 
on the capital market. The prospect that such funds will be available 
under the proper conditions is, however, very important” (1956, p. 252). 
Still, the “role of finance in the knowledge economy and in innovation processes is a 
feature that is under-developed in the literature” (Dabic, Cvijanović, & González 
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Loureiro, 2011, p. 201). Aside from these four generalizations, however, the order of 
resource construction seems to be unspecified. The case of HSSTI emergence seems to 
demonstrate the first and last of these sequence rules-of-thumb. It may be that the 
ultimate order of resource development is opportunistic in nature, depending on 
individual, political, economic, and other contingencies. If this is the case, then predicting 
the order of resource creation is a futile effort, but the ability to identify the gaps in vital 
resources is not. 
Based on the preceding discussions, and the results of the HSSTI HEA, this research 
makes an assessment regarding which resources are accumulated and to what (estimated, 
qualitative) levels, and which require further development. For this study, five firms 
began conducting pre-production activities, at least to the extent of assembling flight 
hardware, and two have progressed to flight testing their vehicles. Of these five firms, 
three have exited the field, one by choice (Scaled Composites), and two after depleting 
their funding, prior to pre-production operations. The two remaining firms, Blue Origin 
and Virgin Galactic, both seem to have ample funding sources for the foreseeable 
future.19 In the Institutional Arrangements IIE, where the Governance and Endorsement 
resources appear adequately developed, it is clear that the Technology Standards 
resources are not. Low levels of regulation and technology standards may be applying an 
insufficient amount of "technology pull" forces upon the Proprietary Functions firms. 
                                                 
19 At the time of this writing, Jeff Bezos was (temporarily) named the richest man in the 
world (Abeyta, 2017), and Virgin Galactic just received a new commitment of funding, 
from the government of Saudi Arabia, for one billion USD (Masunaga, 2017). 
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Therefore, with moderate levels of Endorsement and Governance resources, and a low 
level of Technology Standards resources, the estimated overall Institutional 
Arrangements IIEs level are moderate, at best. Within the Resource Endowments IIE, 
there seems to be an ample supply of resources in the Scientific and Technological 
Research element, and overall, Financial Arrangements seems strong. It is possible that 
the levels of Human Competence Pool resources are lower than required for successful 
industry emergence, but there is currently no quantitative way to verify or dispute this. 
Despite an initial burst of scientific knowledge creation in the mid-20th century, the level 
of basic research results created over the past 30 years is quite low, thereby asserting an 
insufficient level of "technology push" force upon the industry emergence process. 
Therefore, the estimated Resource Endowments resources are at moderate levels, given 
the strong availability of HSSTI financial and human capital resources, but with the 
recognition that there is a lack of supporting public knowledge creation at present. 
Finally, addressing the Proprietary Functions IIE, the general business cycle seems to be 
progressing as expected, although no HSSTI firm has yet begun commercial (revenue-
generating) operation. Furthermore, the level of Market Creation and Consumer Demand 
activities aimed at the general public seem to have ebbed after an initial flurry of contests 
and pre-production ticket sales. The industry trade group has conducted knowledge-
sharing events to increase demand for suborbital flights within the scientific and 
institutional communities since 2009. These efforts help increase cognitive and 
sociopolitical legitimacy of the HSSTI, but because of the narrow focus of the activities, 
and the low number of publicly-visible, pre-production operations, cognitive legitimacy 
is being insufficiently developed with these events. Regarding raising awareness among 
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the general public, the two firms currently conducting flight tests are not executing 
concerted marketing efforts of their particular services. Articles highlighting “space 
tourism” as an emerging industry have appeared occasionally in the popular press, but to 
date, there has been no high-profile, industry-wide effort at increasing the cognitive 
legitimacy within the general public about the HSSTI market overall. Therefore, because 
of the strong performance of the surviving HSSTI firms, but due to the long pre-
production periods they are experiencing, the level of Proprietary Function resources is 
estimated to be at moderate levels. In summary, the major resource deficiencies impeding 
HSSTI emergence seem to be the inability to establish technology standards, the low 
level of non-proprietary research presently conducted in support of the industry, and the 
lack of HSSTI market creation activities. It is not clear if these low resource levels are a 
sufficient impediment to industry emergence. The differences between the HSSTI and 
other industries, discussed above, include relatively high requirements of capital, high 
levels of technical complexity, and high potential of personal harm to customers. It may 
be that 14 years (the time since winning the X PRIZE) is not an unusually long pre-
production period for such an industry, but it is typically considered long for non-space 
industries. The long innovation development process may be the result of the high cost of 
operational failure, and require an ability to forego profits in the near-term to be 
successful. 
As described above, this review of the basic tenets of the accumulation model, as 
observed in the case study of the HSSTI, has identified many events and relationships 
that comfortably conform to the model’s descriptions. Contradictions between the 
model’s tenets and the HSSTI case study observations were absent. This research 
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extended the model by proposing intra- and inter-IIE processes, describing how 
individual second- and third-order resource elements directly correlated to the creation of 
legitimacy, and moderated both second-order element creation, and the inter-IIE linkages. 
The original motivating question of this research was “how do new industries emerge?” 
for which there were two “corollary” questions. The results presented so far have 
responded to the first of the three questions, “what are the processes that characterize 
industry emergence?” Based on the process diagrams resulting from this research, it may 
be possible to identify potential answers to the remaining two questions: “why do 
industries emerge so slowly?” and “how can industry emergence be accelerated?” 
6.4.2 Responses to Corollary Questions 
Regarding the question of the time required for an industry to emerge, the sheer 
complexity of an industry when viewed as a social system is overwhelming. It is 
understandable to think that the accumulation of necessary resources in all three IIEs 
takes an extremely long time if left entirely to chance and random events. Even within the 
guiding context of a capitalist society, where individual actors are incentivized to 
perceive a set of needs and requirements to make their industry viable, the amount of 
effort and time required to build a new industry from scratch is still substantial. In a free 
economy (i.e., an economy that is not subject to central planning), public- and private-
sector actors cooperate and dialogue with each other to build these elemental resources. 
When left to the concerted efforts of all the actors involved, it is only when they are all, 
or mostly, like-minded (with respect to constructing and accumulating the necessary IIE 
resources) that an industry can hope to successfully emerge. Mensch explains the long 
delay between scientific discover and commercial development as being due to the 
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“normative power of factual knowledge about them” (1979, p. 163). To develop a new 
foundation of the emerging industry requires at least a generation or two, since the vast 
majority of actors will reinforce the status quo, resisting the creation of a dialectic 
sociopolitical and cognitive legitimacy. In addition to changes in technology and 
business, there must also be changes to government and education institutions. 
Furthermore, the investment communities also need to be convinced to accept all the new 
ideas. In new, high-technology industries, there also needs to be an appetite for initial 
failure, since utilization of the new technology will be expanding many operational and 
experiential limits. Given this perspective, it is little wonder that the time required for 
industry emergence is commonly on the order of many decades. Finally, the 
accumulation model is admittedly incomplete due to the omission of Parson’s fourth 
social sub-function of pattern maintenance and tension management, labelled “latency.” 
Social scientists have yet to sufficiently model this sub-function, encompassing the 
cultural dimension of a social system, so as to include it in the accumulation model. 
Without including factors of culture to explain industry emergence, the overall 
accumulation model remains probabilistic in nature. It may be possible that the inclusion 
of legitimacy, proposed by this research, is an initial glimpse of cultural influences within 
the accumulation model framework. 
The last corollary question asks how to accelerate the industry emergence. Given the 
previous discussion of why it takes so long, an initial response might be that central 
planning and direction of an industrial policy may accelerate the emergence process. 
Although successfully applied in the past, it is not necessarily compatible with the norms 
and rules of all societies, and therefore might be unacceptable in some countries. This is 
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the case for the U.S. An alternate approach would be to examine the process model 
resulting from this research to identify ways to constructively moderate the accumulation 
of different required resources. For example, public or private actors may decide to 
counteract a perceived lack of technology standardization in a specific function or 
capability area for which the HSSTI is in desperate need. These actions could help 
accumulate those resources and assist in industry emergence. It is possible that a 
privately-funded research consortium (Baumol, 2002) funds the needed basic research, 
with the goal of identifying, studying, and providing solutions to specific questions 
within a focused HSSTI function or capability area. Another potential solution may be 
the creation of a marketing campaign to address the creation of cognitive legitimacy, 
employing the “normative power of factual knowledge,” and targeting current and future 
HSSTI clientele. More conferences, meetings, educational programs, or training activities 
to increase general awareness (cognitive legitimacy) and develop the pool of human 
capital required by the HSSTI is also a possibility. Additionally, the process steps of the 
generalized business development cycle could guide the development of private or public 
programs, encouraging individuals to start a business that could support the HSSTI, or to 
diversify from an existing successful business, expanding in capability or functionality in 
support of the HSSTI. As specifically highlighted in this research, it may be feasible to 
run prizes and competitions, to encourage the pre-production demonstration of HSSTI 
technology, thereby accelerating technology development and helping develop cognitive 
legitimacy at the same time. The government is presently attempting to stimulate industry 
emergence by being a customer of the services, whether those services currently exist or 
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not. These programs and policies, as well as others, can help construct and accumulate 
the necessary IIE resources as described in the accumulation model.  
6.4.3 Practical Implications 
What are the practical implications of this research to communities of entrepreneurs, 
managers, and policy-makers? This final section addresses these important questions that 
link the theoretical knowledge creation to the practical, technological and political, 
communities. This thesis ends with a brief discussion of how this research may be 
applied to countries on the African continent. 
When identifying economic imbalances in potential marketplaces, an important 
indicator for entrepreneurs is the presence of some type of demand for which there is no 
supply. To that end, “[e]valuating the level of infrastructure in an area may prove a 
fruitful strategy for those entrepreneurs seeking to exploit or create an opportunity” 
(Woolley, 2013, p. 21). The areas of HSSTI industry infrastructure that are under-
developed, as described in detail above, include the Technology Standards within the 
Institutional Arrangements IIE, Scientific and Technological Research in the Resource 
Endowments IIE, and Market Creation and Consumer Demand activities in the 
Proprietary Functions IIE. It is possible that regulations for the emerging industry are also 
lacking. Whether performed with a “for profit” or “non-profit” organization, HSSTI 
actors are already addressing some of these IIE deficiencies. For example, industry actors 
solicited the activities of ASTM International to fulfill the deficit of Technology 
Standards. This current activity is broadly focused, covering many commercial space 
industry segments and sub-segments, above and beyond the HSSTI. Consequently, many 
participants, from many different industry segments, bring multiple and diverse 
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viewpoints and interest perspectives to the discussion. This enriches the overall content 
and depth of discussion for any given issue. This situation can also lead to additional 
complexities of arriving at consensus agreements, resulting in unclear or highly-qualified 
statements, making any resulting documents very symbolic, but significantly less 
meaningful. There may be entrepreneurial opportunities in developing standards of 
technological, organizational, informational, or relational (inter-organizational) subjects, 
with a focus on specific supporting industry segments, upstream or downstream segments 
of the HSSTI. Opportunities may exist in the domain of conducting non-proprietary 
research, especially with the low level of government support demonstrated since 1996 
(when the level of HSSTI activity demonstrated a noticeable increase after the 
announcement of the X PRIZE). Although it may not be evident where a third-party 
organization could find sources of funding to conduct public research, whether non-profit 
or for-profit, it is worthwhile that HSSTI actors encourage possible opportunities to 
bolster this important resource element. Finally, beyond the presale of 700 tickets, and a 
number of competitions and raffles to win free tickets, the activities of HSSTI market 
creation are glaringly absent. This, however, is an incredibly critical component of the 
business development cycle. The founders of both existing HSSTI firms are each very 
successful businessmen, and their ability to execute market creation functions is difficult 
to question. Presumably, HSSTI firms will create market demand, through more 
advertising, demonstrations, and educational activities, at the appropriate time, when the 
customer experience and final products reach sufficient levels of maturity. 
This research can provide important information to HSSTI firm managers through use 
of both the HSSTI HEA results, and the industry-level processes proposed. First, the 
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HSSTI HEA results can be useful to managers when deciding whether to collaborate with 
others in resource accumulation activities. If the status of the different resources, required 
to ensure industry emergence, is known by the managers, then they can trade-off the 
availability of relevant capabilities within their firm against the need for some resource 
accumulation activity that may ensure successful industry viability. In other words, it is 
feasible to use the results of this accumulation model study to decide when to cooperate 
or compete with the other HSSTI firms. Secondly, the proposed processes of this research 
can inform managers about the different forms of legitimacy, and help them understand 
the primary importance of both types of legitimacy. It is very common within the space 
industry to promote engineers and scientists, individuals with many years of technical 
experience, and who have demonstrated a high degree of technical proficiency, into 
managerial positions. These space industry managers have a strong history with, and 
dependence upon, quantitative methods and positivist perspectives, combined with a 
general lack of exposure to the social sciences. This results in an under-appreciation for 
the concept of legitimacy in general. This research emphasizes the importance of 
legitimacy in the processes of industry emergence, and it employs the two-part typology 
of sociopolitical and cognitive legitimacy. The more exposure the HSSTI firm managers 
have to these ideas, and if they can witness the power of legitimacy acting upon their 
industry, the more they will be better prepared to make decisions informed by the 
quantitative metrics of the physical sciences, and complemented by the qualitative 
concepts of the social sciences. Another way in which a deeper understanding of the 
industry emergence processes may assist the managers of HSSTI firms is in the area of 
environmental scanning and strategic planning. By providing a view of the overall 
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industry as a comprehensive social system, spanning multiple social sub-functions, 
managers may become aware of, and be able to better see, linkages between their firms 
and external parts of the environmental (Astley & Fombrun, 1983). This improved 
awareness and understanding will allow managers to better plan for, and cope with, 
changes to the environment that may have negative effects on the firm. 
Policy-makers can also implement this research in a number of ways. As in the case 
of implications of this research for HSSTI firm managers, policy-makers can use the 
results of the HSSTI HEA. Additionally, they, too, can interpret the proposed industry-
level processes. Officials in the legislative and executive branches of government are 
supportive of HSSTI emergence for the economic benefits the new industry may provide. 
The accumulation model itself provides a framework with which policy-makers can 
begin to understand the phenomenon of industry emergence. With the framework, it is 
possible for policy-makers to identify relevant phenomenological indicators, leading to 
ideas for the collection of data that can be executed through research or analysis projects, 
resulting in the computation of evaluative metrics, which can ultimately be used to assess 
the status of industry emergence. Some research has already been conducted on the 
effectiveness of specific policies to stimulate innovation and industry emergence, 
concluding that most macroeconomic policies are overly general to stimulate the “right 
kind of innovation” (Nelson, 1982, p. 480), and pointing to investments in knowledge 
creation as the “most potent instrument for nurturing the emergence of high-technology 
industries” (Chakravarthy, 1985, p. 263). Furthermore, looking at the interactions 
between the IIEs will help policy-makers identify ways to support overall industry 
development (Woolley, 2013). Analysts can also measure different indicators inferred or 
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identified by the propositions in this research. It is important to note, however, that data 
collected, based on the propositions, can be used to simultaneously validate the 
propositions and evaluate the status of industry emergence. Currently, evaluation of the 
sufficient accumulation for any given resource is highly subjective, and it is not possible 
to definitively state that a measured amount (as indicated by some metric) of a given 
resource is “enough.” If developed, this type of guidance would be invaluable for policy-
makers. The proposed processes from this research can be important to better understand 
how policy tools of different acquisition instruments (e.g., contracts, grants, prizes, other 
transaction authorities, etc.) may stimulate economic growth and influence the different 
components of industry emergence. By being able to understand the impact of these 
instruments upon the entire industry emergence process, policy-makers can begin to 
influence emerging industries as a part of the larger social system, where survival and 
power are the principle driving mechanisms. It is only through over-use of simplifying 
economic assumptions that industries are seen as atomistic, independent activities, 
separated from the rest of society, and motivated only by efficiency, profits, personal 
interest, financial rationality, or technological superiority. 
Finally, this research has implications for the development of industries in countries 
on the African continent. Assuming the generalizability of the processes proposed from 
the analysis of the HSSTI, these processes can estimate the impact of public- and private-
sector policies on the creation of new industries. The term “new industries,” in these 
cases, do not only mean “new to the world” activities, but can use the definition 
introduced at the beginning of this thesis: a new industry is one in which there are no 
incumbent firms. There is evidence from the previous studies, described in this research, 
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that the accumulation model is applicable to evolving, as well as emerging, industries. 
Traditional industry sectors that are not new to the developing economies, such as sectors 
of textiles, agriculture, steel, manufacturing, etc., can benefit from this research. Policy-
makers can assess the status of industry needs and development stage by tracking the 
different first-, second-, and third-order industry infrastructure elements for every 
industry segment undergoing development. The processes proposed in this research can 
guide the development and implementation of policies. Managers and entrepreneurs can 
use this information to guide their decisions regarding collaborative and competitive 
actions. Researchers would benefit by using these activities as natural experiments, to 
validate and further extend the accumulation model processes and, possibly, to include 
the other functional motor innovation development meta-theory relationships (i.e., 
dependence, peer, problem-solving, and fortification). In these ways, the results of this 
research can be used to accelerate the emergence of new and existing industries within 
African economies where appropriate. 
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APPENDIX A. LEGITIMACY TYPOLOGY TRANSLATION TABLE 
The table below directly compares five different legitimacy typologies as proposed in 
the literature. 
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APPENDIX B. DETAILED HSSTI EMERGENCE CHART 
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APPENDIX C. INDUSTRY STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS QUESTIONS 
The following set of guiding questions to conduct an industry structural analysis. 
Mention throughout these questions of “the text” refers to Porter (1980, pp. 3–29). Also, 
the acronym “BOE(s)” is used, and stands for barrier(s) of entry. 
FORCE 1. THREAT OF ENTRY BY POTENTIAL ENTRANTS  
 Identify all business functions (e.g., manufacturing) and sub-functions (e.g., 
manufacturing of component A, manufacturing of component B) and estimate the 
economy of scale barrier strength of each. Provide examples. 
 Are shared function operations possible for any of the industry players being 
considered? Provide examples. Is the benefit illusory? (see footnote 2 in the 
textbook) 
 Do joint costs benefits exist? Provide examples. 
 Do the industry members have intangible assets to exploit? Provide examples. 
 Do vertical integration economies exist? Provide examples. 
 In general, what are the economies of scale BoEs in this market, if they even exist? 
Provide examples. 
 How strong is each BOE in this influencing factor category? 
 How strong is this overall influencing factor category for this market? 
 Does the strength of this BOE influencing factor category favor smaller or larger 
companies? Provide examples. 
 Are the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category independent of, 
or vary as a function of, the other BOE influencing factor categories? 
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 What can the firm do to control the specific examples in this BOE influencing 
factor category? 
 Do the firms in this market possess resources or skills that would allow them to 
overcome the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category more 
cheaply than their competitors? 
 The presence of economies of scale always leads to a cost advantage for the large-
scale firm (or firm that can share activities) over small-scale firms. However, even 
the economies of scale BOEs have strategic limits when used by incumbent firms. 
Are any of these limits applicable to this specific market? 
 What are the BoEs of product differentiation in this market, if they even exist? 
Provide examples. 
 How strong is each BOE in this influencing factor category? 
 How strong is this overall influencing factor category for this market? 
 Does the strength of this BOE influencing factor category favor smaller or larger 
companies? Provide examples. 
 Are the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category independent of, 
or vary as a function of, the other BOE influencing factor categories? 
 What can the firm do to control the specific examples in this BOE influencing 
factor category? 
 Do the firms in this market possess resources or skills that would allow them to 
overcome the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category more 
cheaply than their competitors? 
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 What are the BoEs of capital requirement in this market, if they even exist? Provide 
examples. 
 How strong is each BOE in this influencing factor category? 
 How strong is this overall influencing factor category for this market? 
 Does the strength of this BOE influencing factor category favor smaller or larger 
companies? Provide examples. 
 Are the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category independent of, 
or vary as a function of, the other BOE influencing factor categories? 
 What can the firm do to control the specific examples in this BOE influencing 
factor category? 
 Do the firms in this market possess resources or skills that would allow them to 
overcome the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category more 
cheaply than their competitors? 
 What are the BoEs of switching cost in this market, if they even exist? Provide 
examples. 
 How strong is each BOE in this influencing factor category? 
 How strong is this overall influencing factor category for this market? 
 Does the strength of this BOE influencing factor category favor smaller or larger 
companies? Provide examples. 
 Are the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category independent of, 
or vary as a function of, the other BOE influencing factor categories? 
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 What can the firm do to control the specific examples in this BOE influencing 
factor category? 
 Do the firms in this market possess resources or skills that would allow them to 
overcome the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category more 
cheaply than their competitors? 
 What are the BoEs of distribution channels for this industry, if they even exist? 
Provide examples. 
 Are the wholesale or retail distribution channels unable to accommodate new 
clients, or do they have excess capacity? 
 How strong is each BOE in this influencing factor category? 
 How strong is this overall influencing factor category for this market? 
 Does the strength of this BOE influencing factor category favor smaller or larger 
companies? Provide examples. 
 Are the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category independent of, 
or vary as a function of, the other BOE influencing factor categories? 
 What can the firm do to control the specific examples in this BOE influencing 
factor category? 
 Do the firms in this market possess resources or skills that would allow them to 
overcome the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category more 
cheaply than their competitors? 
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 What are the BoEs of cost disadvantages, independent of scale, if they even exist? 
(i.e., Do members of this market have scale-independent, critical advantages that 
represent cost disadvantages to their competitors?) 
 Are there specific examples of proprietary technology among members of this 
market? 
 Are there specific examples of favorable access to raw materials among members of 
this market? 
 Are there specific examples of favorable locations among members of this market? 
 Are there specific examples of government subsidies among members of this 
market? 
 Is this a market where cost declines with experience seem to be significant? Are 
firms in this market at the proper product development phase where this is a 
significant factor? 
 Are there any examples among members of this market of shared operations or 
related activities within the same company that can expedite the benefits of 
increased experience? 
 How strong is each BOE in this influencing factor category? 
 How strong is this overall influencing factor category for this market? 
 Does the strength of this BOE influencing factor category favor smaller or larger 
companies? Provide examples. 
 Are the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category independent of, 
or vary as a function of, the other BOE influencing factor categories? 
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 What can the firm do to control the specific examples in this BOE influencing 
factor category? 
 Do the firms in this market possess resources or skills that would allow them to 
overcome the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category more 
cheaply than their competitors? 
 Experience is a more ethereal entry barrier than scale, and even though it can be just 
as effective keeping new firms from entering the market, it too, just as in the case of 
economies of scale, has limitations. Are any of these limits applicable to this 
specific market? 
 What are the BOEs of government policy for this market, if they even exist?  
 How strong is each BOE in this influencing factor category? 
 How strong is this overall influencing factor category for this market? 
 Does the strength of this BOE influencing factor category favor smaller or larger 
companies? Provide examples. 
 Are the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category independent of, 
or vary as a function of, the other BOE influencing factor categories? 
 What can the firm do to control the specific examples in this BOE influencing 
factor category? 
 Do the firms in this market possess resources or skills that would allow them to 
overcome the specific examples in this BOE influencing factor category more 
cheaply than their competitors? 
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 Provide and estimation of competitor reaction strength supported by specific 
examples for each industry. 
 Overall, how would you prioritize the factors influencing the BoEs to this market? 
Which is the strongest, and which is the weakest? 
 What implications might this ranking of BoEs have on strategic decisions of new 
entrants and incumbent firms in this market? 
FORCE 2. INTENSITY OF RIVALRY AMONG EXISTING COMPETITORS 
 Can you cite specific examples of mutual dependency between firms in this market? 
 If mutual dependency exists in this market, what are its advantageous and 
disadvantageous effects on the market? 
 What is the status of the different interacting structural factors listed above and 
what does that indicate about the intensity of rivalry in this market? 
 What can you say about the number of firms in this market? How do they match up 
against each other? Do a small number of firms dominate the market? Are there any 
non-U.S. entities in this market, and how do they stack up? Does this tend toward 
market stability or instability? Why? 
 What is the growth rate of this market? What implications does that have on the 
nature of the competition among firms in this market? 
 In this market, is a high fixed/storage cost with respect to value added (e.g., is this 
product hard or costly to store?), pressuring a trend to fill capacity by cutting price 
in times of excess capacity?  
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 Is the product of this market seen as a commodity? What is the resulting level of 
volatility of this market’s rivalry as a result? 
 What is the size of the increment that capacity can be added in this market, and 
what does that mean for competition? 
 In terms of strategies, origins, personalities, and relationships with their parent 
companies, what is the level of diversity of the firms in this market? 
 Are the strategic stakes in this market high or low? What implications does that 
have on the nature of the competition among firms in this market? 
 What is the state of each of the major sources of exit barriers in this market? What 
implications does that have on the nature of the competition among firms in this 
market? 
 What is the relationship between, and the joint level of, entry barriers and exit 
barriers? Often, they are related. Refer to Fig 1-2 in the text. 
 What are the time-dependent characteristics of the rivalry in this market due to 
market maturity, acquisitions, and technological innovation? 
FORCE 3. PRESSURE FROM SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS 
 Are there substitutes (products that can perform the same function) in this market? 
 If substitutes exist, do they require the attention of the market firms? 
FORCE 4. BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS 
 Who are the buyer groups in this market? 
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 Using the list above, what are the detailed characteristics of each buyer group? 
What are the implications of each characteristic? Provide specific examples where 
possible. 
 Are the buyer groups powerful? 
 How has/does the buyer groups’ power changed/change with time? 
 Who are the most and least powerful buyers? Rank the buyers by their level of 
influence. 
FORCE 5. BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS 
 Who are the supplier groups in this market? 
 Using the list above, what are the detailed characteristics of each supplier group? 
What are the implications of each characteristic? Provide specific examples where 
possible. 
 What is the impact of labor as a supplier on this market? What is the ability of labor 
to unionize or expand? 
 Are the supplier groups powerful? 
 How has/does the supplier groups’ power changed/change with time? 
 Who are the most and least powerful suppliers? Rank the supplier by their level of 
influence. 
GOVERNMENT AS AN INDUSTRY COMPETITION FORCE 
 How does government affect competition through each of the five competitive 
forces? 
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 What is the rank of the five forces by relative strength? Why? How does this 
ranking affect strategy formulation? 
 How can firms decrease the level of power of their buyers? 
 How can firms decrease the level of power of their suppliers? 
 Based on the preceding five sections, how would you characterize this emerging 
commercial space sector as a description of the strength of the five forces? 
Remember that the stronger any or all of these forces are, the more competitive the 
industry will be, and thus the lower the prospects for excess profits. 
 Looking at the strength five forces from a different perspective, what are the 
positions of competitive *disadvantage* that companies should avoid? For 
example, if the entry barrier of Economies of Scale is high, entering this market 
without large scale operations that can overcome that barrier would be a mistake. 
Therefore, to be competitive, companies intending to be successful in this market 
must avoid small scale operations. 
SUMMARIZING QUESTIONS 
 What is the rank of the five forces by relative strength? Why? How does this 
ranking affect strategy formulation? 
 How can firms decrease the level of power of their buyers? 
 How can firms decrease the level of power of their suppliers? 
 Based on the preceding five sections, how would you characterize this emerging 
commercial space sector as a description of the strength of the five forces? 
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Remember that the stronger any or all of these forces are, the more competitive the 
industry will be, and thus the lower the prospects for excess profits. 
 Looking at the strength five forces from a different perspective, what are the 
positions of competitive *disadvantage* that companies should avoid? For 
example, if the entry barrier of Economies of Scale is high, entering this market 
without large scale operations that can overcome that barrier would be a mistake. 
Therefore, to be competitive, companies intending to be successful in this market 
must avoid small scale operations. 
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APPENDIX D. DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION ANALYSIS QUESTIONS 
The following is a set of questions to conduct a disruptive innovation analysis (DIA). 
These questions are primarily derived from Christensen’s popularized works 
(Christensen, 1997; Christensen et al., 2004; Christensen & Raynor, 2003). 
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS CONTEXT 
 What is the industry context (i.e., the “target industry”) of this analysis? 
 What are the facilities, vehicles, and equipment that characterize the target 
industry? 
 What is/are the job(s) being performed by the firms of the target industry? 
INNOVATION DEFINITION 
 What are the performance measures of the related industry? 
 Do we see the characteristic performance increase over time as described by 
disruption innovation theory? 
 How does the target industry fit within the performance measures of the related 
industry? 
 Is the target industry a sustaining, or disruptive (either low end, or new market) 
innovation? 
 How does the target industry fit the characteristics of the innovation type identified? 
 If the target industry represents a new market disruptive innovation, what is the new 
performance metric of the new market? 
 Define whether the target industry performance is within the “performance deficit” 
or “performance surplus” region of the market. 
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TARGET INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION 
 Who are the incumbent firms in the industry related to the target industry? 
 What is/are the job(s) being performed by the incumbent firms in the related 
industry? 
 For the different job(s) being performed by incumbent firms in the related industry, 
who are the high-end, low-end, and non-consuming customers? 
 For the different job(s) being performed by firms in the target industry, who are the 
high-end, low-end, and non-consuming customers? 
 What is the attribute-based characterization of the incumbent (related) and target 
industries? 
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APPENDIX E. HSSTI SAFETY APPROVALS 
The following table lists the HSSTI-related safety approvals issued by FAA AST, 
their issue date, and the recipient name, as of December 2017. All dates in yyyy-mm-dd 
format. 
Safety 
Approval # Recipient Name Issue Date Subject 
10-001 NASTAR 2010-04-07 Suborbital flight simulator 
11-002 Zero G Corp 2011-04-20 Reduced gravity environment 
11-003 SpaceTec 2011-06-10 Technician credentials 
12-004 NASTAR 2012-09-11 Altitude chamber 
13-005 Black Sky Training 2013-03-28 Hypobaric chamber training 
14-006 Black Sky Training 2014-01-22 General space flight training 
14-007 Waypoint2Space 2014-01-23 General space flight training 
10-001 rev 1 NASTAR 2015-04-03 Same as 10-001 
11-002 rev 1 Zero G Corp 2016-04-19 Same as 11-002 
11-003 rev 1 SpaceTec 2016-06-03 Same as 11-003 
12-004 rev 1 NASTAR 2017-07-11 Same as 12-004 
APPENDIX F. HSSTI EXPERIMENTAL PERMITS 
The following table lists the HSSTI-related experimental permits issued by FAA AST 
as of December 2017. All dates in yyyy-mm-dd format. 
Permit # Issue Date Recipient Vehicle 
06-001 2006-09-15 Blue Origin Propulsion Module 1 
11-006 2011-04-29 Blue Origin Propulsion Module 2 
11-006 rev 1 2011-05-20 Blue Origin Propulsion Module 2 
12-007 2012-05-23 Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo 
12-007 rev 1 2013-05-22 Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo 
12-007 rev 2 2014-05-21 Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo 
14-009 2014-02-14 Blue Origin New Shepard 
14-009 rev 1 2014-12-19 Blue Origin New Shepard 
14-009 rev 2 2015-02-05 Blue Origin New Shepard 
14-009 rev 3 2016-02-05 Blue Origin New Shepard 
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APPENDIX G. HSSTI LAUNCH OPERATORS’ LICENSES 
 The following table lists the HSSTI-related launch licenses issued by FAA AST 
as of December 2017. All dates in yyyy-mm-dd format. 
License # Vehicle Company Issue Date Term 
LRLS 04-067 a,b SpaceShipOne Scaled 
Composites 
2004-04-01 1 year 
LRLS 04-068 Xerus XCOR     
LRLS 04-067c SpaceShipOne Scaled 
Composites 
2004-09-28 1 year 
LRLO 16-092 a,b,c SS2 Unity Virgin 
Galactic 
 2016-07-29 2 years 
LRLO 17-105 New Shepard 
System 
Blue Origin 2017-08-17 2 years 
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APPENDIX H. HSSTI SPACEPORT OPERATORS’ LICENSES 
The following table lists the HSSTI-related spaceport operators’ licenses issued by 
FAA AST as of December 2017. All dates in yyyy-mm-dd format. 
ACTION Applicant Issue Date Term 
New License 04-009  EKAD  2004-06-17  5 years 
New License 06-010  OSIDA  2006-06-12  5 years 
Rev1 Mod 04-009  EKAD  2007-12-20 No change 
New License 08-011  NMSA 2008-12-15  5 years 
Rev2 Mod 04-009  EKAD  2008-09-25  No change 
Rev3 Renewal 04-009  EKAD 2009-05-05  5 years 
New License 09-012  JAA 2010-01-11  5 years 
Rev1 Renewal 06-010  OSIDA  2011-05-06  5 years 
Rev1 Mod 08-011  NMSA  2012-07-31  No change 
Rev2 Renewal 08-011  NMSA 2013-12- 09  5 years 
Rev4 Renewal & Mod 04-009  EKAD/ 
MASP 
 2014-06-13  5 years 
New License 14-015  MAF  2014-09-15  5 years 
Rev1 Renewal & Mod 09-012  JAA 2015-01- 06  5 years 
New License 15-016  EFD  2015-06-26  5 years 
ACRONYMS 
EFD – Ellington Field District 
EKAD – East Kerns Airport District 
JAA – Jacksonville Area Airport 
MAF – Midland International Air & Space Port 
MASP – Mojave Air and Space Port 
NMSA – New Mexico Spaceport America 
OSIDA – Oklahoma Space Industry Development Authority 
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APPENDIX I. HSSTI ENDORSEMENT AGREEMENTS 
The following table lists the endorsement agreement between HSSTI firms and 
NASA as of 30 June 2017. All dates in yyyy-mm-dd format. 
FIRM  EXECUTE  EXPIRE  TYPE  CTR SAA # 
Blue Origin 2016-Apr-15 2021-Apr-15 Non-Reimb KSC KCA-4502 Rev. 
Basic 
Blue Origin  2014-Apr-30 2019-Apr-30 Reimbursable WSTF RA-14-16704-1 
Blue Origin  2014-Apr-30 2019-Apr-30 Reimbursable WSTF RA-14-16704 
Blue Origin 2013-Dec-23 2017-Dec-31 Reimbursable ARC 2-402809 
Blue Origin 2017-Jan-13 2017-Oct-13 Reimbursable MSFC 8-1724581 
Blue Origin 2017-Mar-27 2022-Mar-27 Reimbursable KSC KCA-4514 
Blue Origin 2017-Apr-18 2022-Apr-18 Reimbursable WSTF RA-17-25434-01 
Blue Origin 2017-Apr-18 2022-Apr-18 Reimbursable WSTF RA-17-25434 
Blue Origin 2017-Aug-05 2022-Aug-05 Non- Reimb WSTF RA-17-20648 
Virgin Galactic 2012-Jul-13 2018-Jul-13 Reimbursable AFRC 2-402686 
Virgin Galactic 2012-Jul-13 2018-Jul-13 Reimbursable ARC 2-402686 
Virgin Galactic 2015-Jun-29 2018-Jun-29 Reimbursable ARC 2-402686-2 
Virgin Galactic  2014-Jun-17 2019-Jun-16 Reimbursable LaRC 1-17595 
Virgin Galactic  2016-Apr-20 2019-Apr-20 Non- Reimb ARC 2-403106 
XCOR  2015-Jan-14 2018-Dec-31 Non- Reimb LaRC 1-18877 
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APPENDIX J. HSSTI-RELATED KNOWLEDGE-SHARING EVENTS 


















































































One-Off Event Notes 
1993 4 1 1 1     1           
1994 4 1 1 1     1           
1995 4 1 1 1     1           
1996 4 1 1 1     1           
1997 4 1 1 1     1           
1998 4 1 1 1 1               
1999 4 1 1 1 1               
2000 6 1 1 1 1 2             
2001 6 1 1 1 1 2             
2002 6 1 1 1 1 2             
2003 6 1 1 1 1 2             
2004 7 1 1 1 1 2 1           
2005 9 1 1 1 1 2 1 1     1 X PRIZE Cup 
2006 9 1 1 1 1 2 1 1     1 X PRIZE Cup 
2007 9 1 1 1 1 2 1 1     1 X PRIZE Cup 
2008 12 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 DC-X/XA 15-Year 
Reunion, IAA Conf on 
Private Human Access to 
Space 
2009 15 1 1 1 1 2 1 1   2 5 Public roll-out of SS2, 
NRC Suborbital Research 
Mtg, CSF SARG Mtg; 
PSF Emerging Comm’l 
Suborbital Science 
Wkshp; FAA Expt Permit 
Wkshp 


















































































One-Off Event Notes 
2010 13 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 CSF SARG Mtg, IISL 
Suborbital Regulation 
Mtg; SpaceUp DC 
2011 11 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1   2 IAA Conf on Private 
Human Access to Space; 
COE CST ESIL Wkshp 
2012 12 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1   3 Human Spaceflight Tech 
Forum; 2xCOE CST ESIL 
Wkshp 
2013 11 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1   2 2xCOE CST ESIL Wkshp 
2014 9 0 1 1 1 2 1 1     2 2xCOE CST ESIL Wkshp 
2015 9 1 1 1 1 2 1 1     1 NewSpace Researchers 
Wkshp 
2016 9 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1       
2017 6   1 1 1 0 1 1 1       
TOTAL 193 23 25 25 20 34 19 13 7 4 23   
 
COLUMN HEADINGS 
 SAS: Space Access Society’s annual conference started in 1993 on the 
“technology, economics, and politics of radically cheaper space access”. 
 NSS ISDC: National Space Society International Space Development Conference 
 Space Foundation (SF) New Space Conference 
 FAA AST Annual Commercial Space Transportation Conference 
 COMSTAC: FAA AST Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee 
 SEDS: Students for the Exploration and Development of Space 
 ISPCS: International Symposium for Personal and Commercial Spaceflight 
 NSRC: In 2008, the Next Generation Suborbital Researchers Conference was the 
Human-Tended Suborbital Science Workshop, and was held San Francisco, CA. 
 SIS: Space Investment Summits 
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APPENDIX K. ACCUMULATION MODEL FRAMEWORK COMPARISON 
This table presents a side-by-side comparison of the original and the modified 
accumulation model frameworks, with differences shown as gray cells of the table. 
Original Framework  Modified Framework 
2nd-order 3rd-order  2nd-order 3rd-order 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS – 1st-ORDER 
Legitimation Guarantees  Endorsements Guarantees 
Endorsements  Endorsements 
Licensing Practices  Licensing Practices 
Industry Regulations  Industry Regulations 
Governance Norms and Rules  Governance Norms and Rules 
Regulations  Regulations 
Laws  Laws 
Technology 
Standards 
Gov’t Regulatory Mandates  Technology 
Standards 







 Market-driven/de facto 
Standards 




No further delineation  Scientific and 
Technological 
Research 
Gov’t Contract R&D 
Results* 




Public Institutions  Financial 
Arrangements 
SBIR Funding 
 Gov’t Contract Funding 
 Gov’t Grant Funding 
 Non-Equity Investment 
Private Organizations 
(Venture Capital) 
 Equity Investment 








Recruitment and Training  Recruitment and Training* 
Sharing of Knowledge  Knowledge Sharing* 








Manufacturing  Manufacturing 
























Cultural Norms  Cultural Norms 
Consumer Demand  Consumer Demand 
 Competition 
   * denotes inclusion in Common Goods 
categorization 
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APPENDIX L. COMPLETE SET OF PROCESS PROPOSITIONS 
PROPOSED GENERALIZED INDUSTRY EMERGENCE PROCESSES 
Proposition 1a: Endorsement objects/events of the Institutional Arrangements IIE are 
positively correlated to the establishment and accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy 
for the new industry. 
Proposition 1b: Governance objects/events of the Institutional Arrangements IIE are 
positively correlated to the creation and accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy for the 
new industry. 
Proposition 1c: Technology Standards objects/events of the Institutional 
Arrangements IIE are positively correlated to the creation and accumulation of 
sociopolitical legitimacy for the new industry. 
Proposition 2a: Common Goods objects/events of the Resource Endowments IIE are 
positively correlated to the creation and accumulation of cognitive legitimacy for the new 
industry. 
Proposition 2b: Financial Arrangements objects/events of the Resource Endowments 
IIE are positively correlated to the creation and accumulation of cognitive legitimacy for 
the new industry. 
Proposition 2c: Human Competence Pool objects/events of the Resource 
Endowments IIE are positively correlated to the creation and accumulation of cognitive 
legitimacy for the new industry. 
Proposition 3a: Publicly visible, pre-production operations are positively correlated to 
the creation and accumulation of cognitive legitimacy. 
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Proposition 3b: Publicly visible, production operations are positively correlated to the 
creation and accumulation of cognitive legitimacy. 
Proposition 4a: Increased sociopolitical legitimacy is a positive moderator of 
interactions between the Institutional Arrangements and Resource Endowments IIEs.  
Proposition 4b: Increased sociopolitical legitimacy is a positive moderator of 
interactions between the Institutional Arrangements and Proprietary Functions IIEs. 
Proposition 5a: Increased cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator of interactions 
between the Institutional Arrangements and Resource Endowments IIEs. 
Proposition 5b: Increased cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator of interactions 
between the Institutional Arrangements and Proprietary Functions IIEs. 
Proposition 5c: Increased cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator of interactions 
between the Resource Endowments and Proprietary Functions IIEs. 
Proposition 6a: Cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator between Endorsements 
objects/events within the Institutional Arrangements IIE and the creation and 
accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy. 
Proposition 6b: Cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator between Governance 
objects/events within the Institutional Arrangements IIE and the creation and 
accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy. 
Proposition 6c: Cognitive legitimacy is a positive moderator between Technology 
Standards objects/events within the Institutional Arrangements IIE and the creation and 
accumulation of sociopolitical legitimacy. 
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PROPOSED PRIZE EVENT INDUSTRY EMERGENCE PROCESSES 
Proposition 7: Prize competitions are positively correlated to the creation of 
sociopolitical legitimacy. 
Proposition 8a: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between Common Goods 
objects/events within the Resource Endowments IIE and the creation of cognitive 
legitimacy. 
Proposition 8b: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between Financial 
Arrangements objects/events within the Resource Endowments IIE and the creation of 
cognitive legitimacy. 
Proposition 8c: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between Human 
Competence Pool objects/events within the Resource Endowments IIE and the creation of 
cognitive legitimacy. 
Proposition 9a: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between consideration of 
creating a firm and new firm creation. 
Proposition 9b: Prize competitions are a positive moderator to motivate an existing 
firm from another industry to begin initial activities in the new industry. 
Proposition 9c: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between the processes of 
initial firm activity and pre-production activity. 
Proposition 10: Prize competitions are a positive moderator between pre-production 
operations and the establishment and accumulation of cognitive legitimacy. 
